No. 40

SURVEY

A JOURNAL of SOVIET and EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

Khrushchev and the 22nd Congress *H. T. Willetts*

Soviet Foreign Policy *John Keep*

Albania, Mirror of Conflict *J. F. Brown*

Universities in East Germany *Rudolf Reinhardt*

Russian Poetry Today *K. Zelinski*

Soviet Literary Attitudes *Ronald Hingley*

Hungary Five Years After: Contributions by Paul Ignotus, Anthony Rhodes, George Urban, Thomas Schreiber, Peter Kende, George Kemeny, Tibor Meray and others

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Published on behalf of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and printed by The Eastern Press, Ltd., of London and Reading

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SURVEY

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No. 40 **January 1962**

Editor: Walter Z. Laqueur **Associate Editor: Leopold Labedz**

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Editorial and business offices, Summit House, 1–2 Langham Place, London, W.1.
Subscription rates £1 0 0 or 3 dollars a year, post free. Single copies, one dollar.
American Distributors: Eastern News Distributors Inc., 306 West 11th Street, New York 14, with whom subscriptions may be entered.

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KHRUSHCHEV AND THE TWENTY-SECOND CONGRESS

H. T. Willetts

SOME 5,000 Soviet citizens met in the Kremlin's new hall of congresses on 17 October 1961 for nearly a fortnight of relentless speechmaking. 'The best of the best', they represented the Party of the toiling masses, now almost ten million strong, and about 1,500 of them were themselves industrial or agricultural workers. They discussed a new Party programme, the first to be promulgated since 1919, amendments to the Party rules made necessary by the programme, the work of their Central Committee since 1956, and they elected the Party's governing bodies.

There were those who considered the congress to be 'the greatest event in the history of mankind', since the new programme outlines policies through which the Party will, within twenty years, complete the foundations of a new, communist civilisation. On the strength of the printed record, we might think it at least the greatest event in the career of N. S. Khrushchev, who securely dominated the occasion and celebrated yet again his accession to supremacy, and may believe that he has imposed his preferred pattern of social and political development on the Soviet Union for many years to come. Western commentators on the congress have speculated on Khrushchev's position, stressing the danger to him of the no longer hidden rift in the Sino-Soviet bloc, and, in some cases, scanning the smooth surface of the proceedings, and of the public discussions which preceded the congress, for signs that the lines of fissure extend into the CPSU itself. This has not, so far, been a very useful exercise. No one would have doubted, if never a line on it had reached the press, that the structure and armament of the forces, and the deployment of economic resources, must have been and will continue to be subjects of lively debate in the Soviet Union. But there is no evidence that, on either of these issues, Khrushchev has come up against powerful or coherent opposition, or that minority views on these questions have merged with a broader critique of Khrushchev's policies and methods.

Nonetheless, such commentators were not, for once, misdirecting their efforts: there was little in the proceedings of the congress for anyone except the kremlinologist and the student of relations within the Sino-Soviet bloc. Only two or three speakers added points of substance to Khrushchev's report on the programme. Most speakers, whether on the programme, the rules, or the work of the Central Committee since 1956, gave tame optimistic accounts of progress in their own localities or spheres of action. Criticism (except of the distant or discredited) was

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muted. Khrushchev intervened rarely. Where, on other occasions, he has charged in to chivvy his flock and bite the laggards, this time he was content to watch them browse between the electric fences. The solemnity of the occasion, and the desire to give an impression of harmony and well-being, may account for the tameness of practical discussion. It is fair to add that practical matters are nowadays regularly thrashed out in other forums. The real business of the congress was not to debate the documents submitted for formal adoption, nor yet the perfunctory airing of practical problems, but something which could not appear in so many words on the agenda : the affirmation of loyalty to Khrushchev, his past policies and further purposes, and the condemnation of his foes, foreign and domestic, real or potential.

The Khrushchev Cult

IT IS NOT YET, and probably never will be, as gross, hysterical, and ludicrous as the Stalin cult was. Some speakers at the congress, notably Mikoyan, evidently did not feel compelled to flatter, and contented themselves with acknowledgment of Khrushchev's leadership of the Central Committee, which in its collective wisdom was the author of all successes. 'The Central Committee headed by N. S. Khrushchev' was a phrase used, generally with some elaboration, by practically every speaker. ('The Central Committee and Presidium headed by Khrushchev', popular at the twenty-first congress, did not reappear.) Various speakers stressed Khrushchev's initiative both in the evolution of high policy (from the decision on virgin lands to the new programme, drafted according to Brezhnev under his immediate supervision), and at local levels in the inculcation of new techniques (from the planting of peas in narrow rows in the Ukraine to new smelting methods in Sverdlovsk). A frequently mentioned quality was Khrushchev's closeness to the people, his 'humanity and simplicity, ability to learn from the masses' (Podgorny), and his capacity to explain to them 'the most complex questions in clear and comprehensible form' (Brezhnev). He has 'personal links with thousands of people' (Ignatov). His provincial excursions solve tangled problems, and inspire the people to fresh efforts. 'His warm, heartfelt words sank deep into the hearts of the [Georgian] people and . . . awakened them to new feats of labour' (Mzhavanadze). He shows 'tireless energy', 'unshakable firmness', 'daring and resolution' (Brezhnev and others). He is an accomplished theorist as well as a man of great practical skill. He can produce a 'brilliant Marxist-Leninist analysis' (Ignatov), he 'consistently develops the teaching of Marxism-Leninism' (Brezhnev), and is also 'an enormously talented organiser' (idem). And of course he is a 'tireless fighter for peace' (passim), though 'irreconcilable to the foes of Communism' (Brezhnev). Who can doubt that he is 'an inspiring example to the whole Party, to every Communist' (Podgorny), that 'we owe our successes to the fact that at the head of our Central Committee is . . .

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N. S. Khrushchev' (Brezhnev), that 'if the great helmsman Lenin could see the course taken by the Central Committee headed by Khrushchev he would say: course correct, keep straight ahead'.

Now these eulogies are exaggerated, but they are the forms of flattery used to a hardheaded if vain boss, not the amplification of his own head-noises for the delectation of a paranoiac. Khrushchev is praised, excessively of course, but still for qualities which he does in some measure possess, for activities in which he does energetically engage. He *is* shrewd, practical, hardworking, tough. He *can* turn a phrase that goes home to a kolkhoznik. He *does* regularly visit the provinces, shaking up officialdom and looking into awkward production problems for himself. He *does* play an active role in the implementation of foreign policy ('the fight for peace'). He even creatively develops Marxism-Leninism, in the sense that he is not afraid to stretch an old formula to cover a new need.

If the exaggerations of the Khrushchev cult are not insane they are still obviously dangerous. To attribute all successes to him, to represent his activities as invariably correct and effective, is to make him, and him alone, indispensable. There must be many in the Party leadership who fear such a development. Did some such group put pressure on Khrushchev to reprove, in his reply to the debate on his reports, those who 'place a special emphasis on my personality', 'underline my role in carrying out the most important decisions of Party and Government'? It is difficult to see how a sufficiently powerful pressure group could be recruited, when so many of Khrushchev's senior colleagues, on this and earlier occasions, had joined in extolling him. Moreover, after insisting that all the praise addressed to him belonged by right to the Central Committee and the Presidium, Khrushchev went on to claim in effect that he was the unanimously accepted leader of the Central Committee; that he had 'the qualities necessary in the struggle for the Party's cause and the people's vital interests'; that he correctly understood and expressed the interests of Party and people, fought for their interests without sparing his strength, energy, or his very life, and so had the support of the whole Party and people; and that he was a true Marxist-Leninist, as intolerant of flattery as the founders themselves, 'whose services to the working class and mankind at large it would be difficult to over-estimate'. The very next day, Kozlov was speaking of Khrushchev's 'creative attention to theory, closeness to life, ability to express correctly the basic interests of the people, qualities which characterise him as a faithful Leninist, an outstanding statesman and theorist of Marxism-Leninism'. Evidently the limits of permissible praise are still rather wide.

Should we then dismiss Khrushchev's remonstrance as humbug, painfully reminiscent of Stalin's objection to 'flattery that grates on my ears'? We should probably be nearer the mark if we saw the episode as a recognition of the paradoxical truth that the personality cult is at once undesirable and necessary to the Soviet regime. It is, to begin

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with, obviously incongruous that Khrushchev, the liquidator of the Stalin cult, and the violent critic of the petty Stalin in Tirana, should himself be the object of a cult. This is perhaps an ephemeral concern. More important is the permanent danger that the cult hero may degenerate into an irresponsible and murderous autocrat. The confidence of many Western authorities that there can be no relapse into Stalinism is most probably not widely shared by senior members of the CPSU. That Stalinism is not suitable to a modern industrial society, that the Soviet people would not wish to experience it again, they no doubt recognise; but they are not likely to see in these considerations any guarantee, within the framework of their political system, against the abuse of power by an ambitious and unscrupulous clique. Most of the present Party leaders may be quite genuine in their desire for safeguards against a recrudescence of Stalinism, although they can think of nothing better in practice than incessant denunciation of it. They are no doubt consciously exaggerating when they accuse the anti-Party group of having intended to reintroduce, without modification, Stalinist methods of rule. But we must remember that what, in their denunciations, they are almost solely concerned with is 'repression' of members of the ruling class, and particularly of the Party apparatus; and that if the anti-Party group had defeated Khrushchev a purge, of uncertain extent and duration, would have been very likely. Members of the present leadership are now suggesting, not implausibly, although one of their purposes is to emphasise Khrushchev's courage, that the attempted coup in June 1957 had much better chances of success than was generally thought in the West.

Yet a monolithic system cannot dispense with an acclaimed and apparently irremovable leader. There must be a symbol of unity and continuity. Final authority must be vested in an individual, or doubt, dissension, and indiscipline would ravage the Party. Where there are no constitutional balances, no rights for political minorities, ambitious men will eagerly attach themselves to a supreme patron, and see in the continual reinforcement of his position the guarantee of their success and safety.

The Party needs an unchallenged Leader; and it would like safeguards against abuses of power on his part. Obviously, there is no fully satisfactory compromise. It may be said that the Leader cannot obtain absolute security, but must rely to a large extent on persuasion and consent, unless like Stalin he has a powerful and completely dependable apparatus of coercion at his disposal. True. But it is easy to exaggerate Khrushchev's disabilities. He must rely to some extent on persuasion, certainly, but he does not have to persuade a fixed and immovable body. He can, and does, regularly improve the composition of the ruling groups, drawing on the inexhaustible reserve of office-seekers eager to be 'persuaded'. No-one except himself must be irreplaceable. Though he could hardly mount a large-scale security

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operation within the Party, the KGB would probably act unquestioningly and efficiently in a crisis against the ringleaders of an opposition. At the same time, he can at present continue to maintain the mobility of leading cadres, to exploit the great disproportion between the number of ambitious men and the number of offices, as long as he does not frighten the Party at large. Khrushchev may very well be satisfied with this incomplete yet unchallenged authority. He seems to have struck a bargain with the 'ruling class' of office-holders and potential office-holders. He is acclaimed as Leader, and has wide powers in policy-making and in the deployment of cadres. In return, he offered the congress certain assurances against the abuse of the great powers which he has acquired, by discouraging excessive adulation, passionately condemning yet again the consequences of the Stalin cult, and promising that 'no authority', 'however great his services may have been', would be permitted to set at naught the 'opinion of those who put him in his position'.

The Anti-Party Group

AN ACKNOWLEDGED enemy, cast out from its own ranks, is very useful to the Party, and especially to its Leader. Periodic attacks on a discredited faction, and reminders of their fate, or hints that further punishment awaits them, serve as a warning to future challengers. Criticism of the leadership from any quarter can be represented as a recrudescence of the condemned heresy. Or this year's foe can be attacked indirectly, by pointed variations on the formula used against enemies long ago vanquished and impotent: a procedure which is especially useful in the early stages of a quarrel with a foreign Communist Party. It is especially useful to merge all defeated oppositions, however imperfect their sympathies and their collaboration may in fact have been, into a single unholy alliance, for all heresies can then be shown to be 'objectively' identical, however different superficially. The 'anti-Party group' fulfils these functions for Khrushchev. The distinctions between the members of this uneasy and short-lived coalition have been deliberately blurred: their motives, and their guilt, were the same.

The attacks on the anti-Party group at the congress, more savage than ever before, have again raised the question whether Khrushchev is really trying to frighten other, not yet 'unmasked', opponents in the Soviet Union, probably quite unconnected with the 'anti-Party group'. Speakers at the congress strongly denied that any opposition now exists. It could come only from sympathisers of the anti-Party group; there were no such sympathisers; therefore—QED—there was no opposition. 'The group', said Polyanski, 'has not grown by a single member since then' (June 1957). 'We do not', said Kosygin, 'mention the anti-Party group because they represent any danger to the activity of the Party. The Party is strong and united as never before'. And

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Ignatov, lapsing as Soviet leaders in decline often do into poetry, said that ' the poisonous sting of the snakes has been drawn—some of them still creep about, some hiss, but none can bite '. Molotov's stubborn attempts to communicate with the Party at large, through an article on the Lenin anniversary, sent to *Pravda* but of course not published, and a letter to the Central Committee criticising the draft of the new Party programme, were treated with scorn. He was troubling the waters in the hope of catching bony mudfish. The standard explanation of the renewed attack was that : ' We do it to show the Party and the people once more to what the cult of personality leads, what irreparable damage the anti-Party group could have inflicted on the Party and the state. We do not want the lessons of history to be forgotten ' (Kosygin).

Undoubtedly, one of the Party's intentions is to dramatise the break with the Stalinist past. Those who want to build up Khrushchev as the initiator of a new deal, and those who fear his aggrandisement, would naturally vie with each other in denunciation of Stalinism. But this is surely not the only reason for the reopening of the case against the anti-Party group.

No coherent opposition to Khrushchev can be identified, and perhaps there really is none at present, but it is by no means precluded that dissatisfaction with his leadership will grow, at least to the point where his authority is impaired, and possibly to the point when an attempt to replace him will be made. It is easy to anticipate some of the criticisms which might, if his policies run into difficulties, be made against him : that there is a risk of economic distortions implicit in the twenty-year plan, that he is responsible for the widening rift in the socialist camp and the Soviet Union's loss of authority, that his brinkmanship creates situations in which the Soviet Union might either be involved in war or suffer a serious loss of face. Nor is it difficult to imagine who would swell the chorus of discontent. A high replacement rate for leading personnel may, as was said above, help Khrushchev in the near future to keep a strong grip on the Party, but it will also cause great resentment among the dispossessed. Stalin, according to Khrushchev, destroyed three-quarters of the Central Committee elected in 1934. Khrushchev has destroyed no-one, but only half of the full members of the Central Committee elected at the last regular congress in 1956 are now members of any of the (expanded) leading Party organs, only 44 per cent of them are full members of the new Central Committee. The proportion of new men is even higher among the candidate members of the Central Committee and the Revision Commission elected by the twenty-second congress. Several once prominent supporters of Khrushchev, including some former Presidium members, have gone down in the world. Kirichenko, for instance, once considered Kozlov's most formidable rival for the succession to Khrushchev, and Belyaev, now have no place among the 395 members of the new central Party organs. The new Party rules call for the replacement of a large proportion of members of Party Committees at each election,

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in the interests of Party democracy, and of course very many of the old Central Committee members, although they are said to have supported Khrushchev to a man in 1957, were not originally his clients. Nonetheless it can have escaped no-one that Khrushchev's powers of patronage have been greatly reinforced, that he uses them boldly, and that the careers of Party and government functionaries may become more precarious than before. Some of his closest colleagues must wonder how far they are safeguarded by the provision in the Party rules that specially deserving servants of the Party may be indefinitely re-elected.

The opposition most likely to grow up then would be ' conservative ' in character, critical of Khrushchev's over-ambitious policies, and concerned to protect privileges of the bureaucracy. They would certainly find encouragement in the fact that Khrushchev is regarded as a ' revisionist ' by the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, and might look for support from that quarter. This surely partly accounts for the violence of the attacks by Khrushchev and his colleagues on the ' conservative ' anti-Party group, who ' had no positive ideas of their own ', but simply strove to prevent the adoption of bold new programmes, and to perpetuate obsolete (bureaucratic) methods of rule. This is why the undoubted ' conservative ' Molotov, now called the ' ideologist of the group ', now heads the list instead of Malenkov, who was Khrushchev's most dangerous enemy, but was obviously eclectic in his policies and is silent. This is why, although ' dogmatism ' and ' revisionism ' were till lately spoken of as deviations in opposite directions, the group is now called ' dogmatist and revisionist ': dogmatist means conservative, and revisionist is an anticipatory *tu quoque* meaning ' likely to call Khrushchev revisionist '. The specific criticisms which Molotov is said to have made recently are certainly of a conservative nature. Just as he once implied that much remained to be done before the construction of socialism could be completed, so now he accuses Khrushchev of underestimating the difficulties of building communism. Khrushchev's foreign policy, he believes, is based on an over-estimation of the possibility of prolonged peaceful coexistence with capitalism, and entails a risk of dangerous concessions to the capitalist world. Molotov's implied practical prescriptions—more cautious and gradual economic and social developments at home, and in foreign policy concentration on strengthening the socialist camp and non-co-operation with capitalist countries —would obviously appeal to conservatives in the Soviet Union and to the arch-dogmatists in Peking.

Khrushchev and some of those around him are also eager to elaborate the official account of the Stalin period, to make the leaders of the anti-Party group the scapegoats for crimes in which all who held high office in the late thirties were Stalin's accomplices, and to develop the fiction of a ' healthy Leninist nucleus ' in the Central Committee, which survived the Stalin period to re-establish Leninist normality under the leadership of Khrushchev (' the staunch Leninist ', ' the continuer of Lenin's work ').

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Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, it is now said, 'exploited Stalin's weak side' for careerist reasons, cynically fabricated anti-Soviet plots, sent great numbers of loyal Party members to their deaths, and mocked at those who tried to warn Stalin and Molotov of the consequences of their actions (presumably 'the loyal Leninist nucleus'). Molotov formulated Stalin's theoretical justification for the great purge: that class warfare can become more acute even after the building of socialism. These three, and Voroshilov, who bore a heavy share of the guilt for the execution of Tukhachevsky and other military leaders, fought against Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinisation because they feared that they would be hauled to account when the Party found out about their crimes.

No doubt Malenkov is guilty of destroying Belo-Russian, Armenian, and Leningrad communists, Kaganovich of bloody purges in the Ukraine and elsewhere, Molotov of signing away the lives of innocent men who sought his protection, and Voroshilov at least of conniving at the murder of the generals. No doubt the indictment could be greatly expanded. But few can find the gradually evolving official account of the Stalin terror satisfactory. Who can believe that 'loyal Leninists' warned Stalin and lived on in high office? Who can believe that the Party did not realise how many innocent people were slaughtered, and who among the leaders shared Stalin's guilt? Perhaps Khrushchev may, as is claimed, have hampered Kaganovich's efforts to launch a new purge after the war in the Ukraine. But in 1937, when according to the old Bolshevik Lazurkina, a veteran of the concentration camps, Zhdanov 'looked at her with his cruel eyes' and forbade her to intercede for an innocent man, who was Zhdanov's counterpart in Moscow, also in the throes of the great purge? Whose arrival somewhat later in Kiev marked the beginning of a 'proper struggle for the destruction and eradication of counter-revolutionary nests in the Ukraine'? (*History of the Ukraine*: Short Course, Kiev, 1940.) The youngest member of the CPSU probably knows the answer.

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Doctrine and Reality

John Keep

The Role of Ideology

SOVIET thinking on international affairs is compounded of two elements that at first sight appear mutually incompatible: dogmatic adherence to preconceived ideological tenets and realistic calculation of Soviet interests in the light of the prevailing balance of power. In almost any given field where the Soviet Union and the Western Powers are in conflict these two elements are present in varying degrees. The importance that should be attached to either in a particular situation is clearly a matter for detailed study in the light of all the available relevant information. The object of this article is to consider the tendencies at present operating in one direction or the other—i.e., towards greater dogmatism or greater realism—in the light of the latest authoritative definition of the 'general line' of Soviet foreign policy, given by Khrushchev in his report to the XXII Party Congress.

At the outset it should perhaps be said that, although most Western analysts agree in placing considerable emphasis on ideological factors in the formulation of Soviet policy, opinions vary sharply when it is a matter of assessing the other factors involved. A representative of one school of thought is Professor Goodman, who, in a recent comprehensive study entitled *The Soviet Design for a World State* (1960), stresses the continuity of purpose that has animated the Soviet leaders since 1917. He sees Marxism-Leninism not simply as a philosophy—a prism, as it were, through which they perceive and interpret the pattern of events—but as a guide to practical activity, determining the day-to-day 'operative goals' of Soviet diplomacy. Proponents of this view hold that the Soviet leaders mean every word they say when they proclaim the invincibility of the communist system and their own unremitting determination to bring about the doom of 'imperialism', so making it possible to establish a 'world state' on the Soviet model. They point out that the Soviet leaders see themselves as engaged in a struggle which they expect to last for an entire historical epoch, a conflict fought out simultaneously on several planes with a degree of violence varying according to the dictates of expediency. The zealous communist makes no compromise except as a tactical manoeuvre designed to outwit the class enemy; he relates all his actions, however trivial they may be in themselves, to the ultimate goal, whereby they gain in his eyes a supreme validation. In this way he translates abstract theory into concrete revolutionary action.

Other observers of the Soviet scene, while conceding that there is much force in these arguments, tend to believe that they relate only to part of the picture, and that in fact an important role in framing Soviet

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policy is played by hidden motivations of which even its authors may not themselves be fully aware. Men, we are told, seldom act in accordance with the dictates of reason, and least of all can we expect rational calculation of self-interest from those committed in advance to a transcendental creed. Ideological prejudice may obscure the policy-maker's field of vision, leading him, for example, to overestimate his own strength and overlook or minimise factors favourable to his opponent which he finds difficult to explain. Some will argue that concern for national interest, or even for the well-being of those they govern, can cause men committed to a programme of world revolution to modify their goals in practice while obstinately holding to them in theory. The rulers of a powerful country can hardly help being conscious of its historical traditions and interests: was not Stalin's policy influenced very materially by the heritage of tsarist days, and did he not at times oblige foreign communist parties to commit virtual hara-kiri for the sake of the 'fatherland of the international proletariat'? The situation, it is claimed, has changed radically since Lenin envisaged Soviet Russia simply as a base for world revolution; and although Soviet leaders would fervently deny it, there exists an inherent conflict—one writer speaks of 'a flagrant contradiction'—between the interests of the USSR as a Great Power and the aim of world communism.[1] As a result Soviet policy tends to veer between two poles, one 'dogmatic' and expansionist, and the other 'realistic' or conscious of the national interest; in most situations the Party leadership has a fairly clear choice between two alternative courses of action. One observer has put forward the view that the motive force of Soviet policy today is a 'Great-Power dynamic', which has taken the place of the 'revolutionary dynamic' of earlier times: 'Mr. Khrushchev is exploiting the world's trouble spots less with the aim of obtaining limited victories for communism (though he would not disdain these if he could get them cheap and without risk) than with the aim of asserting the claims of the Soviet Union as a Power to be taken into consideration and actively consulted on all matters throughout the globe. . . . In a sense we are back in the old immediate post-war days, when what Stalin really wanted was to establish the Soviet Union on a parity with the United States as a global arbiter.'[2] Whether the pendulum has in fact swung so far in one direction is perhaps arguable; but there seems no reason to doubt the existence of the pendulum. One might perhaps state the problem facing the Soviet Union thus: in a world rapidly gaining in political sophistication, a crude expansionist policy must undermine the Soviet Union's efforts to gain international goodwill by presenting itself as a satiated peace-loving power and could lead to nuclear self-immolation; yet an abandonment of expansionist policies would involve a radical revision of the ideology, and thus serious difficulties for the Party leadership at home and within the Soviet bloc.

[1] V. V. Aspaturyan, 'Soviet foreign policy', in: *Foreign policy in world politics*, ed. R. C. Macridis (N.Y., 1958).
[2] E. Crankshaw, in *The Observer* (London), 16 April 1961.

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Internal Evolution and Soviet Foreign Policy

This brings us to one of the more familiar conundrums of Sovietology: the relationship between internal change and the orientation of foreign policy. At a popular level the proposition is often advanced that, if communism is largely the fruit of poverty and ignorance, its appeal may be expected to decline in the measure that these evils are overcome; as material conditions improve, Soviet citizens will acquire a vested interest in their new relative prosperity and be unwilling to see it jeopardised by an adventuristic foreign policy; the spread of education, even of a narrow specialised kind, may stimulate independent thought on political issues, despite the obstacles placed in its way; and thus the regime might grow more mellow under pressure from below. To the question how those discontented with official policy could make their views known, the more optimistic observers point to the emergence since Stalin's death of something approaching a 'public opinion' in the USSR which, although lacking any organised means of self-expression, can nevertheless exert a certain indirect negative influence upon the policies adopted.

In this connection it is relevant to consider the difficulties met with by Party propagandists in their constant endeavours to raise the status of the Party and make its ideology meaningful to the ordinary citizen who, after more than forty years of indoctrination, feels somewhat apathetic towards teachings that do not impinge directly upon his own life-situation. The triumph of socialism at home and abroad, which may have inspired his grandfather in Lenin's day, no longer affects him deeply. He can be approached more readily by appeals to his national pride and enthusiasm for technological progress, and to his hope of further material improvements. Hence the Party has shifted the emphasis of its propaganda from long-term objectives and abstract truths to matters of more immediate practical importance. Successes in all spheres of endeavour, from a rise in the output of steel to the launching of a spaceship, are officially attributed to the inherent virtues of the socialist system, even though these feats may bear only a remote relationship to the Party's expressed goal of an egalitarian communist society. In this way the ideologists seek to justify the Party's continued monopoly of power in the eyes of the general public and to maintain the élan of the Party members themselves.

Some commentators consider that this apathy does not present the leadership with an insuperable problem.[3] The totalitarian apparatus remains in being, and is well able to keep any opposition from becoming articulate. Indeed, it can be argued that the Party is in fact a good deal stronger today than it was in the Stalin era. The various measures taken in recent years to advance popular well-being may have led many normally non-political people to extend more than grudging recognition to the regime, and to give their approval automatically to its foreign as well as its domestic policy. They are in any case under heavy pressure

[3] P. E. Mosely, 'Soviet myths and realities', in *Foreign Affairs* (Washington, D.C.), April 1961.

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to conform to the official view of international events, which depicts the Soviet Union in an attractive and flattering light as the acknowledged leader of the world's peoples. The Party can point to a number of real achievements in the international sphere to justify its claim that it is following a truly 'correct' Marxist-Leninist path; such setbacks as the Soviet Union may experience can scarcely be appreciated by a public virtually deprived of access to uncontrolled information media.

Professor Ulam has advanced the hypothesis that, as the USSR comes nearer to solving its economic and social problems, it may become increasingly liable to the temptation to intensify its proselytising activities abroad. For the Party is constantly faced with the need to legitimise itself by producing fresh evidence of revolutionary transformation; and if it is unable to do so with reference to home affairs, it might prefer to seek triumphs in the foreign-policy field. In this way increased prosperity could lead to results the reverse of those expected by the optimists: greater militancy in Soviet dealings with the non-communist world.[4] This view, though somewhat alarming, is not an unreasonable one; but at least two objections could be raised to it. First, the scope for domestic improvements (or quasi-improvements) seems almost limitless—consider the housing situation alone. Space exploration could probably offer abundant opportunities for 'firsts' which could be presented to the public as evidence of Soviet superiority in its competition with the West for prestige victories. Second, the question of the possible political consequences of increased prosperity should surely be seen within an overall international context, i.e. taking into account the degree of resistance met with by the USSR in its drive for expansion. External opposition will encourage the regime to seek its successes at home; conversely, the stronger the position of pro-Soviet groups outside the bloc, the less hope there would be of any enforced modification of foreign policy in response to the pressure of public opinion. In the last resort, it is the East-West balance that is the determining factor.

Intra-Bloc Relations: The Trend to Diversity

Before going on to consider the effect of the East-West balance upon the framing of Soviet policy, it is worth looking briefly at the other two of the three areas into which Soviet spokesmen now divide the globe: have developments here led them to assume a less dogmatic position than was formerly the case?

Professor Brzezinski has recently pointed out that, although the cohesion of the communist bloc still depends in the last resort on Soviet armed might, the last few years have seen a considerable modification of the relationship between the USSR and its European clients. Under Stalin the whole bloc was ruled virtually as the personal empire of the dictator; now, however, inter-State and inter-Party relations have to a

[4] A. Ulam, 'Soviet ideology and foreign policy', in *World Politics*, January 1959; cf. also his 'The new face of Soviet totalitarianism', in ibid., April 1960.

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certain extent become institutionalised : that is to say, great efforts have been made, and still are being made, to raise the prestige of the satellite regimes and to give the impression that they enjoy equality of status with the Soviet Union. A great deal of this effort is of course mere window-dressing, but in Professor Brzezinski's estimation there is also some real substance behind the formality. One small pointer to the changes taking place is the fact that serious studies are now being undertaken in the USSR in an effort to define the juridical relationship that should exist between members of what is now proudly called ' the socialist commonwealth of nations '.[5]

However, in this commonwealth (and perhaps not only in this one) some members tend to be more equal than others. In fact there has emerged within the bloc an ' in-group ', i.e., countries with a more privileged status and whose opinions carry greater weight. The old monolithic unity of the Soviet bloc is now a thing of the past. No organisation has been created to take the place of the Cominform, dissolved in 1956. The present system of periodical general conferences and bilateral talks between Party leaders in the bloc countries does not in practice ensure 100 per cent Soviet control over the affairs of the ' socialist camp ' as a whole, and despite official assurances that this system ' corresponds to the present stage of development of the international labour movement ', one can hardly believe that the Soviet leaders are particularly content with it.

This does not of course mean that the bloc is in imminent danger of collapse ; but it does mean that several centres of power exist, and that Moscow is obliged to treat the views held in the other capitals with a certain amount of respect. This ' polycentrism ', as it has been called, may to some extent represent an accession of strength, in that it provides a safety-valve for the ventilation of pressures that might otherwise find a more violent outlet. It helps to bolster the standing of the satellite regimes in the eyes of their own peoples, but at the same time it poses a challenge to the most deeply-cherished Leninist principle of organisation : that there must be a single centre of authority competent to determine ' the truth ', to lay down what interpretation is to be placed upon commonly-held ideological concepts. It is generally held that a totalitarian system cannot afford to tolerate alternative centres of power and allegiance, lest this lead to the expression of ' revisionist ' or other heretical opinions, thus undermining the power of the leadership, based as it is on the claim to be virtually infallible in matters of doctrine.

The most acute problem is of course the Sino-Soviet dispute. This has now reached a new stage in its development, in which the protagonists are openly identified instead of being merely referred to indirectly. The quarrel extends far beyond the loyalties of Hoxha's Albania, on which the spotlight was focused. It concerns the whole orientation of bloc policy towards the Western and uncommitted worlds. It is now clearer

[5] S. Brzezinski, ' The organisation of the communist camp ', in *World Politics*, January 1961.

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than ever that the climate of Sino-Soviet relations is intimately linked to the state of the East-West balance.

The lesson that this teaches seems to be that there exists within the Soviet bloc a natural tendency towards the strengthening of centrifugal forces and the emergence of different varieties of ' national communism ', with local leaders developing a sense of pride in their own achievements and seeking to maximise them for their own sake. Such trends are, as one would expect, most evident in countries where communist regimes have emerged largely as the result of an indigenous revolutionary process. But even where they were originally imposed by external pressure there appears to be a tendency for them to strike root locally—to ' become acclimatised ', as it were. They come to derive their motive force from such domestic support as they possess instead of simply from their leaders' knowledge that the Soviet Union is ready to intervene on their behalf. Where these leaders were once bound to the Soviet Union by fear of dangers jointly shared, by a consciousness that they must swim or sink together, with the passage of time the bond of interest tends to be replaced by a less compulsive one. Instead of being conveniently subservient dependants, they become allies whose aspirations and claims can often prove embarrassing. One day Moscow finds itself presented with, say, a demand from Poland for aid in realising some cooperative project which to orthodox eyes smacks of opportunism; the next day there comes a call from, say, the East Germans for political or military support over some issue which does not immediately affect Soviet security interests. Where once the Soviet leaders could simply command, they now have to cajole, exhort, or reprimand; unity ceases to be something that can be taken for granted; it has to be worked for by continual effort.

In this situation Moscow may perhaps be finding it less easy to base its foreign policy on the simple ideological concept of two opposing camps. The tendency may rather be for it to judge each country, whether communist or non-communist, according to an empirical criterion: the degree to which it can be persuaded to serve Soviet interests. In this way something approaching normal practices of diplomatic behaviour may come to be adopted in the Soviet Union's relations with the other countries of the bloc; it has to manoeuvre between them for advantage, or balance the claims of an ally against those of an uncommitted country —or what it considers to be the interests of the bloc as a whole in its struggle against the West.

The Uncommitted Countries: The Search for a Principle

The same tendency towards less dogmatic ways of thinking can be observed in the evolution of Soviet relations with the uncommitted countries, although the issues here are different. In this field the problem is one of inventing an acceptable ' Leninist ' ideological framework to which practical policies can be related.

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Lenin himself was always first and foremost a European. It is true that towards the end of his life he came to attach considerable importance to revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries of the East; but he remained convinced that in Europe the communists had suffered only a temporary setback, and that Europe was still the decisive theatre in the world struggle. His remarks on Asian problems were relatively infrequent and remained general in tone. This was only to be expected, for with Soviet Russia as weak and isolated as it was in the early 1920s any specific guidance on revolutionary tactics would have been out of place. It was only after World War II, and particularly after the communist victory in China, that the Soviet Union found itself faced with the practical problem of working out its relations with emergent national movements in the Afro-Asian world. This had to be done empirically, not only because Lenin's ideas on the subject were inadequate but also because he greatly underestimated the length of time necessary to build up an effective communist movement in a backward colonial society. Looking at Asia through the distorting mirror of the Russian nationalities problem, he tended to assume that in countries such as India or Egypt the revolution would take much the same course as it had done in Bashkiria or Tajikistan, where the local nationalist forces were relatively weak and the communists strong enough to eliminate them and impose their own rule. He did not foresee that the Western Powers would be able to preserve their position in non-Soviet Asia for another generation or so, or that they would then be succeeded by relatively well-established indigenous elites, able and willing to preserve their countries' independence in the face of communist pressure.

In this situation the only policy that the Soviet Union could adopt was a blatantly opportunistic one, seizing upon allies wherever they were to be found, regardless of their social or political credo: even feudal potentates were hailed as progressive if it was believed in Moscow that they were anti-Western and could help to expand the scope of Soviet influence. The 'New Colonial Policy', as it might be called, was evolved from about 1952 onwards, and consisted in effect of offers to the 'national bourgeoisie' in almost all the uncommitted countries of diplomatic and moral support—and, of course, economic aid. It was given doctrinal sanction by the XX Party Congress, when Khrushchev put forward the concept of a 'peace zone' embracing the socialist countries and the neutrals (using the term in the Soviet sense, i.e. a non-communist country that followed the Soviet lead against the West).

These tactics, associated specifically with Khrushchev, may well have recalled to the minds of experienced party members the somewhat similar views of the 'rightist' Bukharin, who in the early 1920s was arguing that Soviet Russia could attract the colonial countries to her orbit by the sheer superiority of her economic and social system, thus bringing about a fundamental shift in the balance of world power by more or less peaceful means. There may well be some persons in positions of power and influence today who remain critical of this policy of granting aid to

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' bourgeois nationalists ' in exchange for that most insubstantial commodity, international good will. These ' leftists ' or ' dogmatists ', as they would be labelled in Soviet parlance, would doubtless prefer to see economic assistance granted more selectively, and made more overtly dependent on the political line followed by the recipient country—or, better still, confined to the countries of the communist bloc. That the Chinese leaders would have very good material reasons of their own for endorsing such views is fairly evident.

Relations with the uncommitted world are thus a field that offers plenty of scope for the realists and the dogmatists to jockey for advantage, with victory going to those whose policy seems likely to promise best results. Khrushchev can certainly claim that the spread of anti-Western sentiment in the Afro-Asian world is a tribute to the success of his line, and he did indeed stress this argument fairly strongly in his report to the Congress. But his critics may perhaps still feel that this brings the Soviet Union itself few concrete advantages. From their point of view the growth of neutralism, while gratifying in so far as it embarrasses the West, also conceals a latent danger ; for any tendency by the uncommitted countries to draw closer together, thus forming an alternative centre of attraction for the newly-emergent peoples, gravely threatens the Soviet Union's aspirations to play the part of leader in the anti-imperialist struggle. This appears to be borne out by the contemptuous attitude adopted towards the Belgrade conference, which suggests a sense of disappointment that the neutralist nations have been less accommodating towards Soviet ambitions than had been hoped. At the congress Khrushchev sorrowfully testified to the strength of ' neo-colonialism ' : ' Almost half the countries that have emerged as a result of the disintegration of the colonial system are shackled by burdensome unequal treaties.' Moscow shed no tears at the secession of Syria from the UAR. Soviet policy remains flexible, but the line seems likely to harden proportionately as the uncommitted countries succeed in consolidating their internal and international position and in resisting communist encroachments.

East-West Relations : The Changing Temper

Hitherto we have considered the stimuli to realistic thinking arising from domestic evolutionary trends, disparities within the communist orbit, and the facts of life within the Afro-Asian world. But all of these have, it seems, been less important than the nuclear stalemate between East and West. There seems little doubt that the most significant development in the history of the Soviet Union during the last decade has been the acquisition of what the strategists call ' a deterrent capability '. This is not an event to which a definite date can be attached : it was in August 1953 that Malenkov announced to the Supreme Soviet that the United States no longer had a monopoly of the hydrogen bomb, and in August 1957

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that it was officially stated that the Soviet Union had ICBMs capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads and delivered accurately to any point in the globe; but one may doubt whether either of these dates was decisive. The really important moment, as H. Dinerstein points out,[6] occurred when the Soviet leaders became aware that they had the means to annihilate a potential adversary—at a price—in the event of war.

But Soviet spokesmen have been exceedingly shy to recognise in public the facts of life in the 'missile age'—a term which, it is worth noting, finds no favour in communist writings. According to the official view, this is the age, not of the missile or of any other technological device, but of 'the further strengthening of the socialist countries, the intensification of the crisis of imperialism, and the unfolding of the national liberation movement in a number of countries'. The clumsiness of this definition should not blind us to its significance: it lays emphasis unambiguously upon political phenomena. It might be said that such emphasis on the primacy of the political factor was Lenin's major contribution to political thought—in contrast to Marx, who stressed the economic aspect of human affairs as determinant. To the Leninist the essential fact about an individual is not the class to which he belongs, his relation to the means of production, but his attitude towards the Communist Party, i.e., on which side of the ideological barricades he is to be found. Some passages in Marx's writings can be read as implying that changes in technology are the basic stimulus to progress: it is they that cause changes in the production relations, and so indirectly also in the political institutions and ideas of a given society. But such an interpretation is unacceptable to Soviet communists brought up to believe that 'there is no fortress the Bolsheviks cannot conquer'. This voluntaristic approach has become so firmly ingrained in the Soviet official mind that, after more than 40 years of power, the leaders of the USSR cannot bear to admit that their will could be limited by some mechanical contrivance. They have been able to harness nuclear power to their political strategy, but they cannot accommodate it to their ready-made dogmatic philosophy.

Although the men in Moscow have been at pains to uphold the comforting image of the Soviet Union marching on steadily towards its predestined communist goal, more or less unperturbed by nuclear alarms, they too have been obliged to modify their assumptions. During the 1953–57 interregnum period both Malenkov and Mikoyan stated publicly that a modern nuclear war would result in 'the destruction of civilisation' (i.e. whether capitalist or socialist); the implication was that weapon developments had ruled out war as an instrument of policy, since no country would willingly commit suicide. There was therefore, they argued, no alternative to peaceful coexistence—a term they chose not to define too carefully.

[6] *War and the Soviet Union*, N.Y., 1959.

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Coexistence and the Congress

Although it does not figure in the indictment drawn up against the so-called 'anti-party group', one of the charges which Khrushchev levelled against his opponents in 1957 may well have been that they were guilty of 'defeatism'. In any case he has consistently maintained in public statements that a nuclear war would lead to the destruction of capitalism alone, on the grounds that the Soviet Union was allegedly better prepared than the United States to withstand an all-out attack; and in his report to the Congress he emphasised once again that 'everything necessary has been done to ensure the *superiority* of our country in defence' (my italics). As in the past, the dangers of war are exploited for the maximum propaganda advantage, but at the same time the traditional thesis is reasserted that the danger allegedly arises solely from actions by the West. No further modification has been made to Leninist teaching other than the repudiation of the idea of the inevitability of war, announced by Khrushchev nearly six years ago. Moreover, the fiction is still maintained that this modification is the result exclusively of political developments—the strengthening of the 'socialist camp' and the growth of the 'world peace movement'—whereas in reality it ensues from the existence of the 'balance of terror' between East and West. The latter concept, however, has never been publicly recognised in the Soviet Union.

The Congress proclaimed that the basis of Soviet foreign policy remains 'peaceful coexistence'. But, as Khrushchev frankly points out, 'peace and peaceful coexistence are not quite the same thing'. His own elucidation of the phrase is vague and contradictory. He states: 'It is not a temporary unstable armistice between two wars but the coexistence of two opposed social systems, based on mutual renunciation of war as a means of settling disputes between states'. Logically, this formula would imply that peaceful coexistence does not at present exist, but relates only to a desirable future state, since in the Soviet leader's analysis the 'imperialists', far from having 'renounced war', are portrayed as still breathing fire and thunder. But at the same time we are told that 'peaceful coexistence . . . can only be maintained and safeguarded by means of an unceasing struggle of all peoples', and that the peoples are indeed struggling in this sense; if so, then peaceful coexistence must relate to the here-and-now. This confusion is no doubt deliberate. In any case it seems reasonably clear that Khrushchev still stands by the narrow definition of the term which he gave at Novosibirsk in November 1959: the prosecution of the anti-imperialist struggle by all means short of war.

What does this signify in practice? Khrushchev's interpretation of peaceful coexistence evidently does not preclude the build-up of Soviet armed forces, the resumption of nuclear testing, or acts of brinkmanship in Berlin, Laos, and elsewhere. It is also compatible with a totally obstructive attitude towards disarmament and with the adoption of a

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most aggressive posture—but one which stops short of actual measures that, in the Soviet leader's estimation, would be likely to lead to war. He finds himself under a strong compulsion to seek major victories in order to justify his claim that 'the world socialist system is becoming a decisive factor in the development of society'. After all, it is no use proclaiming oneself the world's champion wrestler unless one can demonstrate one's muscular prowess in the ring. Neither the suggestion of further bilateral talks with the United States, nor the flexible approach to the German peace treaty deadline, indicates any readiness to work towards a détente in East-West relations. On the contrary, Khrushchev states unequivocally that 'concessions to the imperialists on matters of vital importance do not constitute a policy of peaceful coexistence, but a policy of surrender to the forces of aggression. To that we will never agree'. In other words, negotiations are envisaged which are expected to lead to concessions by the West, enforced under duress.

How is this pressure to be made effective? The nuclear balance, it would appear, leaves the Soviet Union free to apply force in two main areas. The less important of these is in the under-developed world, where active support is to be extended to 'national liberation movements'. Khrushchev is quite explicit about this: 'Warring classes have always sought the support of kindred forces from outside. For a long time the bourgeois class had an advantage in this respect . . . [but] the situation has changed since then. The people of a country who rise in struggle . . . will enjoy the support of powerful international forces possessing everything necessary for effective moral and material support'. This presumably refers in the main to local wars fought with conventional arms by local communist forces, as in Laos, with the introduction of Soviet troops envisaged only in the last resort. Such a policy inevitably obstructs to some extent the efforts made simultaneously to woo neutralist opinion, but in present circumstances it is no doubt felt that this is a risk well worth taking. The experience of the Belgrade conference must have convinced Khrushchev, if he had any doubts, that the uncommitted nations could be most easily impressed by a show of force. The setbacks administered to Soviet hopes in this sphere appear to have led to a hardened attitude towards the uncommitted world, and to have prompted the Party leader to concentrate more earnestly than ever on Europe (i.e. the German problem and other major East-West issues related to it) as the main arena in which to apply pressure.

The chief weapon here is less military than psychological. The various warlike gestures made since June 1961 are clearly designed to exploit the fear of war that exists among non-communist public opinion in the West and the reluctance of democratic governments to go too strongly against the popular mood. Khrushchev's report also shows him to be well aware of the scope for manoeuvre offered to Soviet diplomacy by the disagreements and rivalries that exist within the NATO alliance.

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It is scarcely necessary to point out that the Soviet Union enjoys considerable advantages in a psychological warfare operation of this kind, since democratic countries are in no position to reply with similar measures, and in an open society even organs of 'bourgeois' opinion can be expected to spread, if not actual sympathy for, then at least an understanding awareness of the Soviet viewpoint. Nevertheless the potential impact of the campaign is blunted by the fact that the measures which the Soviet government can take have only a limited credibility. Such a policy is thus in the last resort little more than a gigantic piece of bluff. It gives rise to two principal dangers. One is the possibility of the bluff succeeding. The other is that the victim of the bluff may demonstrate his scepticism so openly that the bluffer is impelled to raise the stakes, and to make threats more far-reaching than had originally been intended, which could lead to a miscalculation.

However serious the risks implicit in such a policy, it seems true to say that they could be much worse. Even the testing of the 50-megaton bomb, though a formidable challenge to the ideal of a peaceable world, does not in itself pose a grave threat to Western security. Certainly the threat is less grave than that which would arise from a spread in the area of Soviet power. In other words, a Soviet explosion is better than Soviet expansion.

One may go further. The latest series of nuclear tests may be seen as falling within the same category of operational devices as the space-flights of Majors Gagarin and Titov. Both are by-products of the drive for military superiority. Both are relatively harmless demonstrations of technological expertise. They apparently serve a dual purpose. On one hand they are moves in the game of bluff played by the Soviet leadership with non-communist opinion, designed to put it in a pliant frame of mind. At the same time they are means of demonstrating to the dogmatists and doubters at home (and possibly even to Khrushchev himself) that the peaceful coexistence policy, as he interprets it, does not imply a slowdown in the onward march of Soviet power. These exhibitions of nuclear and missile strength serve as a substitute for a more aggressive policy, which can no longer be pursued because it entails an unacceptably high risk of military conflict and self-annihilation. They are a means of concealing the painful fact that in the nuclear age the Soviet government no longer possesses full freedom of action in the international sphere. Khrushchev, it must be assumed, is aware of these limitations; yet he cannot afford to admit them openly, lest he incur the stigma of 'revisionism',—i.e. insufficient militancy. His sense of responsibility obliges him to heed the nuclear facts of life; but he must camouflage his realism beneath a mask of boundless self-confidence. He has to cover his retreat towards rationality by a mushroom-shaped cloud.

It could be argued that the same purpose may be served by the renewed criticism of Stalin, which prevents potential opponents of the Khrushchev line from appealing to the authority of the deceased *Vozhd*

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—although other motives are doubtless involved here as well, and there has as yet been no suggestion that Stalin was guilty of 'dogmatism' in his attitude towards the West.

In the same way the emphasis on the proximity of communism at home could be interpreted as one way of deflecting attention from the fact that the ultimate ideal of *world* communism has become more utopian than ever before: so long as nuclear arms remain in existence, it could hardly be imposed from above, while present-day trends of social evolution in the West hold out negligible hopes of fulfilment of the official Soviet prognosis: a free option for communism by the peoples themselves.

The XXII Party Congress has thus seen no substantive changes in the orientation of Soviet foreign policy. This need not surprise us: the 'general line' as evolved in 1956 has led to reasonably satisfactory results from Moscow's point of view. 'On a world scale, comrades, these six years have been good years for us'. Khrushchev's boast was exaggerated—there have been major setbacks, and the tempo of advance has been slower than he expected—but it does not fly in the face of the facts. There would therefore seem to be little advantage to be gained from embarking on a less well-charted course. Moreover, it would be hard to do so. Concern for the most basic of Soviet national interests—survival—prevents Khrushchev from adopting a more aggressive course towards the West.

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ALBANIA, MIRROR OF CONFLICT

J. F. Brown

THE sensational denunciation of the Albanian Communist Party leaders by Khrushchev at the 22nd CPSU congress was the climax of some 18 months of bitter dispute between Tirana and Moscow, and of over six years of serious Albanian misgivings over Soviet policy. In what follows an attempt will be made to outline the course of the Albanian deviation, describe the main charges and counter-charges during and after the 22nd Soviet congress, and examine the main implications of the Albanian affair, which has led to the severance of Soviet-Albanian diplomatic relations.

Albanian uneasiness, to put it mildly, over the policy of Khrushchev was awakened in 1955 with the beginnings of international détente in general and the Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia in particular. The 20th Soviet Party congress in February 1956 gave added strength to the growing distrust of the new Soviet leader. In the space of a few months Enver Hoxha and his colleagues saw their deadly enemy, Tito, at least partly rehabilitated, and Stalin, the man they considered their posthumous protector against this enemy, cast down and disgraced. Stalinism, as a concept, had meant to Hoxha the ruthlessness which kept his own regime in power at home, and the implacability towards Yugoslavia which had kept the foreign enemy at bay. The denunciation of Stalinism meant his exposure to revisionists from within and without, both, however, being directed from Belgrade. The fact that, in April 1956, he had to put down a serious 'revisionist plot' against himself only convinced him of his own wisdom and Khrushchev's folly. The Hungarian Revolution naturally confirmed him in these opinions.

But, thoroughly alarmed though he was, he made no attempt to take open issue with Khrushchev. He has since said that he complained at the time of Khrushchev's 'unilateral' action in rehabilitating Tito, but there was no sign of this from the outside. He contented himself with paying lip-service to destalinisation and with modifying his attacks on Yugoslavia until the Hungarian Revolution.

The reason why the Albanian deviation was not then brought into the open was that Hoxha, desperate character though he is, at key moments has always realised that discretion is the better part of valour. Albania, at all times and in everything, has always needed a patron. In 1956 there was no patron in sight. He had to wait over three years before he found one.

China's open hostility to Khrushchev's foreign policy (and her confidence to express it) began to show itself in the autumn of 1959 after the Soviet leader's visit to the United States. His visit to Peking immediately afterwards was obviously designed to allay Chinese misgivings. In this it failed conspicuously. Hoxha had found his patron.

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It was from this time (October–November 1959) that Albanian speeches, broadcasts, and articles took on a 'Chinese' tone on questions of international policy. It was a matter of emphasis rather than fact, but it was there. The first striking sign that something might be wrong with Albania came in June 1960, when neither Hoxha nor Shehu attended the Communist 'little summit' in Bucharest. Hysni Kapo, Albania's No. 3 man, went. His published speech was also 'Chinese' in emphasis but implied no open breach. There was, however, a secret session in Bucharest, and there the differences were evidently profound and bitter. The Chinese delegate Peng Chen was backed solidly by Kapo in arguments which apparently echoed the now famous *Red Flag* article of the preceding April. It was here that the Albanian deviation probably began in earnest. On this point both Khrushchev and Hoxha are in unique agreement. Here Albanian anger, pent up for four years, exploded. Peking's cause became Tirana's case. The dispute was on.

SHORTLY before the Bucharest meeting an incident occurred which may have persuaded Hoxha to throw caution to the winds. At the end of May 1960 Khrushchev had given an interview to the Greek Liberal leader, Sophocles Venizelos, in which, as Venizelos was to report later, he had promised to discuss the question of internal autonomy for Northern Epirus with the Albanian delegation at the forthcoming Bucharest conference. Hoxha must have heard of this very quickly and it may have finally decided him on desperate measures. Combined with his placating the Yugoslavs, Khrushchev, in the interests of his 'peace offensive' in the Balkans, was now cultivating the Greeks—all at the expense of Albania's national integrity. Nationalist concern is the main reason for the entire Albanian deviation.

In the interval between Bucharest and the September session of the UN General Assembly in New York, the Albanians continued to give evidence in articles and broadcasts of their affinity with the Chinese line. Delegations of many kinds plied between the two countries with notable frequency and the most laudatory protestations of friendship were uttered. In early September the first sign of the strain which the new Albanian policy was imposing on the Party showed itself. It was announced that Liri Belishova had been dismissed from her Politburo and Secretariat positions, and Koco Tashko from the chairmanship of the Central Audit Commission. Later, in November, Maqo Como, Belishova's second husband, was replaced as Minister of Agriculture. These three were considered pro-Soviet and Mikoyan, at the 22nd Soviet Party congress, confirmed this.

For the special session of the UN General Assembly in September Hoxha again stayed away. He sent Shehu, who was cold-shouldered by his Communist peers but said nothing from the platform which caused concern. He was, however, only biding his time. In his report to the Albanian Parliament on 25 October, he attacked the Zhivkov proposal

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for the drastic reduction of arms in the Balkans as a prelude to worldwide disarmament, and the Gomulka proposal for freezing of military bases on foreign soil. He did not mention the two leaders by name but left no doubt to whom he was referring.

This was on the eve of the Communist summit conference of eighty-one parties in Moscow. To this meeting Hoxha went, along with Shehu. What happened there is well known. Hoxha, in a speech of which a fragment has since been revealed, vilified Khrushchev in a manner which evidently embarrassed even China, and Shehu made a few well-chosen remarks which were brought up against him at the 22nd congress. The two left early and have not set foot in Moscow since.

AFTER this, Albanian relations with the Soviet bloc deteriorated steadily, if not too obviously; with China they rapidly and ostentatiously became closer. The first official admission that there had been trouble at the 1960 Moscow conference came from Ulbricht. Addressing the SED Central Committee on his return, he was quoted by *Neues Deutschland* (18 December) as saying that the Albanians had advanced 'dogmatist and sectarian' arguments at the conference. In its New Year message to the Albanian Party the CPSU, in a classic venture into esoteric communication, omitted to include the word 'comrades'. Immediately after, the Bulgarians referred to plain Enver Hoxha.

Later, in January, in perhaps a last attempt to bring Hoxha either to heel or to reason, Moscow sent the experienced *apparatchik*, Josif Shikin, as ambassador to Tirana. (His appointment had been announced the previous November.) His task was to smooth relations; the twice postponed Albanian Party congress was due in February and this may have been considered the last hope for a change in attitude. The Soviet delegate's speech to the congress was admonitory, but it was the Polish delegate, Nowak, who explicitly appealed to the Albanians to mend their ways. But the congress changed nothing; the leadership and the line remained the same. Hoxha continued his tactic of swearing eternal fealty to the Soviet Union, but on his own terms. Several speakers, notably Shehu, carried on an almost open ideological wrangle with Moscow; the Soviet delegation was treated as a poor relation compared with the Chinese; Khrushchev was treated as an unperson. The differences between the Albanian speeches and the Soviet and Soviet-bloc speeches were all too clear. Finally there was the famous 'plot' which Hoxha now revealed. This, he said, had been hatched the previous autumn by some Albanian traitors inside and outside the country, by the Yugoslavs, the Greeks, and the American Sixth Fleet. Most outside observers agree in believing that this was actually a Soviet plot to unseat Hoxha. It is certainly true that Hoxha's disclosure met with virtually no response from the Soviet bloc and that some of the culprits, who were later given a Stalinist show trial, had had very close Soviet connections.

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The congress probably set the seal on any hopes of bringing about a change in Albania. But still there was no open condemnation from Moscow. Only Togliatti, from Rome, voiced his disapproval in the April issue of *Rinascità*, a fact of which he has recently boasted. Other evidence pointed to the widening gulf. Both Hoxha and Shehu failed to attend the important Warsaw Pact conference in Moscow at the end of March. Speaking to the trade union congress in Tirana in late April, Rita Marko, a prominent Politburo member, expounded a fire-eating theory of international relations which was diametrically opposed to ' peaceful coexistence '.

In early June 1961 the eight Soviet submarines left Valona, and Albania's strategic value to the Soviet bloc came to an abrupt end. But perhaps more important was the steady withdrawal throughout the whole year of Soviet and Soviet bloc money and men from Albania. Having failed to browbeat and overthrow Hoxha, Khrushchev obviously hoped to grind his pitiful economy to a standstill. He had actually begun to do this in the autumn of 1959, since this was one of the bitter complaints Hoxha had made in Moscow. The Soviet, Czechoslovak, and East German governments blocked the credits they had promised to Albania, and later the technicians and specialists they had sent began to be withdrawn. The East German specialists, for example, were all ordered home by 31 August at the latest. By that date probably all East European technicians had gone. In ordinary circumstances all this would have brought collapse. But Hoxha turned to China. At the end of April it was announced that the Peking government had agreed to supply Albania with credits to the value of about 125 million dollars. Chinese specialists began to move in, perhaps a bit slowly for the Albanians' liking, but at least they were coming. East Europeans became conspicuous by their absence. In their place came the first trickle of Hoxha's new allies and protectors. Throughout the whole year the exchange of compliments and delegations between Tirana and Peking had been multiplying.

Looking at the situation now, with the wisdom of hindsight, one can see that it was heading for a showdown. From 3 to 5 August a Warsaw Pact conference was held in Moscow to discuss the German problem. A communiqué issued at the end stated that it had been attended by the First Party Secretaries of the Warsaw Pact countries. Yet a subsequent Albanian announcement made it pretty clear that Hoxha had not attended and that whoever had led the Albanian delegation had not got much further than the front door. The following month (September) there was no Albanian representative in Pankow at the celebrations of the twelfth anniversary of the GDR. In October there were no East European representatives at the fifth congress of the Albanian Women's Union. A few days earlier Radio Moscow, in Albanian, had given its listeners a lecture on the evils of the personality cult. The stage was being set for the events in Moscow.

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THE fact that neither Hoxha nor Shehu went to Moscow for the congress was not, of course, surprising. The fact that no Albanian delegation at all was present for the opening was sensational. Still it was not sensational enough to lead people to expect what happened. It was generally expected that Khrushchev would continue to ignore his puny tormentor. Albania after all was saluted in the slogans of the congress in just the same way as the rest of the communist-ruled countries.

But on 17 October Khrushchev attacked the Albanian leaders. This was the first direct official Soviet criticism since the dispute began. In effect Khrushchev called them unreconstructed Stalinists. They were perpetuating the cult of personality. Not only were they themselves continuing the harmful practices of the past; they were trying to get the Soviets to resurrect them, as was the anti-Party group within the Soviet Union. The Albanian leaders had waged a struggle against the 20th Party congress policy. Hoxha had given his approval to the attack on the cult of personality at the 20th and 21st Soviet Party congresses and at the third Albanian Party congress in 1956. But, Khrushchev continued:

> The facts show . . . that recently the Albanian leaders, despite their former statements and the decisions of their congress, have, without any reason, sharply altered their political course and have embarked on the road of a sharp deterioration in relations with our Party and with the USSR. They have begun to retreat from the generally agreed line of the whole world Communist movement on the most important questions of contemporaneity, which has begun to be particularly noticeable since the middle of last year.

Here Khrushchev was approximately dating the beginning of the conflict at the Bucharest conference in June 1960. He went on:

> Apparently the Albanian leaders were inwardly in disagreement with the conclusions of the conferences of fraternal parties in 1957 and in 1960 which as is known approved the resolution of the 20th Party congress. . . . Such a position is explained by the fact that they themselves, to our sorrow and regret, are repeating the methods used in our country at the time of the personality cult. . . . It is painful for us to see that ordinary Albanian Communists, the whole Albanian people . . . have to pay for the erroneous policy of their leaders. We are profoundly concerned at this situation and have insistently sought ways of overcoming our differences.

Khrushchev was doing two things here. He was confirming what was known already, and what the Albanians have since confirmed, that they did not like the 20th Party congress. He was also appealing to Albanian communists and the Albanian people against their leaders, an appeal made by Stalin in 1948 in the case of Yugoslavia with signal unsuccess.

On Albania's future position Khrushchev was vague, deliberately so. 'In keeping with our internationalist duty' the Soviet Union would do 'all in its power to ensure that Albania marches shoulder to shoulder

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with all the socialist countries'. This statement was open to different interpretations. The safest one was that Albania was still in the bloc but perched in ideological limbo on the furthest fringes. The impression that the door was not yet completely closed was confirmed by Brezhnev in his speech on 19 October. If the Albanian leaders wished to avoid 'fatal developments', said Brezhnev, they should give up their erroneous attitude and return to the fold.

ALBANIA'S future would now depend on two things. Her own attitude and that of China. The immediate Albanian reaction was to publish an editorial in *Zeri i Popullit* (18 October) full of praise for the Soviet Union. This editorial may well have been prepared before Khrushchev's speech the previous day. But the fact that the Albanians printed it showed that for the time being they were prepared to carry on as if nothing had happened. The editorial was similar in content and tone to all the speeches and articles which had come out of Albania since the dispute began—fulsome praise for the Soviet Union and loyalty to it, the use of the archaic 'headed by the Soviet Union', but no mention of Nikita S. Khrushchev.

On 19 October two important events occurred. That morning's *Zeri i Popullit* published Khrushchev's attack in full. This meant that the Albanian tactic of trying to conceal the dispute by publishing nothing but praise for the Soviet Union could no longer be pursued. Some kind of comment or answer was necessary and it was urgent. At the congress the same day it was Chou En-lai's turn to speak. He directed the now famous rebuke to Khrushchev by indirectly reminding his audience of the Moscow Declaration of the 81 Communist Parties which stated that disputes between fraternal parties should be settled quietly with patience and moderation. To bring them out into the open could not be considered, said Chou, 'a serious Marxist approach'. In his enumeration of the members of the socialist camp Chou also specifically included Albania. It seems clear from Chou's speech that he did not wish to create an impression of partisanship on behalf of Albania or of an antagonistic approach to Khrushchev. He was in a very difficult position and handled it with his customary skill, trying to pose as the mediator between the disputants. The rest of his speech was almost a poem in praise of the Soviet Union and of Soviet-Chinese friendship. But the fact remained that Khrushchev had been challenged and the first, and a very important jarring note in the congress had been struck.

On 20 October came the Albanian reply in the form of a Central Committee declaration broadcast in the evening. It burnt any bridges which might have remained between the Albanian and Soviet Parties. Khrushchev was accused of being a 'splitter' of the international movement and a fractionalist who had no right to speak for the Soviet Party or people. The Albanians simply took Khrushchev's charges against themselves, reshaped them a little, and threw them right back.

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Perhaps the most significant part of the whole diatribe was the passage in which Chou's admonition of the previous day, about how inter-communist disputes should be settled, was noted 'with satisfaction'. It is this reference to Chou which raises the whole question of how much the violent Albanian reaction was influenced by Chou's remarks and by the expectation of firm Chinese support. Judging from the behaviour of the Chinese in the year or more prior to the Khrushchev attack. Hoxha no doubt felt entitled to support. He must also have realised that many of the attacks being made at the congress on him and on the anti-Party group were actually directed at Peking. China was in this as much as he was. He was cautious enough to wait to see what Chou said before he made his answer, and was then encouraged by the fulsome praise for Albania in the Chinese press after 17 October. He may have consulted with the Chinese Embassy and got the green light. In other words, he may have felt sure either that this was what China would want him to do or that this was what China would support him in doing.

But it is perhaps likely that Hoxha was intentionally presuming a little. On the face of it there was no justification in Chou's speech for what Hoxha said on 20 October. It seems that Hoxha was trying to force China's hand, to make her stand up and be counted, to prove her fidelity in the hour of need. If this is correct, then Chou's departure home on 23 October was not so much an ostentatious snub to the Soviet Union as a desire to get to Peking as soon as possible to discuss the very grave dilemma with his colleagues.

AT the congress the attacks on Albania continued. On 20 October, before the Albanian reply, Mikoyan made an interesting speech which showed how the Albanians had incensed the CPSU. His main target was not Hoxha but Shehu. He quoted the Albanian premier as saying that Stalin had made only two mistakes. One was that he died too soon, the other was that before he did die he didn't exterminate the whole of the present Soviet leadership. He also quoted Shehu as saying what would happen to the miscreants who did not agree with the Albanian leaders. They would get 'a spit in the face, a sock in the jaw, and, if necessary, a bullet in the head'. This was the worst kind of Stalinism, and the Albanian leaders had been 'praising to the sky the cult of Stalin'. Shehu's threats had been reflected in the treatment given to Belishova, Como, Tashko and others who had supported the Soviet Union. Sailors and students returning from Russia had been arbitrarily jailed.

But more important than these glimpses into Hoxha's dungeon were the remarks of general bloc interest which Mikoyan made in connection with Albania. He raised the perennial East European spectre of nationalism. The Albanian leaders were departing from internationalist positions and were going the way of nationalism. 'What nationalism can lead to, and separation from the socialist camp' said Mikoyan, 'is shown by the experience of the revisionism of Yugoslavia. It would

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be worthwhile for the Albanian leaders to think about this'. He also said, almost in so many words, what everybody except the most naïve has known all along—that 81-Party declarations etc. are all very well, so is all the lip service to free and equal Parties, but it is how the Soviets interpret them and what the Soviets say that really count. 'We must clearly understand' that only 'by choosing the attitude obligatory to Communist Parties' could one count on the friendship of the Soviet Party and people. It was this attitude, this thinly veiled insistence that the Soviets still laid down the true law, that Hoxha and the Albanians were later to attack.

On 21 October it was Suslov's turn to attack. Appropriately, the chief burden of his complaint against the Albanians was the short shrift they had given to the new Soviet Party programme. Albania was the only Communist country which had not published the programme in full; they had printed it in a 'mutilated and distorted form.' Actually, Radio Tirana on 1 August had devoted 20 minutes to a summary of the programme. It was condensed, certainly, but hardly 'mutilated and distorted'. But the point is that Suslov evidently considered the Albanian refusal to print the *Soviet* programme in full to be a crime against *the whole bloc*. If all Parties were seriously considered to be free and equal, this charge could hardly have been made. His whole approach was in the spirit of Mikoyan's remark about 'the attitude obligatory to Communist Parties'—i.e. the Soviet attitude.

As early as 21 October, when Suslov spoke, the abuse against Albania had piled up to impressive dimensions. But on the same day there were two notable abstentions. These were by Kim Il Sung, of North Korea, and Ho Chi Minh, of North Vietnam. There were significant differences between the speeches of these two leaders but they had at least one thing in common. Neither of them attacked Albania. Thus three of the twelve ruling Parties refused to go along with Khrushchev on this matter. Two of China's Communist neighbours had stood by Chou in this respect. An as yet unknown number of other Parties were to do the same.

Chou's reproach to Khrushchev had to be answered and several Soviet speakers addressed themselves to this task. Perhaps the most important answers were given by Kuusinen on 26 October and by Kozlov two days later. The line was obviously to continue and to stress Khrushchev's remarks in his opening speech that the Soviets had tried several times to discuss their differences with the Albanians. Thus Kuusinen averred that 'already last year', at meetings of the fraternal parties, the Albanians had 'aroused universal indignation' by their slanderous attacks on the CPSU and on Khrushchev personally. The CPSU had tried 'more than once' to reach agreement, but the Albanians 'were downright insolent and would not even hear of any agreements'. Kozlov carried the argument one stage further and directly answered the now absent Chou. To bring the rift out into the open, said Kozlov, was the 'only correct and serious Marxist-Leninist

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approach'. To 'play mum in this case would mean to encourage their fallacious anti-Leninist actions'.

IN his speech on 27 October Khrushchev, so to speak, summed up on the Albanians and on the Chinese connection with them. Albanian intransigence had given a further impetus to the attack, and now Khrushchev entered the fray with a whole series of examples of their Stalinist inhumanities. He shed tears over Liri Gega, who, according to Khrushchev but not the Albanians, had been pregnant when executed in 1956. (This same Liri Gega, incidentally, had herself killed a Central Committee colleague in the early days of the Communist regime.) This, according to Khrushchev, was but one example of the 'bloody misdeeds' of the Albanian leaders. They were, if anything, worse than the Tsarist police.

In addressing himself to Chou's remarks, Khrushchev said that the decision to bring the matter into the open was 'correct'. He took the line that Kuusinen had taken the previous day—that Soviet patience had been exhausted. The Albanian leaders, he said, had evaded repeated attempts by the Soviet Central Committee to discuss the controversies which had arisen. They had rejected talks during the meeting of the Communist Parties in Moscow in November 1960. When a talk was finally arranged, at the insistence of the Soviet Central Committee, Hoxha and Shehu 'frustrated it and resorted to actions which can only be described as provocative'. They had turned down subsequent proposals for meetings and had stepped up their 'slanderous attacks against our Party and its Central Committee'.

Khrushchev then made a direct appeal to the Chinese on the subject of bloc unity:

> We share the anxiety expressed by our Chinese friends and appreciate their concern for greater unity. If the Chinese comrades wish to make efforts towards normalising the relations between the Albanian Party of Labour and the fraternal Parties, there is hardly anyone who can contribute to the solution of this problem more than the Communist Party of China. That would really benefit the Albanian Party of Labour and would meet the interests of the entire socialist commonwealth.

The implication here seemed to be that if China was able to bring the Albanian leadership to its senses then all would be well and bloc unity preserved. The Soviet Union had given up trying. But if Albanian obstinacy continued and China supported its ally, then bloc unity would suffer and it would be the fault of China, not of Russia. The Soviet Union was not prepared to accept unity if the Albanian leadership carried on as it had been doing. There was also, of course, the implication that Albania's behaviour was due to the Chinese who could change it (and their own) at any time they chose.

Khrushchev then repeated, but in bolder terms, the appeal to the Albanian Party and people which he had made in his first attack. 'We

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are confident', he said, 'that the time will come when the Albanian Communists and the Albanian people will have their say, and then the Albanian leaders will be called to account for the damage they have done to their country, their people, and the cause of socialist construction'.

This is quite clear, but in his appeal to China Khrushchev seemed to be implying that, if Peking would use its good offices with the present leaders, the Soviet Union would be satisfied. There was doubt on this point, as there was on the whole question of Albania's position vis-à-vis the camp. Was she in or was she out? Khrushchev in his first speech did not specifically say she was out; Chou, in his speech, specifically said that she was in. It would have seemed that Albania's answer to Khrushchev on 20 October would close the door. But by the end of the congress the situation was still unclear. After all that had been said on both sides, the final congress resolution issued on 31 October still expressed the hope that the Albanians would give up their 'erroneous views' and return to the fold. The door was, therefore, still left slightly ajar, with just space for Albania's foot.

It was probably left slightly ajar because of the attitude and position of China. The Chinese government has, as will be seen later, not yet openly committed itself against Khrushchev. But, through Chou, it has shown that it is not prepared to desert Hoxha. Therefore, a move against Albania would have meant an *overt* move against China, and this Khrushchev at the moment was evidently not prepared to undertake. His aim was to shift any responsibility for finally splitting the camp on to China and Albania. If Peking decided to support Albania against Khrushchev then China could be blamed for the split.

There are also two technical points. Formally, a Soviet Party congress is hardly the body to expel a member from the communist movement; secondly, there is now no Comintern or Cominform to supply the mechanics of formal expulsion. In theory what would probably have to happen would be a meeting of the entire communist movement, or of the ruling Parties, called to discuss Albania's situation. This, of course, is a possibility; but, even if Khrushchev wanted this, it would involve a great risk. Opinion on the subject would have to be practically unanimous, and at the 22nd Party congress the condemnation of Albania was by no means unanimous.

There are, however, two important bloc organisations whose membership is confined to the Soviet Union and the East European communist states, excluding Yugoslavia. These are the Warsaw Pact organisation and Comecon, bodies to which China sends only observers. At a recent meeting in Warsaw there were no Albanian delegates, and no Chinese observers either. Albania has not been excluded in any public resolution, but whatever might be decided formally at such a conference, it seems clear that Albania has already ceased to be a functioning member of either organisation. The withdrawal of the Soviet submarines in June this year had isolated her from Soviet strategic

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plans, and the withdrawal of money and men had in practice put an end to Albania's Comecon co-operation.

WHATEVER Khrushchev may have expected from his initial attack on Albania, the vigour of the Albanian response probably came as a surprise. The Albanian Central Committee declaration of 20 October was stinging enough, but it was followed by a whole barrage of defence and counter-attack which is still going on.

The Central Committee answer to Khrushchev was the signal for a widespread 'indignation' campaign in support of the Party leadership. Meetings were held throughout the country which, according to Radio Tirana, pledged unfailing support for Hoxha and his policy. Telegrams poured into the capital from all parts calling Khrushchev a liar, slanderer, splitter, plotter, and, of course, an anti-Marxist, and urging his speedy downfall. One even compared him with John Foster Dulles.

There were no further official attacks on the Soviet leaders until after the congress was over. But on 1 November *Zeri i Popullit* called Khrushchev 'a splitter and an underminer of international communism'. By 'violating the most elementary principles of relations' between communist parties, the paper said, 'as well as the 1957 and 1960 declarations', Khrushchev had attacked a fraternal Party with a vigour he had never used 'against either the imperialists or their devoted servants, the Yugoslav revisionists'. Because the Albanians had admitted that they disapproved of some theses of the 20th CPSU congress, especially of the struggle against Stalin, Khrushchev was now saying that they could not be in the 'international communist family'. It continued: 'This is a strange logic, according to which one stops being a communist when disagreeing with Khrushchev's revisionist thesis'. The Party daily continued by accusing Khrushchev of using illegal methods, 'of pressure and plots to subjugate our Party'. These had been and would continue to be unsuccessful because the Party was united with the people and because the Albanians had allies in the whole communist movement.

Then came the interesting claim that at the congress 25 delegates did not attack Albania, and by implication, therefore, sided with Albania. Hoxha was later to increase this number to 34. Attempts in the West to compile the roll call have led to many errors and great confusion. No accurate estimate is yet possible. Conservatively, one could perhaps say that not more than 12 to 15 representatives did not attack Albania; one certainly cannot say that all these abstentions were due to support for Albania or China. But it is significant that, of the known abstainers, the majority were from Asia.

Having disposed of Khrushchev, the Albanians next turned to their humiliated hero, Stalin. On 2 November *Zeri i Popullit* devoted a long article to the 'name and deeds of J. V. Stalin' which would 'live and continue to live throughout the centuries'. There is no need to go into many details here. It was the sort of thing Khrushchev was saying

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before Stalin died. After a eulogy which, from a communist point of view, contained a good deal of truth, *Zeri i Popullit* stated that 'Nikita S. Khrushchev had imposed upon the 22nd CPSU congress the decision to remove the coffin of J. V. Stalin from the mausoleum in Red Square where he was lying near Lenin'. He was thus carrying on the process of 'destalinisation' begun at the 20th congress. Khrushchev had thus clearly joined the ranks of 'the revisionists and opportunists—all the enemies of Marxism-Leninism, from Tito to Brandt and Spaak', in flying the banner of anti-Stalinism, 'this discredited banner of the ferocious enemies of Marxism-Leninism and socialism'. He had done this to 'open for himself the bright road for the implementation of a revisionist, anti-Marxist policy'.

These two *Zeri i Popullit* articles were admirably synthesised and amplified by Hoxha himself in a major speech on 7 November, the eve of the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Albanian Communist Party.

This speech deserves careful study for it is certainly the most important document yet published in the whole Sino-Soviet dispute. Hoxha gives what must be the Chinese view on almost every important communist issue of the present time. But China does not wish to say it and it is highly doubtful whether she wished Hoxha to say it so forcefully and unambiguously.

First, the Chinese case in the ideological dispute which has been waged for the last eighteen months:

(a) *Revising the creed*: Hoxha stated that his Party knew and understood 'the profound changes which have taken place in the world'. But he rejected all attempts by 'modern revisionists' who 'under the guise of "interpreting Marxism in a creative manner under new conditions" are publicising their distorted points of view, attempting to present them as the ultimate development of Marxism and qualifying as dogmatic, sectarian, or adventurous anyone who opposes those views'.

(b) *Revolution in the emerging countries*: The conclusions which should be drawn from the changes which have taken place in the world should be correct ones, said Hoxha, which do not 'banish the cause of revolution but bring it ever closer'. They should be interpreted so that 'the people are not removed from the struggle for their national liberation but will pursue it on a still vaster scale'.

(c) *The nature of imperialism*: It is not only very 'wrong but also very harmful' to conclude 'that the change in the balance of forces in favour of socialism has also brought a change in the nature of imperialism, that imperialism has been bound, that it can no longer do anything, that it cannot launch wars or undertake other aggressive actions'.

(d) *Peaceful coexistence*: The Albanian Party was not opposed to peaceful coexistence, said Hoxha, but 'we do not agree with certain opportunist views of N. Khrushchev and his followers who consider peaceful coexistence as the general foreign policy line of the socialist

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countries, as the main path to the victory of socialism on a world scale'. This concept of peaceful coexistence negated the class struggle.
(e) *Transition to socialism*: At the 20th congress and after, Khrushchev had, according to Hoxha, 'made the assumption of power by the working class through pacific means as an absolute method, and the illusion was created that allegedly by a majority in parliament the working class and its Communist Party could take power into their hands'. The elevation of 'peaceful means' to an 'absolute method' was against 'Marxism-Leninism, historical experience, and present realities'; the working class must be allowed non-peaceful as well as peaceful means.

ON some of these issues one can, of course, accuse Hoxha of distorting the Soviet stand. But the point is that this is how he views the Soviet position and this is the clearest sign yet of how the Chinese view it.

Hoxha dealt with the German question at some length. In their attitude to the German question, he said, the Albanians had been accused of 'being afraid of imperialism, of being afraid of accepting our responsibility in the settlement of important international problems'. But the Albanians had always supported, and still support, the efforts of the USSR and GDR for a peaceful settlement of the German problem. 'We have been and are in favour of the settlement of these problems as rapidly as possible because every delay benefits only our enemies. One may wonder then who, in reality, is afraid. Who is afraid of responsibility for the settlement of the German problem? Who is delaying things? Is it we, who have been and are in favour of settling the problem as rapidly as possible, or is it our accusers who have drawn back in this matter and have delayed it from year to year?'

Leaving the Chinese aside for a moment, it is probable that many other East European communists have been asking the same question. None more than Walter Ulbricht, who must certainly be with Hoxha on this point. The Albanian attitude on Germany and Berlin was expressed at some length in the statement issued by the (unidentified) Albanian delegation to the Warsaw Pact meeting of 3–5 August in Moscow. It might have been taken straight from *Neues Deutschland*; many communists, other than the Chinese and East German, must have tacitly sympathised with its militancy.

For Khrushchev's 'mistakes', Hoxha had the simple explanation that he was a revisionist. It was in endeavouring to prove this point that he once again showed that the basic and most important single reason for the whole Albanian deviation was hatred and fear of Yugoslavia.

Hoxha confirmed Khrushchev's disclosure that the trouble started at Bucharest in June 1960. But he did say that even before this there had been differences of opinion. He then revealed what had already been assumed—the serious Albanian uneasiness over the Soviet

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rapprochement with Tito in 1955. This was another example of Khrushchev's highhandedness. Acting completely on his own initiative, he had ' thrown in the wastepaper basket ' the Cominform resolutions on Yugoslavia. Hoxha then, with considerable skill, showed the disastrous results of Tito's rehabilitation for the whole camp. The floodgates were opened for the revisionists, for the Tito agents. The outcome was the Hungarian Revolution and near disaster. But Khrushchev was still trying to exonerate Tito from responsibility for the Hungarian events. He persisted in his efforts to draw closer to Tito, and the Yugoslavs replied with their un-Marxist programme of April 1958. They were justly condemned at the Moscow conference of 1960 (the implication here seems to be that it was the Chinese and Albanians and others, who insisted on such strong anti-Yugoslav statements), but even now Khrushchev was saying that he regards Yugoslavia as a ' socialist country '. The Yugoslav issue was one of the aspects of the 20th Party congress which the Albanians did not approve. It provided ' ideological fodder for the renegades and revisionists in their struggle against Marxism-Leninism '.

The Stalin issue had provided the same kind of fodder. On Stalin Hoxha scored heavily. The Soviet leader, he said, had accused the Albanians of ' throwing mud at the Soviet Union '. Yet here was Khrushchev saying in effect that for nearly 30 years out of the Soviet Union's total of 44, the country had been a terrorist nightmare. Who, then, was doing the Soviet Union a disservice? Khrushchev was saying just what the imperialist and the bourgeois press had always said.

Hoxha did not claim that Stalin had been immaculate, but argued that in any assessment of Stalin's service to the communist cause his merits were in the foreground. He quoted Khrushchev's own remark on this point in 1957, and then proceeded to show that Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin were not motivated by an awareness of the dangers of the personality cult since the Soviet leader himself was the object of an extensive personal cult.

Khrushchev was using the attack on Stalin for his own ends, which were revisionist ends. Hoxha closely linked the issue of Stalin with the issue of revisionism; one of Stalin's very great merits had been his struggle against revisionism. In other words, Stalin had been a protector of Albania again Yugoslavia; Khrushchev was not.

Hoxha, of course, denied that his own Party was using either the Stalin type cult of personality or suppressing internal Party democracy. He made a counter-attack here. He skipped lightly over the question of what internal events in the CPSU and the Soviet Union were causing the attack on Stalin and the anti-Party group. This ' is none of our business ', he said. On the question of internal democracy within the CPSU, however, he took Polyansky to task. Polyansky, he said, had avoided bringing ' into the open the intrigues that he and his collaborators organised during the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in the summer of 1957. Polyansky kept those things from the

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congress but he told all about it to his friend Liri Belishova, who put our Party in the picture'. Hoxha left it there; every student of Soviet affairs must be wishing he had said more.

In his attacks on 'N. Khrushchev and his followers', Hoxha first criticised the Soviets for the 'mistaken opinions' which they held, secondly, for their attempts to foist these opinions on the entire camp regardless of whether the different Parties agreed with them or not. The Albanians, he said, regarded some of the policies of the 20th congress, and even of the 22nd congress, as positive contributions and models. But they did not agree with some basic principles of either the congress or the CPSU programme. It was their right to do this since 'according to Leninist principles governing relations between Marxist parties, however important the congress of a party, however great and authoritative the party itself, the decisions of the congress are binding only for its own members'. At the Bucharest conference, Khrushchev had tried by 'fallacious, unilateral accusations' to 'make the Marxist-Leninist Parties give way and, by a rapid pronouncement which was neither well-founded nor studied, to compromise representatives of fraternal Parties'. But, 'in spite of all his efforts, he did not reach his aim'. Then came Hoxha's explanation of why the November 1960 conference was called,

> On the contrary, Mr Khrushchev was compelled to accept the results of the Moscow meeting of November 1960 at which correct debates took place during which it became clearly apparent that his views did not find enthusiastic support among the participants, a fact which is also noted in the documents of the 81 Parties which Mr Khrushchev is brutally violating by all his actions. Therefore, in order to attack our Party and because he feared an international assembly, he returned to his 'putschist' methods, using for this purpose the 22nd congress. In this way Mr Khrushchev has also effectively sabotaged any future international meeting, because by publicly and unilaterally attacking our Party, he has placed the Albanian Party of Labour in a position of inequality.

It was because Khrushchev feared an open and fair discussion of the Albanian case that he had not invited the Albanians to the 22nd CPSU congress. The Soviet leaders feared open discussion but were trying 'at any price to impose their opportunist conceptions on all the communist and workers parties without shrinking from the most brutal pressure, blackmail, and attacks on the fraternal Parties and their leaders who do not agree with the revisionist theses of N. Khrushchev, who oppose them and resolutely defend Marxism-Leninism'.

There are numerous references, scattered throughout the speech, to this type of dictatorial behaviour. It is perhaps sufficient here to quote Hoxha on the specific steps Khrushchev has taken against Albania to try to bring her to heel. According to Hoxha the Soviet leader has attempted to 'disarm' Albania, an obvious reference to pressure on Albania to accept the Zhivkov proposal of complete disarmament in the Balkans as a prelude to the implementation of Khrushchev's plan for

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worldwide disarmament. More important are the economic sanctions. All the credits granted by the Soviet Union for the Albanian five-year plan had been cut, the Soviet specialists had been withdrawn, ' although we had asked them officially to stay ', the Soviets were demanding that Albania start repaying outstanding credits this year, although repayment was due to begin only in 1970. In short, the Soviets had ' almost broken off trade relations on the clearing basis '.

Khrushchev was, therefore, transferring what was essentially a Party dispute to the state level. He was acting and talking as if Albania, politically, militarily, and economically, was no longer a member of the camp. He was even, said Hoxha, inciting the imperialists actually to attack her. But Albania had friends in the socialist camp ' who would not leave her in the lurch '.

THIS was an indirect reference to China, and one must conclude any study of the problem of Albania with China. The Chinese government was, in a very real sense, in on the beginning of the Albanian defiance, and it must now, in one way or another, take the consequences.

Peking's dilemma is to nobody more clear than to the Chinese leaders themselves. If they abandon Albania their prestige in the whole communist movement will suffer a blow from which it will be difficult to recover. In the key underdeveloped areas whose Parties have much sympathy for the Chinese, their weakness will be quickly spotted by men to whom strength is paramount. Their hopes of challenging Russia for supremacy or even equality will for the time being vanish. This, of course, is bad enough, but in internal policy there could be even more immediately serious repercussions. To abandon Albania would be to admit openly that an important policy had failed because they were too weak to carry it through. This could lead to internal Party dissension and undermine Mao's pose of infallibility.

If, on the other hand, China comes out in open support of Albania, there will also be a heavy price to pay. The unity of the bloc—and there is no reason to believe that at present the Chinese do not value this—would be destroyed. Soviet and satellite trade and aid might be seriously curtailed. China's already very shaky economic position would be gravely impaired. Yet the Chinese might feel that since history and the birth rate are on their side anyway, they can afford to wait and endure the humiliation.

All these considerations (and many more) must have been weighed carefully in Peking since Chou's return from the Soviet congress, as well as the knowledge that though they were never named, they too were severely manhandled there. Many of the attacks on Albania and on the anti-Party group, especially Molotov, were probably directed against them. If they give in on the symbol of Albania, it might be the beginning of a whole series of intolerable humiliations.

China has so far sought to ease itself out of the dilemma by continuing its moral and presumably material support for Albania without being

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drawn into a direct attack on Khrushchev. An excellent example of this tactic was seen in the Chinese treatment of the Albanian Party's 20th anniversary celebrations. A most fulsome telegram of greetings was sent to Tirana. It praised the 'revolutionary heroism' of the Albanian Party, its devotion to the 'purity of Marxism-Leninism'; it also praised Hoxha personally for his 'correct leadership'. It left no doubt about where Peking's sympathies lay in the struggle between Tirana and Moscow.

Nor did a *People's Daily* editorial of 7 November.

> The Albanian Labour Party, headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha, the long-tested leader of the Albanian people, is a Party taking Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action, a Party long steeled in the flames of revolutionary struggle, and a Party that maintains close contacts with the masses. It has always been loyal to Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism, and to the 1957 declaration and the 1960 statement of the Moscow meetings. It has resolutely safeguarded unity with the Soviet people and the peoples of the other socialist countries, and the unity of the international communist movement.

This was about as direct a refutation of Khrushchev's charges as was possible without addressing Khrushchev personally. This the Chinese have been very careful not to do, for it would lead to an open break between Peking and Moscow. It was the Chinese concern on this point which probably made them refrain from sending a delegation to the Party celebrations in Tirana. For to have sent a delegation would have meant directly associating themselves with the personal attacks on Khrushchev that Hoxha was bound to make. Any delegation would, by its very presence, have been giving its moral support to these attacks, even if it had made no such attack itself.

Their refusal to commit themselves openly against Khrushchev is reflected not only in their own statements since 17 October but also in all the Albanian statements. In their attacks on Khrushchev the Albanians have not dragged in China so far as *the core of the dispute* is concerned. They have simply referred to Chou's rebuke to Khrushchev about bringing the quarrel into the open. They have made no attempt to say directly that in the quarrel itself they have China's support. This was confirmed by Hoxha's speech. Not once did the Albanian leader refer directly to Chinese support in his struggle against Khrushchev. In this the Albanians are probably acting under Chinese instructions. Left to themselves, they would no doubt have been only too eager to do so.

Thus China, for the moment, is skirting the brink, doing all it can to avoid responsibility for an open break with Moscow. Its own press has printed without comment Albanian attacks on the Soviet Union and Soviet attacks on Albania. How long it can keep this up would seem to depend on Khrushchev. He put up with the Albanian defiance for a long time and finally decided to attack Albania alone simply because he was reluctant to attack China openly. This is a confession of weakness,

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not a show of strength. He now sees China openly supporting Albania. His authority is obviously being undermined, yet he sees the Chinese trying to manoeuvre him into a position where, if he comes out openly against them, it will be he and not they who is openly destroying the cherished unity of the movement. The Chinese are trying to transfer their dilemma to the Soviets. Very recently, however, it seems that the Soviet bloc have responded with a counter-play—that of criticising the Chinese, in comradely but unmistakeable terms, for giving support and encouragement to the Albanians. This is significantly different from merely criticising Chou En-lai for arguing that intra-bloc differences should not be brought into the open. It was Ulbricht who gently eased the criticism out of its former narrow confines in his address to the SED Central Committee plenum held between 23 and 26 November. According to Ulbricht, 'the Chinese friends should in some form take a stand about the anti-Soviet rallies and violations of the Warsaw Treaty by the leaders of the Albanian Party.' Ulbricht was immediately followed by L. Tsend, the second secretary of the Mongolian Central Committee, who was quoted by Tass on 30 November as criticising Chou En-lai for opposing the public exposure of the Soviet-Albanian dispute 'without touching on the content of the criticism.' At a Bulgarian Central Committee plenum held on 28 and 29 November, Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian Party leader, stated that at the 22nd Congress Chou had 'expressed a certain support for the Albanian leaders,' and hoped that the Chinese leaders would 'come to realise' Hoxha's erroneous line and the harm it was inflicting on the whole communist movement. The attack has therefore moved towards the crucial area of the core of the Albanian-Soviet dispute. Until there is a direct, 'uncomradely' criticism of Peking, the Chinese leaders may not need to reply directly. But they have been challenged to explain themselves. The diplomatic break with Albania is the latest and most important step in the mounting pressure on China to clarify its position, intended either to make Peking back down from its support of Tirana, or to make it responsible for ending 'the monolithic unity of the Socialist camp'. The situation is very delicately and dangerously poised; every little sally could bring the breaking point closer.

Another question is how the other European communist countries will show their awareness of the implications of the whole affair. The Sino-Soviet polarisation has given them opportunities for manoeuvre. Their Parties could, if they so desired, demand in return for their loyalty to Khrushchev greater freedom; they could flirt with China as a means of attaining it. The non-ruling Communist Parties, less dependent on the Soviet Union and more distant from it, have a choice between the old Rome and the new. In this novel situation Khrushchev may have to face some difficult choices.

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SOVIET LITERARY ATTITUDES

Ronald Hingley

IN *Literaturnaya gazeta* of 2 November 1961, Aleksey Surkov summed up the part played by Soviet writers in the twenty-second congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The writers' contribution had been sufficiently satisfying—at least statistically—to call forth Surkov's exclamation marks. Delegates to the congress had included the record number of thirty-two writers! And of those no less than five had made speeches!

Surkov was not mistaken in claiming the Party congress as an important event in literary politics. It provided Soviet writers with their most notable public occasion since the third congress of the Union of Soviet Writers in May 1959—in fact one might almost say that they took the opportunity to hold a ' little writers congress ' within the framework of the Party congress as a whole.

This therefore seems a good moment to follow the Soviet example by taking stock of Soviet literary politics as they have evolved since 1959 and to attempt an interpretation of the five writers' speeches at the twenty-second congress. Interpretation is certainly necessary, for Soviet literary politicians have developed a particularly obscure and esoteric language in which to communicate with each other—a dialect (and a difficult one at that) of the more generalised hieratic tongue in which almost all Soviet public utterances are couched. So deceptive is this dialect, and so well adapted to its main purpose of spreading an aura of decorum and harmony over Soviet literary affairs, that there must have been many among the more provincial of the congress's 4,500 delegates who missed the main point—that they were witnessing the latest episode in a long-standing quarrel.

To understand this it is necessary to remind ourselves briefly of what happened at the third Writers congress in 1959. The main purpose of that wordy engagement was to declare a truce. Instructions had evidently been given out that there was to be no repetition of the outspoken slanging-matches which had imparted distinction to the second Writers congress in 1954. Henceforward everyone was to co-operate in lending literary deliberations the special air of ritual decorousness required (but fortunately not always obtained) on Soviet public occasions from all participants except Mr Khrushchev himself. Nobody was to *say* anything any more. And as an encouragement to behave, Soviet writers received a much valued prize—the demotion of Mr Surkov, who ceased to be their First Secretary and became an ordinary secretary along with twenty-five others. This was a very popular concession because Surkov's habit of energetically meddling in his colleagues' lives and works had antagonised even extreme political conformists among the writers.

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More important was the unofficial concordat which was drawn up between Mr Khrushchev and the writers. Bygones were to be bygones, and authors of the kind of 'protest literature' which had appeared in 1956 were to be forgiven. There was to be no more 'protest literature'. But it was also tacitly understood that writers might publish what may be termed 'neutral' works—literature which either avoids politics altogether or at least dodges the sharper implications of politics.[1]

Meanwhile the writers were busily adapting the language of reconciliation so that they might be able to continue quarrelling without appearing to do so. Thus, behind the atmosphere of truce at the third congress, a latent tension remained visible between the two main opposing camps which may be termed 'Hard' and 'Soft'. The Hards are those who wish to subordinate writers as much as possible to the aims of the Party, while the Softs are those who want a more liberal approach.

This tension has increased since 1959 and the allegiance of literary individuals and periodicals to one or the other camp has become more clearly discernible. The diehards include A. Surkov, V. Kochetov, N. Gribachov, and their journals are *Oktyabr* and *Literatura i zhizn*; the Soft personalities are A. Tvardovsky, I. Ehrenburg, Ye. Yevtushenko, and they publish in *Novy mir* and *Literaturnaya gazeta.*

THE first thing which strikes our attention about the Hard camp is that its three chief representatives are far from forming a united front. They seem to be competitors for power rather than allies, and what appears to be happening is that the two younger men, Kochetov and Gribachov, are jockeying for the position of Dean of the Hards which Surkov lost in 1959. For Surkov is now patently on the defensive. He retains his position as candidate member of the Central Committee, but unlike his two younger rivals did not make a speech at the twenty-second Party congress. The fact that Surkov is a contributor to the Soft organ *Literaturnaya gazeta* is a symptom of his weakening position, as is also the tone of his article on the twenty-second congress to which reference was made above.

Here Surkov still seems to be unrepentant, cleaving to two ideas which contributed much to his original unpopularity—his love of getting his fellow-writers bogged down in endless committee work, and his urge to despatch all and sundry on 'creative assignments' (*tvorcheskie komandirovki*) to distant parts of the Soviet Union. Here he has few supporters even in the Hard camp, and must be conscious of this, to judge by the feeble and apologetic way in which he defends these two ideas in print.

A vivid contrast with Surkov's drooping pose is provided by the militant stance taken by Kochetov in his speech to the twenty-second congress (*Pravda*, 31 October 1961).

[1] See my article 'The Soviet Writers Congress', *Survey*, July–September 1959.

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Kochetov lashes out at two leading Soft representatives, whom he does not name, but whose names can easily be supplied by anyone who has been following the current literary controversy. The first of these is Ehrenburg, whom Kochetov has principally in mind when he says:

> Among our writers there are still some morose composers of memoirs, whose gaze is turned more to the past than to the present day or the future. This distorted view causes them, with a zeal worthy of a better cause, to burrow in the rubbish dumps of their rather crackpot memories in order to drag out once more into the light of day long rotted literary corpses and to pass them off as something still capable of life.

The reference here is to Ehrenburg's memoirs, which began to be serialised in *Novy mir* in August 1960.

One is reminded that the first five instalments of these memoirs had already been reviewed by A. Dymshits in the Hard organ *Oktyabr*, of which Kochetov is editor (*Oktyabr*, No. 6, 1961). The review is unfavourable, and takes Ehrenburg to task for praising cubism and other 'modernist' features in art. But the tone of Dymshits' review is restrained compared with Kochetov's scurrilous abuse.

In his Party congress speech Kochetov also joins issue with Yevtushenko, sneering at 'poetic . . . chickens, sparsely sprinkled with yellow fluff, who are desperately eager to appear as fighting cocks'. The reference here is to the literary scandal initiated by the publication in *Literaturnaya gazeta* of 19 September 1961 of Yevtushenko's poem *Baby yar*. The poem contains two ideological heresies. Firstly it draws attention to the fact that the Jews were the main victims of Nazi terror during the war, whereas (as Soviet reporting of the Eichmann trial revealed) [2] the Nazis must be portrayed in Soviet propaganda as enemies of humanity in general, without discrimination in favour of any one nationality. More important, Yevtushenko's poem implied that anti-Semitism is still a live issue in the Soviet Union.

Literatura i zhizn was quick to give the Hard point of view on this gross breach of etiquette. A short poem abusing Yevtushenko was followed on 27 September 1961 by a long and particularly scurrilous article, signed D. Starikov. Here Yevtushenko was accused of betraying communist ideology, and of taking up the position of a bourgeois ideologist. Starikov had the ingenious idea of using Ehrenburg as a stick with which to beat Yevtushenko, since—according to Starikov—Ehrenburg had taken up a correct ideological line on occasions when he had written about the Jewish problem. Ehrenburg (who, unlike Yevtushenko, is himself a Jew) took the first opportunity to print a brief note in *Literaturnaya gazeta* dissociating himself from the Hard interpretation of his words.

Yevtushenko was involved in another literary scandal on 8 October 1961, when young people staged a demonstration in his honour by the

[2] Cf. 'Reporting the Eichmann Case', *Survey*, December 1960.

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statue of Mayakovsky in Moscow. A number of the demonstrators are said to have joined in reciting *Baby yar* in chorus.

The *Baby yar* incident was taken up at the Party congress by Gribachov, who followed the conventions of the literary controversy by not referring to the matter directly. But he did make a frontal assault on *Literaturnaya gazeta* for its irresponsibility in indulging in sensation-mongering, instead of paying sufficient attention to the literatures of the national minorities of the Soviet Union (a characteristic Hard complaint) or working out problems of aesthetics properly (*Literaturnaya gazeta*, 28 October 1961). 'Aestheticisers' (*estetstvuyushchie*) has, incidentally, become a regular term of abuse whereby Hards refer to Softs.

AS befits their designation, the Softs are considerably less vicious in counter-attack than the Hards are in attack. It is, however, their habit to complain of the lack of 'artistry' (*khudozhestvennost*) in Soviet literature, and the Hards are sensitive enough to take this amiss. They also complain of the 'aristocratic disdain' with which the Softs look upon honest Hard attempts to portray the honest Soviet toiler.

> What such assessors and judges of literature consider artistic [Kochetov said in his Congress speech] is the result, made public by typographic means, of grubbing about in human quarrels, in the trivia of everyday life, in the disorders and muddles.

To this 'grubbing about', another regular term in the vocabulary of Hard abuse, the Hards oppose the method of Socialist Realism—a method which Softs rarely mention. No doubt they would attack it if they could, but the term is of course sacrosanct. Socialist Realism directs that greater attention should be paid to the so-called 'positive hero' than Softs, in their concern with imperfections of character, are prepared to give.

Tvardovsky, the only Soft representative to speak at the Party congress, gave an amusing parody of the kind of absurdity to which this approach can lead. The following is his version of the beginning of a typical story of the kind which would meet with Hard approval.

> The bright rays of the setting sun were still gilding the tops of the silver birches in the yard of the Collective Farm *The Road to Communism*, when the milkmaid Grunya, after assessing her capabilities, took the decision to milk so many litres in excess of the obligations which she had accepted.

Thus, as Tvardovsky showed, if Socialist Realism cannot be attacked under its own name, it is at least not immune. Such parodies have, of course, appeared in Soviet literary controversy before.

Another somewhat hackneyed theme was resurrected at the congress—'contemporaneity' (*sovremennost*). This is another Hard catchword, for according to the Hards the Soviet writer should make contemporary life his main theme. In opposition to this the Softs have evolved the 'theory of distance', according to which a writer can describe a subject

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more effectively when he is able to view it from afar. This theory is used as a justification for the memoirs which several elderly writers in addition to Ehrenburg have been producing lately, and also of the tendency to make Soviet life of the 'twenties a subject for fiction. But the real reason why such subjects appeal to the Softs is of course the fact that the further away a writer gets from the contemporary scene the less his work is subjected to the fierce light of political scrutiny. Distance, in fact, enables the pen to move more freely.

One characteristic Hard accusation relates to the crime of writing fiction calculated to tickle the Western or 'bourgeois' palate. 'Our ideological enemy', Gribachov said, 'reacts with almost lightning speed to such mistakes. . . . If a film is in the Western spirit, if a book has a false twist . . . then we get tumultuous praise in the bourgeois press and approving claps on the back, as if to say "There, that's real art!"' This line of attack appears to be temporarily on the increase, although, of course, it is unlikely ever again to become so extreme as in the days of Zhdanov.

Rather more sinister is the relatively new trend manifested at the congress to attack young writers for producing 'boudoir literature' and (another phrase popular at the moment with Hard spokesmen) the 'bedroom lyric'. 'The world of such artists is not broad', Kochetov remarked. 'It's really . . . about the size of the bed on which the action of an innumerable quantity of Western novels, stories, plays, and films is unfolded'. This line is sinister because it constitutes an attack on what is described above as 'neutral' literature, in which Soviet writers treat the private lives of individuals without taking up any explicit or implied political position. Such literature (associated with the names of S. Antonov, V. Nekrasov, V. Tendryakov, Yu. Kazakov, Yu. Nagibin and others), has been continuing to flourish quietly. It would be a sad thing if the Kochetovs of the Soviet Union managed to have their way and put it under the ban which existed in Stalin's day.

The congress included a speech from another Hard writer in addition to Gribachov and Kochetov—A. Korneychuk. But Korneychuk was mainly concerned to give the Hard line on international affairs, in accordance with his position as Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defence of Peace. He had little to say on literature.

AS already indicated, the standard-bearer of the Softs at the twenty-second Party congress was Tvardovsky, the editor of *Novy mir*. He began his speech by welcoming the anti-Stalinist line taken at the congress in connection with the more complete overthrowal of the 'cult of personality', first seriously attacked at the twentieth Party congress in 1956. But Tvardovsky regretted that

> Despite all the obvious achievements of our literature in recent years . . . in my opinion it has not yet been able to take full advantage of those favourable conditions which the twentieth Party congress laid down for it (*Literaturnaya gazeta*, 28 October 1961).

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This was as near as Tvardovsky could go in accusing the Gribachovs and Kochetovs of hankering after Stalinism. Among the residues of Stalinism, Tvardovsky counts the 'note of uncontrolled boasting' with which certain spokesmen are apt to speak of recent achievements in Soviet literature. This underlines another point at issue between the Hards and Softs. The Hards are at pains to exaggerate the positive achievements of Soviet writers, while the Softs are more inclined to stress their defects.

Like many other speakers, Tvardovsky touched on the question of the geographical distribution of writers in the Soviet Union. Too many of them, according to some people, live in Moscow and Leningrad, attracted by the superior plumbing facilities, when they ought to be out in the virgin lands getting mud on their boots. This typical Hard point of view seems to have been temporarily abandoned even by some of the Hards, and, of course, Tvardovsky has no use for it at all. He emphatically rejects the idea of Moscow as a sort of modern Babylon, full of temptations fatal to the writer's craft, whereas it is in fact the political and cultural capital of the country. He made a particularly good point when he said that what was needed was a novel or several novels which would give as good a picture of Moscow as Balzac gave of Paris. It is difficult not to join him in this *cri du coeur*. Tvardovsky also dealt a shrewd blow at the 'positive hero' beloved of the Hards when he said that such a positive hero might be a model of virtue in all sorts of ways, 'but just imagine having to share a carriage with him to Vladivostok'.

THE writer who spoke at greatest length at the Party congress is one who has not so far been mentioned, partly because he does not fall easily into either the Hard or Soft category—Sholokhov. His position is, however, an interesting one. Because of his eminence as Russia's greatest living author, he is allowed a latitude in expressing himself such as is permitted to no one else except Mr Khrushchev. For this reason he was able to keep out of the verbal grooves obligatory for other speakers, and his speech was therefore the most unorthodox in tone of all given at the congress.[3]

In indulging his Don Cossack sense of humour, in which subtlety is scarcely a leading element, Sholokhov seems to have taken on the role of licensed buffoon. His clowning included the claim that he would much like to praise Khrushchev according to his deserts, but was impeded by the (much publicised) close friendship claimed to exist between the two men ever since Khrushchev took Sholokhov with him to America. Sholokhov earned laughter and tumultuous applause when he put down his reticence in praising Khrushchev to the fact that 'manly love is always a bit silent'.

He was soon involved in an exchange of wisecracks with Khrushchev. Sholokhov claimed that the ties of comradeship uniting Party members

[3] For Sholokhov's speech, see *Pravda*, 25 October 1961.

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were stronger than a man's love for his wife and children. He was prepared to say this even though he knew that he would catch it from his wife Marfa Petrovna when he got home. Khrushchev, never one to be outdone in the exercise of such bluff and manly geniality, promptly intervened with an offer to do what he could to soften such domestic discord in the Sholokhov household.

The tone of Sholokhov's speech suggests that he is now modelling himself closely on one of his own fictional characters, the garrulous Grandpa Shchukar from *Virgin Soil Upturned*. Even when he eventually turned to the discussion of literary problems, he spoke of them more as a Shchukar than as a distinguished novelist. He prefaced these remarks by pointing out that he was first and foremost a communist and only secondarily a writer.

Sholokhov's comments on literature were facetious rather than amusing, and are more important for what they tell us about him than for any light which they shed on the literary controversy. The point is that Sholokhov does not want to get involved—he seems to regard all his fellow-writers, whether Hard or Soft, as a lot of long-haired intellectuals who are beneath his notice.

At the risk of seeming infected with Sholokhov's facetiousness we may therefore sum up the writers' speeches to the Twenty-second congress as being the work of five egg-heads—three hard-boiled (Korneychuk, Gribachov, Kochetov), one soft-boiled (Tvardovsky) and one addled (Sholokhov).

The elections to the Party Central Committee which followed the congress permit us to make certain wary predictions about the immediate future of the Soviet literary controversy. Three writers became members or candidates of the Central Committee for the first time. Of these Sholokhov became a full member, which means very little because he stands apart from these petty quarrels. What is more interesting is that one Soft (Tvardovsky) and one Hard (Gribachov) became candidate members for the first time. This careful balancing of the two factions suggests that, so far as the Party is concerned, the present armed truce among the writers is to continue for the time being. Brickbats will continue to be exchanged, but neither side will be permitted to push out the other.

It is to be hoped that the Softs will retain at least the limited freedom of action which they enjoy at the moment. Soviet affairs would be a great deal duller without the literary controversy. One reason for this is that literature is the only sphere of importance in which controversy on matters of principle, and the accompanying public debate, is permitted in the Soviet Union. We have seen that this controversy has its own elaborate conventions of camouflage, but behind all this a few determined and (in some cases) gifted people are genuinely arguing about things on which they genuinely disagree.

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RUSSIAN POETRY TODAY

Korneli Zelinski

Korneli Zelinski's birds-eye view of the development of Russian poetry in the past half century or so is a remarkable compromise between a relative, almost objectivist, detachment, and the conventional approach of Party-controlled criticism. It was obviously written specifically with an eye on the sophisticated reader abroad (though the more sanguine passages show surprisingly little regard for his counter-suggestability), and one wonders what the effect of its publication in the Soviet Union would be.

So smooth, so complacent is this vision of poetry flying like a TU 104 jet plane on wings of music and politics to the rendezvous with communism, that one feels almost like one of the less respectable members of the Union of Soviet Writers when one points out how considerably this splendid image deviates from the usual presentation of the development and significance of poetry by Soviet literary critics.

Possibly the erosion of the militant conception put forward in 1946 by Zhdanov has gone so far that Zelinski's basic attitude would not now cause so much as a lifting of the eyebrows, never mind the clanking of prison doors which it would certainly have caused fifteen years ago. For, according to Zelinski, Soviet poetry is not the result of a qualitative breach with the Russian tradition of the nineteenth and early twentieth century but, on the contrary, part of that very poetry to which Pushkin, Nekrasov, Akhmatova (and as we now learn, for the first time from a Soviet source, even Gumilev) belonged.

Even Mayakovski, the poet who has been officially proclaimed the bard of the Revolution, appears to Zelinski to be a link between the glorious past and the 'three times more glorious' future of Russia, and though such general views as this might now pass without censure in the Soviet Union, his remarks on some individual poems would certainly be contested. His acknowledgment of the technical excellence of Gumilev's poetical achievement combined with the reference to the poet's execution, recalling that of André Chenier, would surprise the Soviet reader even after Pravda, *breaking the traditional silence on this 'counter-revolutionary' poet, has mentioned his name in connection with the flight of an inter-planetary missile to Venus. His recognition that without the verse of Anna Akhmatova Soviet poetry would be poorer, in spite of the sharp criticism which Zhdanov had directed at her, would not surprise anybody in the Soviet Union now that her work has appeared in popular editions. But the same would hardly apply to her presentation as a representative of Soviet contemporary poetry together with that even more problematic personality, Boris Pasternak. Even more striking is Zelinski's estimate of the poetical importance of such a proven champion of the Party cause in Soviet letters as Alexei*

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Surkov. Not a word of his ability to transform into ringing verses the latest decree of the Central Committee. Instead, the recognition of his merits in poetic propaganda is combined with regret for his lack of genuine artistic energy. In a word, Zelinski's survey surprises both by the choice of his subjects and by the standard he uses in his evaluations. Not that one should disagree with him. On the contrary, he is usually right, even when he protests against allegations by 'unfriendly' Western critics and maintains that Soviet poets today are not fleeing from reality into an Ivory Tower, but are writing poetry about life as it is, and for people who stand in the very thick of it. And yet there is a false note to it all, for Zelinski professes these often unimpeachable, although not always very original views, as if they were generally accepted and generally professable in his own country. That this is not the case is one of the basic facts about poetry in the Soviet Union, and to pass it over in silence is—however good the intention—to mislead. To ignore it is also to adopt an attitude of academic detachment and complacency towards the tragic development of poetry in the Soviet Union for the period under survey with which it is difficult to credit such a sensitive and understanding critic. One must doubt his sincerity when he fails even to mention the suicides of Yesenin, Mayakovski, and Tsvetaeva, the death in a concentration camp of Mandelstam, the tragic end of Pasternak's life, and the untold tribulations of Akhmatova, to mention only a few of the poets with whom Zelinski deals. He is quite right in claiming that they never sought escape into an Ivory Tower, but it was precisely their desire to remain in contact with life and to maintain their independence from 'Party-mindedness' (partiinost) *which was at the root of their individual misfortunes, and at the basis of much that is tragic in the complicated story of modern Russian poetry.*

G. K.

IN order to fly, poetry needs the wings of music and politics. This word politics may seem to some too explicit. But with the greatest philosophical exactness the word can and must underline the real nature of the confluence of the rhythms of music and up-to-dateness in the soul of the poet. In any case, the essence of the development of Soviet poetry over more than forty years is contained in the tendency to unify music and politics in such a way that the poetry of the word becomes the poetry of life. In this article I would like to sketch in a picture of the situation of poetry in the USSR. We must, of course, concentrate on the foreground, examining the principal tendencies and the nature of the most typical figures. But first we will, so to speak, look backwards, if only briefly (in telegraphic style) at what things were like yesterday. Where do today's currents have their source?

The literature of the infant Soviet Union was characterised by a torrential outpouring of ideas and images of revolutionary events. Mayakovski wrote in 1917 : 'Today the foundations of the world are

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visible again. Today, right down to the last button, we must redress Life. . . .'

The dominating positions in Russian poetry, on the eve of the socialist revolution, were held by the Symbolists, led by Bryusov and Blok, and the Acmeists, led by Gumilev.

Blok is the poet of unrest. His refined lyricism, which penetrates the deepest emotions and embraces the fleeting states of the human soul, is at the same time soaked in a sense of history. His poetry is full of the torment of the slavery produced by the inhuman, by the deformed, by the gross and coarse. He is full of tendencies to romanticism. The old world he called 'the terrible world'. Some saw a paradox in the fact that Alexander Blok saluted the Bolsheviks as a 'purifying principle'. But it was not a paradox. Leaving the 'terrible world', he passed courageously into the flames of the revolutionary renewal. His poem, *The Twelve*, even forty years ago had been translated into all the languages of Europe. In fact, it is one of the most arresting poetic productions of the 'revolutionary music' of the day.

Then Valeri Bryusov, this 'unbuttoned man', the leader of Russian symbolism. A gifted poet, erudite in thought and feeling, who dedicated all his verse to every aspect of human emotion, to all people in every century—even he recognised the socialist revolution. More, he joined the Communist Party, and dedicated to Lenin a poem in which he expressed his pride, as a patriot, in the revolutionary bravery of his country. But these poets of the older generation could not become the singers and interpreters of what was new in the Russian way of life, all that had placed itself under Lenin's banner.

Hostile to the revolution was the leader of the Acmeists, Nikolai Gumilev, the bard of Russian expansionism, who brings to mind Kipling. He wrote glittering lines, in which life bubbled like sparkling wine. But Gumilev, unlike the Symbolists, often turned his back on the people in those years of revolutionary storm. Worse still, an excellent poet, he became an accomplice in a counter-revolutionary plot and, like Chenier, paid with his life.

Of the poets of the older generation, it was only given to one, who came from the Futurist camp, to become the first poet of the new, revolutionary Russia. This one was Vladimir Mayakovski. One would say he had been expressly thought up by nature to go into the squares and shout at the crowds. Everything he had seen, everything he had been, before the revolution, had been a testing time and a time of waiting. Now he could shout out loud: 'Let the footsteps of revolt ring out on the cobbled squares! With the waters of a second Flood let us wash the cities of the world. . . .'

There are men whose significance grows with the passing of time. Such a man is Mayakovski. Such poets are born to any one people perhaps once in a century. I, personally, believe that after Pushkin, Mayakovski is probably the most significant Russian poet. In any case, he is the most original. I do not think that anybody since Mayakovski

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has been able to speak for the soul itself of the revolutionary Renewal, with such a wealth of tones and such a depth of humanity. Worth noting is the form of his work, the structure and rhythms of his verse, his way of expressing himself. Mayakovski's work is easily recognised. He writes odes to heroes, sketches in the epic drama of the history of his times, in the background of which the heroic figure of Lenin stands out, and at times he turns to biting satire—in all this the individuality and the personality of the artist make themselves felt. Mayakovski is the Pindar of the generation which ushered in the socialist era. And, like the great singer of olden days, Mayakovski knew how to weave thorns into the wreaths with which he crowned his heroes. But what is above all impressive about Mayakovski is the way he looks to the future. 'I praise the Russia which was, but three times the Russia which will be.' In him the long strides of History may be heard. And if, after many decades, our descendants want to feel inside, and relive, the experience of those who made the October Revolution, understanding the soul of the revolutionary and the state of mind of the men who laid the foundation stones of the new world, then our descendants must turn the pages of the works of Mayakovski. 'Civil poetry', the poetry which expresses the social interests of men, has existed for thousands of years. We can trace back its beginning to the songs of the harvesters and granary slaves, to songs which have been preserved on papyri found in the tombs of the Pharaohs. This is a natural poetry, because man by nature is, as Aristotle said, a social being. In all the different forms of society in every epoch, 'civil poetry' had an appropriate theme and content. Mayakovski did not fill his verse with references to the new idea of our time, the struggle for communism. Mayakovski in fact created a new genre of poetry in which politics just sounded louder than the other musical components, as the principal sphere of interest of the people. And it is easy to understand why—the command, and political programmes, seemed in a backward country to be the natural and most important means of Renewal, of a turnabout on to the road of revolution.

The word 'propaganda' is normally used with a nuance of disapproval. In other words, we think that propaganda is not 'true'. It may well contain a substantial germ of truth, but the means of propagating this germ is somehow outside the realms of truth. But, analysing the dictionary meaning of the word, we must come to the conclusion that propaganda (that is the insistent, organised diffusion of certain ideas) is inherent in any work of art. Some works are more 'objective' and many-sided than others, and in them the propaganda potential is less noticeable. But a great writer is always a king among thinkers. He is a master of life, and a propagandist for his ideas. In the development of all Soviet literature, it is easy to see that the didactic element, the tendency to propagandise certain ideas, is present to a greater degree than in other literatures. Mayakovski is the poet of propaganda for communism. And he was not afraid to make it quite clear that he

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was ready to put his pen at the service of the working class. 'Take note of the word "service"', Mayakovski always insisted.

It is possible to list a great many names of poets who in one way or another were the 'discoverers' and then the 'troubadors' of the revolution, heralds of the political struggle for communism. Such a man was Demyan Bedny, especially popular during the first years of the civil war. His fables, his satirical tailpieces, always full of cross references to the political reality of the day, enjoyed a particular success with the soldiers of the Red Army.

WHAT alternative was there to this development of acutely political poetry? There were only poets of the recent past, 'alien to the noise of the public forum, the movement of the mob, to politics in general'. It was as if they said: 'Man does not live by politics alone. What about love, death, the stars and the moon, the whisper, the sigh, the song of the nightingale? What shall we do with this complex internal world of man? We think of poetry as the expression of this complexity, of this secret beauty inside and all around man'. In these words there were elements of truth and elements of falsehood. There was 'upside down propaganda', if you will. Man became detached from the most important fertilising elements of his life, his contact and social relations with other men. Even the slogan 'Away from politics!', however, was political, of a kind. Even Italian 'ermetismo', which carried poetry away from the noise of centuries into an uncertain world of refined sensation, was a hidden protest against the drums and cymbals of Mussolini. A retreat from the battleground of the struggle for communism (by Russian decadent elements) only served to show how unacceptable the communist revolution was in certain strata of society, and this retreat was 'political'. However, in a work of poetry some declaration of political faith is not essential, nor should one look only for that. Every real work of art sets out some aesthetic and humane concept, that is to say, something over and above the limits of some scheme or other, and this concept synthesises various aspects of man's emotional and spiritual life. Without doubt, the most important, and the greatest, figures among the poets who looked for inspiration outside politics, even eschewed 'politics', and the interests of the state and the revolution, were Anna Akhmatova and Boris Pasternak.

Anna Akhmatova is a poet in the classical tradition. Her verse is clear yet profound, so that every adjective and noun creates a sensation of the ponderability of things. This was a characteristic of the Acmeists. Such a poet was Osip Mandelstam whose 'sacred mutterings', linking ancient myth with topical event, were stretched over a framework of austerity. Akhmatova drew her inspiration from the inner world of the women of old St. Petersburg. It is only natural that Soviet criticism should see in her the symbol of the old restricted world. But Akhmatova knew how to go beyond this world. Feelings of patriotism came to the surface during the Great Patriotic War against the

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German fascists and this almost reconciled Akhmatova to Soviet poetry. Anna Akhmatova, notwithstanding the reproaches directed at her of indirectness and of having too restricted a horizon (reproaches not without foundation), in my opinion was and remains a page without which Soviet poetry would be the poorer.

Surprising is the case of Pasternak. The unhappy story of his anti-Soviet (and artistically unsuccessful) novel *Dr Zhivago,* for a time turned the poet's name into a card to be played in the war of nerves, in the cold war. But that story does not obscure for me the irrefutable fact that Pasternak is one of the more noteworthy manifestations of that phenomenon, 'individualistic and refined poetry' of the century of 'eremitism' long since past. I think, too, that Ilya Ehrenburg was right when he saw, forty years ago, that Pasternak represented not only the end of 'eremitism' but also a step towards the future, even a bridge. The events of the revolution, he thought, were reflected in Pasternak's poetry like a rainbow, curving over the river and giving back a thousand sparkling images. For example, in the poem about the 1905 Revolution. If Akhmatova is quiet, contemplation, a tinkling of broken glass, Pasternak on the contrary is a noisy disintegration of images, a tempestuous union of disunity. 'I would not look down on even an expensive and unprofitable word' says the poet in one of his poems in 1917.

This is an echo of the school of Futurism, from which Pasternak, together with Mayakovski and Aseyev, came. Pasternak astonishes in two ways. First, with the sound and syntax of his verse (his monophonism), his improvisation of metaphors and similes, though these storms break in a microcosm. Secondly, Pasternak astonishes by the limitations of his social horizon. Blok had a feeling for history. Mayakovski was one of history's Hercules, and one of its librarians. But Pasternak's arena is that of the jeweller and the watchmaker. The question comes like a wisecrack: 'Why then this storm in a teacup about him?' But this would be unjust. Pasternak wrote lines about Lenin, but who of the other poets of our time, while the earth shakes with atomic explosions and with the suppressed revolutions of the millions in all the continents, could, speaking of surf, write of waves that 'the surf cooks them like cakes'? An intimate, private-room sort of sound: waves and cakes. In this sort of comparison lies the key to an understanding of Pasternak. Is this possible—that history is a macrocosm and the human I a microcosm? Let us not play with words. It is not worth while wasting time with superficially ingenious antitheses polarised in every possible way. Hegel had already shown that the dialectic frees metaphysics from its formal contradictions. In life things change their quality as naturally as rain becomes rivers and lakes, or rivers and lakes become clouds. We have seen that the beginnings of Soviet poetry were typified by breaks with the past, the polarisation of feeling and thought, and opposition of different kinds.

I will not examine in detail the whole of the road that Russian

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poetry has followed in four decades. I am not writing the history of Soviet poetry. I only want to lift the veil from the face of today, or, to be more exact, from a whole gallery of faces.

What do we find today? The aspirations to 'civil poetry' and aspirations to a world of 'lyric poetry' still remain. But between them there is no longer the sharp break which forty years ago their contemporaries felt between Mayakovski and Akhmatova. The dogmatic antithesis of these polarisations of poetry was abandoned by critics in the thirties. Now, in fact, critics do not busy themselves with what they call 'pure lyrics' because of their backwardness or braking effect. Similarly, they do not praise 'civil poetry' to the skies as the only possible aspect of poetry, exclusive of all others. Of course the antithesis sometimes makes itself heard. Not long ago I read in *Pravda* a poem, *Dialogue about Poetry*, by Yaroslav Smelyakov (one of those who came into literature in the thirties). Imitating Mayakovski's *At the Top of My Voice*, Smelyakov writes coarsely, contrasting his coarseness, his deliberate vulgarity, with the absurd refinements of women's magazines. Apart from this, Smelyakov is one of the most capable and typical of contemporary poets.

In general, the different tendencies have remained, but the extremes of these tendencies have disappeared or faded into insignificance. Why? Because man himself has changed in the Soviet Union, has become unrecognisable, as unrecognisable as his country and his standard of living. In those days, the flames of the Civil War still burned. Today even this aspect of city life, the crude funeral pyre destroying the evidence of destruction, has changed. This is a world which has put on clean underwear, where millions know what a well-laid and well-laden table looks like and where people understand the structure of a Shostakovich symphony, the purpose of a painting, where the differential calculus has become a commonplace for the intelligentsia. The new generation of Soviet men and women, born after the war against German fascism, whose minds are not oppressed by the various taboos which the Stalin cult of personality for a time created, wants to live fully integrated lives. It is for this reason (in any event, this is my impression) that the voice of youth sounds loudest in Soviet poetry today, a youth which has introduced into Soviet poetry a widening of the horizon and a zest for experiment. Mayakovski, of course, had already felt precisely these needs.

I must make it clear that the poets of the older generation, like Nikolai Tikhonov, Alexei Surkov, Ilya Selvinski, Alexander Prokofiev, Nikolai Aseyev, Mikhail Isakovski, Mikhail Svetlov, have not exhausted their inspiration. The reader does not look at them as he looks at actors who have said their piece and remain purposelessly on the stage. No—these older men have great talents. Their literary legacy occupies entire chapters in the textbooks of Soviet literature. They are still read today, and in particular their songs (especially those of Isakovski) are

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sung. Some of Isakovski's poetic dicta have become proverbs in general use. This is why I will speak first of these ' old heroes '.

Perhaps the most coherent, and in a certain sense the most typical warrior of the old conception of ' civil poetry ' is Surkov. However, it must be recognised that, at least in my opinion, the propaganda poetry written by this eminent activist lacks genuinely artistic energy. A singer of the revolutionary struggle, Surkov is at the same time a traditionalist in his solution of formal problems. He has his talent as a warrior poet and he finds it difficult, in his conception of man and his times, to get rid of the gunsmoke and the smell of cold steel. Tikhonov, too, in the first part of his poetic life, was a ' warrior romantic ' of his times, reflecting some of the noises of the Acmeist school. Even he spent most of his time on patrol in the zone of formal experiment in verse, and perhaps his topical romanticism still seems today the prime source of strength in his verse, added to a certain individual freshness of approach. Among the poets who have been writing for almost half a century, and who are nearing seventy, the most powerful and imposing is I. Selvinski. He is a Gargantua *sui generis* of Soviet poetry. He is a super-producer of verse—he must have written tens of thousands of lines—and he manages them with great virtuosity. He is the author of several books of lyrics, of an entire series of epic dramas (*The Story of Ulyalaev, Pushtorg, Artico,* etc.), the author, too, of many verse tragedies. Once in 1930 Selvinski wrote and published in the format of a newspaper the *House-Electrician's Herald.* Everything, from the editorial to the round-up of international affairs, the chess competition corner and the miscellany, was written in verse. It looked like the solution to some gigantic artistic crossword puzzle, and it would raise a smile if it were not an eloquent witness to the inexhaustible energy of Selvinski and his virtuosity as a versifier. In the twenties, Selvinski was the leader of the ' Constructivists ', and to Mayakovski's later thesis : ' I would inundate you with novels, too, ever more readable and attractive, but I am overwhelmed and my songs stick in my throat ', Selvinski opposed the thesis of the ' flourishing man ' (in the spirit of Feuerbach). Later he recognised that the pathos of the ' flourishing man ', who lives in a fully integrated world, who in other words enjoys encyclopedic thoughts and feelings and unlimited freedom, and whose behaviour seems like some function of an arbitrary anarchy, cannot be described or abstracted. But despite the fact that in his output (especially in his early period) there is a prevailing hypertrophy of form and content, Selvinski remains one of the clearest expressions of our experimental epoch.

WE often say we live in a world of change. Men of every country and all countries say this, because the development of history accelerates in a sort of geometric progression. But perhaps in no other country more than in the Soviet Union is the scale of change so visible. In any case, those who took part in, or were present during, the 1917

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Revolution tell us that now we are living in an entirely new world. Not only because of the cars which have taken the place of the horses in the streets of Moscow, and the stars of the sputniks the place of the gas-lamps, but because the rhythm of life is quite different. For the poets of Selvinski's generation, like Pavel Antokolski or Vera Inber, all this has meant the necessity for a reconstruction, ideological and artistic, of the internal apparatus of poetry itself. This generation of poets has not only represented its epoch, but has followed on into the next ; has not only built, but has also reorganised. In this sense, that generation of intelligentsia, poetic intelligentsia which came into literature in the thirties, found itself in a clearer position. But while avoiding some obstacles to development, they found themselves up against others. Avoiding the experience of the ' break ' in the class struggle, this poetic generation had to go through the ordeal of ' compression ' during the years of the Stalin personality cult. Nevertheless, neither in the one case nor the other did the exigencies of the historical situation, which at times took the form of an almost military order with military duties, decompose the souls of these men, who opened themselves and Soviet poetry to a development of a ' romanticism of communism '.

Of this intermediate generation perhaps the most outstanding figure, in any event the most popular, was Konstantin Simonov. Simonov's creative activity, as poet, dramatist, novelist, war correspondent, activist, is an exceptional example of enthusiasm for life. Everything is attractive about his talent : his ideological maturity and his ability, the depth of his impressions, the precision and the extent of his interests, his equilibrium and his quick mind (this last sometimes to a fault). In this writer there is a health and energy, a confidence in his own strength which is the epitome of the nature of the new generation of Soviet intelligentsia, of the Soviet man formed wholly by our times. All these qualities would constitute the raw material of Simonov's poetry, but this brief summary of his qualities does not do justice to more than a tenth of the poet's own ambitions, or to the wide and multiform movements of the spirit indispensable to such an intense activity. It is odd, but in Simonov's poetry there is no trace of romanticism, or escape into a wider world, or a call to the far away and unattainable.

Why is this? I think that it has nothing to do with any lack of talent, but with a one-sided conception of poetry and an absence of frustration in such a multiform and successful life of self expression. Journalism in a way suppresses lyricism. The strength of Simonov as a poet lies in the vividness of his descriptions, and in the almost tangible quality of his detail. Simonov has lived a lot, has travelled a lot, and so the range of his observation is great (perhaps the best of his reportage poems is *Guest of Shu*). He is emotionally sensitive to the social and political pulse of life, and in this quick reaction to life lies one explanation of his popularity with his readers. Some of his early war poems, like *Wait for Me*, addressed to women, to wives and girl friends (' Wait for me and I will come back, in spite of all the dead . . .'), had

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a success on a national scale. In contrast to Surkov, Simonov as poet or novelist was at home with war themes. Both men are an heroic page in the book of Soviet poetry.

The war against German fascism had a profound effect on the spiritual development of our country, as on almost all the countries of Europe—England, France, and Italy. This was most apparent in Soviet poetry and in Soviet literature in general. The war showed the Soviet people as warriors in the name of an ideal, a human ideal, that of the development of man's potential. Alexei Tolstoi was right when he said that the war with Hitlerite Germany was not so much a war of armoured cars as of moral values. In other words, the war did not just put Soviet literature in the trenches (i.e. did not only transform it into an agency of propaganda for military objectives), but helped it to show a consciousness of moral values, and a new humanity.

Of the poets of the intermediate generation which came out of the war ideologically tested, mature, and enriched by their experiences, the most important was Alexander Tvardovski. There is a certain rationalism running through his poetic works, a rationalism which subordinates feeling to thought, even drags feeling along behind thought. Perhaps, to be more exact, one could describe his writings as arguments in verse, clear, concise, and logical. This affects the structure of his verse, which is clear and logical and tends towards classical forms, to the verse of popular tradition. Tvardovski has an unusually acute sense of the life of the masses. The Russian people, above all the Russian peasant, the collective farmer, the soldier, the Ivan in the street, crop up again and again in his work, sometimes sketched in lightly, sometimes forming part of an epic, buffeted by the winds of our time, the winds of revolution and war. The almost bucolic origins of the poet's world are easily discernible, in the structure of the verse, in his propensity to facetiousness, to proverbs, to aphorisms, all of which contain echoes of the conversation of the rural man in the street. In Tvardovski it is as if two currents, two traditional currents, of Russian poetry joined together —one comes directly via Nekrasov, the pessimist of the life of the masses, the other from the optimist Pushkin.

If Sholokhov in his novels has been able to spotlight the Russian man, in epic and high drama, at the most important stages of his development in this century (the Civil War, the years of collectivisation, the years of the Patriotic War), he must give some of the credit to Tvardovski, who has gone step by step with him in the solution of the problems which these events pose for the artist. Tvardovski's poems (*The Country Called Moravia,* about collectivisation, *Vassily Terkin,* the Russian soldier fighting against Hitler, *The House on the Street,* about the sufferings of a woman soldier with two children in a Hitlerite concentration camp), have taken their place among the classics of Russian literature. At least as such they are considered by the Russian reader, and Vassily Terkin has become almost real. His prototype is to be found in any barracks, or army unit, just as the prototype of

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Sholokhov's Davidov, the hero of the novel *Virgin Soil Upturned,* is to be found everywhere. Finally, Tvardovski's great poem *Beyond the Horizon,* which is almost a panorama of contemporary Soviet life. There Siberia takes its place, with the building of the huge hydroelectric installations on the River Angara, side by side in the pages of the poem with reflections on Stalin, a meeting with a comrade just released from a concentration camp, thoughts on Stalin's historical function and his significance today, single images joined together by the vividness of a travelogue, meetings with people, souvenirs, the lyrical bitter-sweet of the past and pictures painted from memory, all mixed up with thoughts on the destiny of the Soviet people, of man as a whole, as he goes towards his historical end along a difficult road.

In this poem, the reader is distracted to a lesser extent than in its predecessors by the rural, bucolic atmosphere; its scope eliminates levity and widens the poet's own horizons. But, to my mind, the drama is not always sustained and the structure of the poem is weak in parts. Tvardovski is very democratic. He is the poet of the mob, of men in the street, of the sea of men (to be stylistic). But he is not a poet who, rocking himself to sleep on the waves of this sea of men like an absent-minded fisherman, is complacent about the storms beating against his boat, the wind and rain in his face. He not only describes, but thinks aloud about the movements of the waters, about the decisions to be taken, about the Captain: you can hear his mind at work. And it is not always possible to put your finger on what it was—the way of thinking, the spirit of observation, or the obscure movements of the spirit of the singer—which produced the poetic impression we used to get from Yesenin.

THE names of Isakovski, Surkov, Tvardovski, and sometimes Prokofiev—a poet close to them in the structure of his verse and its folklore themes—are usually considered together by critics, as if they formed a school of poets. This does not seem to me to be fair or accurate. They have certain affinities, in their peasant origin, and in their political-ideological position, but as poets they are quite different. Isakovski has made his reputation largely with lyrical verse and songs, Surkov in propagandist poetry, and Tvardovski by his excellence as an epic poet.

The political alternative to this 'school' is perhaps Stepan Shipachev. Shipachev, because of his age, ought to be numbered among the older generation. He, too, is of peasant origin, learnt to read and write late in life, and fought in the Red Army in the Civil War. But because of the nature and direction of his poetic gifts, Shipachev seems to be at the other pole when compared with Tvardovski. He has chosen as his special field that of the 'pure lyric'. And to give him his due, Shipachev has insisted on his right to develop his own line. Even in the years when 'publicist themes' dominated Soviet poetry, Shipachev took the risk, and it was a real risk, of persisting in his exploration

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of ' eternal themes ', seeking in them his new man, his own new man. And Shipachev found him. His lyric hero is the man of limitless magnanimity, discretion, of a feeling of personal responsibility for history and the condition of human society.

It is interesting to see how Shipachev handles, for example, the theme of love (and Shipachev's best verse is dedicated to this ' eternal theme '). In all the many centuries of poetry—from Catullus to Horace, Shakespeare, and Ronsard (not to mention the decadents of the twentieth century)—the right to get drunk on love is sacred. All the witches, wizards, and poets of the world have worked together to distil an amorous potion. Shipachev presents his readers with a love potion which gets rid of the hangover. He is the poet of reserve, discretion, fidelity—not the poet of duty towards the family so much as counsel for the stability of an ensemble of emotions. His verse is popular with Soviet readers, especially with young readers. If one may speak of the formulation of a new socialist ethic at this stage—the development of our Soviet lyric poetry is inseparable from this process—then Shipachev's verses on love, however one may judge them artistically, are a noteworthy phenomenon and a signpost. But his lyric hero observes rather than suffers, thinks rather than gives himself up to his feelings. In his love poems, Shipachev does not so much express the nature of feelings of love in the person, as describe the objects of love, analyse its spiritual content, dissect its spiritual anatomy. This is why his poetry is usually confined to the traditional form of contemplative verse, the stanza sequence.

It is odd that, in describing the world of feelings, Shipachev shows himself not so much their captive (like Verlaine or Yesenin) as their mentor or judge—he weighs up and values the feelings he describes, from the outside, so to speak. Obviously, a certain rationalism in many Soviet poets is a sort of *mal de siècle*. The *correct thought* has become more important than the *right feeling*. Perhaps it is for this reason that Shipachev's poetic thought is not disturbing but calming? He leads his readers not out into the world, but into the street, narrowing the horizon and so reducing the effort needed to understand and see it clearly. And in this respect, even if the poet says that ' moralising is not the poet's job ', in many of Shipachev's poems there is a moral at the end. It is this that gives the impression, at the end of reading his stanza sequences or elegies, that one has been reading a fable ; and here, too, lies the explanation for their leaning towards the oriental, and especially the classical Persian, in much of their concern with allegory.

A place here, under the sign of ' Opposition ', for Leonid Martynov. He, too, is of the older generation. But sometimes recognition by the reading public comes late, and this happened with Martynov. It is as if he came on the scene twice, first as the author of great poems, highly observant and highly coloured like the Russian fable (*Poem Su Uvenkae* and others), and often derived from them. Then the fable

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seems to have lost its appeal or to have been transformed into a lyric principle, highly original and a 'revelation' of the world around him. This is Martynov's position today. He is a poet who brings out into the light the fact that he is a poet and what it means, and what the poetry in the poem is all about. There is in him a sense of getting close to the edge of the world and a sort of madness of discovery, of everything headless and out of place, a nightmare world. In Martynov's poem *The Bay*, trees wander over the earth's surface and strange beings with classical madness in their eyes appear, homeless, vainly seeking shelter. Here is an unreal world painted and drawn larger than life, as in the old Russian tales of Prince Ivan and the firebird, where there are fauns and vampires, but where, in the end, Good and Love triumph. In Martynov's descriptions there is much which is fabulous, and a lot of narration, dubbed on to the verse so to speak in a game of counter-rhythm and repetition. Escaping in his poetry from too much rationalisation, Martynov often goes to the other extreme, towards what in the olden days they used to call the 'holy hissing of the pythoness'. Horace was right when, in his *Epistle to the Pisons*, he wrote that an honest and competent man notices the defects of a poem and '*parum claris lucem dare coget*'. As for me, I am not afraid to admit that the talent of 'mad' poets, incomprehensible, as described by Horace, does not arouse much enthusiasm in me either. Perhaps it is true that Orpheus knew how to hypnotise lions and savages with his lyre, with a few noises. But a man worthy of the name of poet looks for sense, too.

In October 1958 Nikolai Zabolotski died. As he is dead, perhaps I am wrong to include him among representatives of contemporary Soviet poetry, but as I knew him Zabolotski remains one of the most congenial and profound of contemporary Russian poets. In his poetry we find the classic balance between thought and emotion. If Martynov has retired from the wide open spaces of the epic into the woods of nightmare fable, Zabolotski began with bizarre verse and then passed on to clarity. In his verse there are also reflections of past thought, and even more of philosophic thought, wonderfully fused in the body of his poetic dreams. Zabolotski said to me once that the principal thing about poetry is the viewpoint, the angle of sight, and in the 'chaste chasm of verse' there are things to be found in him not glimpsed by others.

It is difficult to summarise his poetic output. It is impossible to explain it with a single theme. He will give you the portrait of a plain girl or of an old artist, describe a swamp in the *taiga*, a city or the steppe, the leaves of the eucalyptus or the nature of poetry—always a particular and wonderful world, full, however (different in this from Shipachev), of a secret anguish. Zabolotski does not teach so much as put you in front of his window and force you to think about what you see through it. For example, when daylight is fading and the sky boils up like 'a colossal atomic explosion', in front of you is placed the thought-provoking image of another man, who at another point in the

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universe is in the dark, in a garden, looking up at the stars. ' Because at the end of my days I disturb him with a shadowy dream.'

Zabolotski is a poet of unrest, and he unsettles the reader like Tiutchev. In spite of his lexical dress, even he is a little out of date. He does not try to dazzle you with a firework display of words, like Kirsanov. One can say of Zabolotski (as one says of some people in company) : in his presence it is better to say nothing and just think.

I HAVE listed some of the poets who have made an impression at least on me. But perhaps others will find my choice of names too subjective. This reproach of subjectivism is hard to avoid. Literary criticism is not a chemist's shop in which powders are mixed with an accuracy of to within one-tenth of a gram. The liking for a particular poem, for this or that line of poetry, is not something made up according to a prescription, not susceptible to variation. Either you like a poem or you do not. Some poems you like more, others less. And adding a score or so more names to our list of contemporary poets is not going to fill in the general picture any more. In every country thousands of people versify. Every day in some part of the Soviet Union at least three books of verse are published. Falling in love for the first time awakens in the adolescent the lyric Muse. To Appollo's temple of the Muse many are called but few are chosen. Every fiancé of the lyric Muse tries to bend the bow of Ulysses. But it is not given to all to do it and not every poetic arrow wounds the heart of every reader. Some people like complex verse, others like it clear. Tvardovski, for example, the paladin of logical clarity, said once that in his opinion verse rich in content could be as well written out in prose and this would be the measure of its poesy. This exists only in the content of the poem, irrespective of the form. I, too, like transparent, comprehensible verse, but I do not agree with Tvardovski's thesis. The logical content of poetry is always refracted by the prism of its music. Pushkin once said: ' God forgive me, poetry ought to be a bit ingenious '. Some poets take this half joking comment at its face value and make great efforts to imitate the sound of birds and the mumbling of oracles. But the ' difficult ' poet with his ' abstruse verse ' always suffers in the end. ' Abstruse verse ' takes its revenge on the poet. He loses all his readers.

Authentic poetry always comes out of the soil of life itself. And its arguments, its themes, its demands and its interests, couched in poetic images, catch our imagination to a much greater depth and with much greater frequency than the verbal abstractions or capricious movement of emotive clouds from soul to soul.

In this way, with an approach which has some relevance to contemporary life, one can make clear the task of contemporary Soviet poetry, of the younger generation of Soviet poets—those poets who started to publish after the war. This generation went through all the hardships of war when they were still children. In their psychology, the changes which have since taken place in the USSR are heavily marked. These

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changes are the result of an enormous advance in the economic sector, and a rise in the standard of living; but even more, they are the result of the elimination of the consequences of the personality cult, and of the noteworthy growth, spiritual growth, of the new young intelligentsia.

The well-known American poet Carl Sandburg, who was in the Soviet Union in 1959, wrote in the Swedish newspaper *Stockholms Tidningen*: 'The Soviet Union is fifty years ahead of us. . . . We must have more schools and widen the teaching of science and mathematics in the schools we have already'.

What is the principal characteristic of the intelligentsia, and in particular the scientific intelligentsia, which has grown from the remarkable widening of the scientific and technological base of Soviet society? It is not only the substantial nature of their knowledge in the most revolutionary fields of contemporary Soviet culture—the physics of the elementary particle, mathematics, polymetry, electronics, cybernetics, etc., although this knowledge is widespread among them; also important is the fact that by assimilating foreign languages they have come into direct contact with foreign literature. In the ranks of this intelligentsia there are more than a million people of about thirty years of age. The principal characteristic of this intelligentsia, the sign by which they are known, is their width of interest and creative activity, directed towards communism.

Some hostile commentators in the West, in Europe and in the United States, force themselves to believe that the Soviet Union is now remarkable for the fact that there is a reaction *against* propagandist literature and this reaction takes the form of a movement *towards* 'pure lyrical poetry', 'art for art's sake', and so on. These 'experts' and 'observers' (like George Oibian, author of a book published in the United States called *Interval of Liberty*) must be disillusioned, and I must disillusion them. The new generation is in no sense moving away from Soviet reality (as the 'observers' put it), but the reverse—they are, our young poets, totally immersed in Soviet reality, with all their interests and intellectual activity. But for this new generation, obviously, there no longer exists the necessity for choice between politics and introspection, between personal and social, between 'civic poetry' and 'pure lyricism'. This generation, on the contrary, is up with the avant-garde of communism, not paralysed with fear or circumspection but full of energy directed at clearing away what is dead and old from the path of communism, just as Mayakovski was.

Anybody who really wants to understand what is happening in the Soviet Union must stop and think about the two words: Great Renewal. What sort of renewal and in whose name? In the name of the 'human man', to use Marx's phrase. In other words, in the name of the complete development of man, in the name of the man whose nature, freeing itself from animal instincts, flourishes as an image of human beauty. This is possible only in a society where there is no exploitation of man by man, where oppression and interference by the

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state has gone, where wars are abolished, where prisons and the police have gone—in a word, where every sort of restriction has been done away with. To put it more plainly, such a state of affairs as can only exist in a communist society. But there is a historical logic in the progress of humanity towards these new forms of social being. Before conquering an unlimited freedom, in the struggle for this freedom some of its aspects have to be temporarily renounced. Occasional and temporary restrictions of liberty in the Soviet Union are always accompanied by Great Leaps Forward towards tomorrow, towards the realm of freedom. As Mayakovski wrote : ' Beyond the fighting line lie all the things of beauty. Go forward and they are yours, Choose! ' The old and the new are still mixed up together. And the struggle for the new is for a time the struggle with the old.

NO revolutionary development can be uniform. It is not like movement along a motorway. It is *revolutionary*. In the thirties, the critical and satirical elements in Soviet poetry were smothered by the Stalin personality cult. Now, naturally enough, they are free to develop again and show themselves, and this is true in general for young Soviet poetry—it is full of vitality. For this reason, attempts by bourgeois critics (especially in England and the United States) to extract ' non-political ' short stories and poems from works by Soviet authors, are attempts comparable to trying to make bread from grapes. The aim and object of this super-selectivity by bourgeois critics is to produce ' evidence ' that Soviet youth is retreating from the ideals of communism. They tell me that in Italy a collection of short stories by the young Soviet writer Kazakov appeared in the bookshop windows ticketed ' Without ideology '. This one-sided collection of signs of apoliticality comes from a certain ingenuousness and a superficiality of acquaintanceship with their subject. In the end, what they want to read they find.

In reality, we see quite a different state of affairs : a natural widening of the horizon of literature in its themes, a deeper knowledge of the inner world of Soviet man, and a growth in the depth and seriousness of the critical element in the struggle for true communism. All these traits are visible in the works of Evgeni Evtushenko.

Evtushenko is a prolific author and almost every year he gives us a book of verse. He is always popular with the younger generation, which, not without reason, sees in him the interpreter of their collective state of mind, of their everyday thoughts about life. When the war began he was a twelve-year-old boy. Ten years passed and he was already publishing in magazines. He made a name for himself because he touched fearlessly on some of the most acute social problems, and above all, those phenomena of Soviet life left over from the spiritual regime formed under the conditions of the Stalin personality cult. I do not see in Evtushenko that artistic candour there was in Mayakovski or

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that intensity of emotion which holds the attention and compels reflection in the best lines by Zabolotski.

Evtushenko's verse is narrative in character. Many of his things (e.g. *Consider Me a Communist*) are loose in structure and approach, and some of his lines make the reader think they were added as an afterthought. But what one cannot take away from the poet is his creative energy, his expansiveness, and his sensitivity to everything around him. Evtushenko knows how to play on people's nerves like harpstrings. In him we see the outline of a new Soviet reality, in his moments of wisdom—but these are mixed up with backstairs doggerel, risqué verse which lacks taste, poetic profiles of his contemporaries, confessional lyrics, and odd appendices. He seems to be speaking with many voices, always in a hurry to polemicise, often victim of an excess of impressions. Of his generation he himself says: 'We move about restlessly in the crowded trams . . . the Underground sucks us in, spitting us out later from its smokefilled mouth . . . we take tobacco out of our pockets, we hum popular songs . . . bumping into each other, digging elbows into each other's ribs we apologise or we say . . . this is what foreigners call, and so do we, Moscow!'

True, to the eyes of the foreigner all this is Moscow, the Moscow crowd. Everything we mean by the word 'population'.

Evtushenko is the poet of the young stratum of 'the population'. In this lies his weakness, for sometimes he does not succeed in distinguishing between the petit-bourgeois and the hero of the crowd. But herein, too, lies his strength. Perhaps the best of Evtushenko's verses are those in which he does not use the pronoun 'I'. He has never done the Narcissans any good. In my opinion, Evtushenko's best work is his expressively filled gallery of the crowds which make up the population of the Soviet Union, the 'common men and women': the worker, the factory girl, the pensioner, the student, the underworld character, and many others. Often Evtushenko draws his characters to illustrate his social arguments: here the young man who has become a Teddy boy, who 'has read Hemingway' according to his father, who looks on with raised eyebrows. And then the 'nihilist' gives his life to save a friend, and in the end we have a spiritually pure man, built up in the best heroic traditions, with the moral: Don't judge people by appearances.

Much has been written about Evtushenko and he is often criticised. He comes up against bigots and hypocrites (and in every sort of human society these remain). But in spite of his ideological defects and his artistic lacunae (which spoil his work in great patches like those on the back of a giraffe), he himself, and his poetry, are symptomatic of the growth of conscious creative activity on the part of the new generation.

After the twentieth congress of the party (February 1956), many aspects of the development of the Soviet Union, both in economic thought and in technical-scientific thought, as well as in spiritual fields, acquired or reacquired a revolutionary dynamic, at the very least found every sort of progress accelerated. One of the ways in which this

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speed-up showed itself was in a thirst for enterprise, for creative activity. Some young people went off to the virgin lands, others looked up at the stars, others at poetry, hoping in this way to embrace the whole process of evolution and catch hold of the fleeting passage of time. We admit that this did not always seem mature, precise, or complete (like the works of Evtushenko), but it was a sign of new times. Or, as N. Gumilev said : ' Our souls cry out, the flesh diminishes, generating a new organ for the sixth sense.'

Quite different in form, but gripped by the same consuming, pulsating creative energy, is another of the generation of twenty-odd-year-old poets, Andrei Voznesenski. In his verse there is an impetuosity, an audacity of comparisons not always well thought out, emotion in plenty. For example, his poem on Goya ; this is difficult to translate because it is built up by sound, deriving much of its effect from alternating ' o 's and ' r 's : ' I saw the throat of the hanged peasant, his body swinging like a bell, he was naked in the square, I, Goya! '

If Evtushenko urges the themes of his poetry towards politics, Voznesenski urges his towards a revaluation of form. In some of his poems he even seems to have become a paladin of formalism, but his is not the simplicity of the tinkling sounds and formalistic experiments which so delighted Selvinski and others, Tsvetayeva, Kirsanov, the French dadaists and so on. I would not classify him with the formalists. In Voznesenski there is everything I have described above, characteristic of the generation of the cosmonauts. As he himself said in a poem : ' A spark of research, a spark of risk, a spark of olympic insolence, can set fire to a heart, can burn it out, can destroy the earth for the Devil.'

Who are his models? The girl at the cash desk, the artist, the student, the miner, the pilot, the passengers on branch lines, war wounded, architects . . . Lenin, Khrushchev's speech at the inauguration of a power station on the Volga. . . . But he never looks at anything from the front. His principle seems to be to ' walk round and have a good look ', but he draws parabola, and not happy circumferences.

The names of many poets, of the same age as Gagarin, come to mind. There are young women among them, very capable poets like Bella Akhmadullina, with her courageous and unexpected attitudes ; like Svetlana Evseyeva, who paints with words as if they were oil and brush, light and strong. It is not for nothing that she says : ' I am as strong as a washerwoman '. These are our Soviet girls : ' I walk side by side with my man—twentieth century with twentieth century—believe in my goodness—and be my man '.

I want to name two more young poets : Evgeni Vinokurov and Boris Slutski. These two are the oldest of the ' school ' and both lived through the war, but have come into literature only in the past few years. Evgeni Vinokurov strikes the eye for the extreme lightness of his lyricism. As for Evtushenko and the majority of the young, the atmosphere and the everydayness of Soviet life are all important—the usual scenes at the club, at the museum, at home, etc. And in these

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scenes the figure of the lyrical hero comes to the fore, ready with reflection, ready to philosophise. There are people who by their nature just cannot lie. They seduce with the extreme simplicity of their message. This is the charm of Vinokurov's verse. Slutski is strong and almost coarse in the way he traces the outline of his poetry. His lines seem to have been cut out of wood, or linoleum. There is much of the soldier, and a sense of drama in his verse. It is impossible to forget his poem about the fascist mine which blew up a ship full of horses, horses which swam about in the Atlantic until one by one they grew weaker and drowned.

Poetic visions are not hidden in books, and to bring to life or even list the names of authors would take many years. I have only mentioned contemporary Russian poets, but Soviet poetry is multilingual and multinational. There are noteworthy poets in the Ukraine, in Georgia, in Lithuania, in Latvia, in Estonia, in Byelorussia, in Armenia, in Azerbaijan, in Kazakhstan, in the Central Asian Republics. It is impossible to speak of them briefly. Each national poetry has its colour, its national characteristics, even if the general tendencies which I have outlined here are, to a greater or lesser extent, true for the literature of other Soviet peoples. Because everywhere there is a fervour for communism. Everywhere the sparks of the welder break the darkness and the building of new houses and factories goes on apace. The sound of metal on metal rings out all over the country and wheat floods the steppe.

When the sun comes up over the East we hear the sound of a million wings. They are the wings of poetry. They go up to the sky and fly towards what we, Soviet men, call our tomorrow: to the meeting with communism!!

(*This essay forms part of a collection edited by Dr. Olga Muzio, to be published shortly by Morcelliana, under the title* A Survey of Contemporary European Poetry. *Acknowledgments are due to Dr. Muzio and the Casa Editrice Morcelliana.*)

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THE UNIVERSITIES IN EAST GERMANY

Rudolf Reinhardt

The following article describes the situation in East German universities, as observed from the inside during the last few years. When the curtain came down between East and West Berlin on 13 August 1961 it not only affected decisively the status of the former German capital; both for the rulers and the ruled in East Germany, the entire political situation was changed. There were to be no more escapes: Bleibe im Lande und nähre dich redlich, *said Kurt Hager, the leading cultural official of the SED, quoting an old German proverb. Mr Hager obviously has a well developed sense of humour; it is doubtful whether this is shared by many of his compatriots.*

FOLLOWING the example of the Soviet Union, the East German authorities have systematically aimed at an expansion of higher education which is unusually extensive even by German standards. Before the second world war there were, apart from a few art schools with University rank, the five Universities of Leipzig, Jena, Halle-Wittenberg, Rostock, and Greifswald on the territory of the present 'German Democratic Republic' (GDR). Besides these there were also the technical college in Dresden and the mining school in Freiburg. Since 1810 Berlin has had the Unter den Linden University, which is housed in the centre of the city, occupied by the Soviets since 1945. All these institutions of higher education resumed their teaching activities in 1945 and 1946. Most of them were later renamed in accordance with the Soviet custom of giving all institutions propagandistically effective names. The Friedrich-Wilhelm University of East Berlin is now called the Humboldt University, the University of Leipzig, where Goethe studied, the Karl Marx University, that of Greifswald is named, after the poet of the era of the war of liberation, the Ernst-Moritz-Arndt University. In the early post-war years the former University of Halle-Wittenberg, which now exists only in Halle, was given a patriotic designation with the name of Martin Luther University. The University of Rostock and the special colleges of Dresden and Freiberg are for the time being still waiting for a sufficiently 'progressive' adornment.

To these eight teaching and research institutions no fewer than thirty have been added since 1945. Amongst these are eight specialised technical colleges, three schools of medicine, four agricultural colleges or educational institutions with the same rank, four colleges for economics and political science, two colleges or University institutes of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of exclusively political character, and one college for physical culture. An example from among these new

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academic institutions is a 'College for Collective Farms' in the city of Meissen. A simple 'Industrial School' founded after the first world war in the Saxon textile and machine-building town of Chemnitz (now called Karl-Marxstadt) has been turned into a 'College of Machine-building'. In Leipzig a 'College for Internal Trade' has come into existence. Furthermore, after the separation of the Soviet-occupied Zone from the rest of Germany and the foundation of the GDR, more than a hundred new technical schools for giving people intermediate qualifications have been established, so that these institutions now number more than three hundred.

At the end of 1958, 89,000 students were enrolled at the Universities —their capacity is being constantly enlarged—and the technical schools were being attended by 60,000 future engineers and other candidates for careers requiring intermediate qualifications. By 1959 the number of places available for students at both levels had already grown so much that, of the entire population (from infants to old-age pensioners), nearly 1 per cent had to pass the day in a lecture-hall or seminar classroom.

BUT it is not only this extension of academic or semi-academic educational opportunities which differentiates the East German system of public education from that in the other part of Germany. The more fundamental difference follows as a consequence of the *completely altered function* which is assigned to the Universities. It is the declared aim of the central committee of the SED to create a complete system of 'socialist Universities'. They are intended to be totally different from the historically developed, classical model of the University of letters. Instead of giving the future members of the intelligentsia a universal education, these Universities of the 'socialist type' are expected to shape their research and teaching exclusively according to the demands and directions of the ruling SED. Although the government thought it necessary to set up thirty new colleges for a population of 16 million, the possibility of founding a new University has never been considered. On the contrary, at the very time when new academic institutions were springing up like mushrooms, most of the old Universities were being deprived of some of their traditional faculties.

The colleges of the new type established by the SED are one and all institutions for vocational education. They serve either to train specialists for economic and other professional callings, or to produce leading political officials for the organisations of the Party and state. Of roughly 70,000 full-time students enrolled in 1957, about 36,000, that is more than half, were occupied with technical, economic, or scientific subjects. Almost 1,700 of these candidates for the key positions in the planned economy of the GDR had registered for technical subjects; 8,000 studied physics, chemistry, pharmacology, mathematics, or mineralogy; almost 6,000 devoted themselves to the agricultural sciences, and more than 5,000 to economic and commercial subjects. A further 3,000

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students were specially trained in exclusively political subjects—political science, politics, ideology, political journalism; 11,000 students matriculated as future doctors, and 14,000 as future secondary school teachers. By contrast, the number of philosophy students fell from 2,782 in 1954 to 1,959 in 1957, that of law students from 1,621 to 1,335, and that of theology students from 965 to 882 in the same period. Professionally oriented studies dominate; the state favours all subjects which promise to be of direct benefit to itself and its aims. This is shown quite clearly by the number of places for some of the traditional humanistic subjects. In 1957 there were in the Zone 267 students of art, music, and librarianship, 249 of history, 26 of classical philology, and 63 of Oriental studies.

THE methods as well as the aims of education in East Germany are no longer to be compared with those previously in use. Studies are carried out in accordance with a strict scheme of work in which the lectures compulsory for every student are laid down. The University teacher also has to submit to this corset and is equally deprived by the plan of his intellectual freedom of movement. The government prescribes the curriculum which the professor has to cover in his lectures, and at the same time delimits the scope of the professorial chair. The professor cannot, except marginally, deal with matters which do not seem of importance to the state, without neglecting his compulsory curriculum and thereby endangering his students.

For them the main problem is to pass the examination at the end of their studies, and this is entirely tailored to the needs of their future profession. In the pursuit of this aim they cannot allow themselves any digression into other than the prescribed fields of knowledge. Scholarship-holders—and only 10 per cent of the students do not have scholarships from the state—have to complete their studies within a fixed period, usually four to five academic years. The horizon of most of the students is necessarily narrow, much too narrow for the liking of the old professors. But woe betide them if they freely spread their intellectual treasures before the young people and leave the prescribed tracks; in every institute and faculty, and attached to every professorial chair, Party officials of the SED are on watch to see that the professors do not depart from the lecture plans. The professors can only guess at how large the number of overseers with whom they must always reckon is, for these supervisors seldom reveal themselves. The governmental youth organisation of the Soviet Zone, the so-called Free German Youth (FDJ), whose political aims coincide with those of the SED, dominates the seminars and study groups. These play a much bigger, and essentially quite different, role in East German Universities from what was ever before normal in Germany. Previously a student, round about the middle of his course, would attend at most twenty lectures and not more than two seminars a week. But now the students of East Germany have something like a 48-hour week, which sometimes even deteriorates into a 60-hour week. For every lecture there are

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seminars and study-groups, and it is the FDJ which sees that these are all attended. The small seminars and study groups are directed by the branch secretaries of the youth organisation, and nothing in the way of 'deviations' raised by the professors in the lectures escapes them, nothing of that sort can or may remain uncontradicted or unattacked. All the same, the influence which the officials have on the outlook of the students is not all that great. They are even more energetically supported by an army of academic assistants who operate as leaders of the seminars and study groups in the teaching institutions. These assistants and senior assistants make it very hard for the professors to keep up an academic standard. They are generally selected by the SED and FDJ organisations in the University, which attach greater importance to political reliability and proletarian origin than to intellectual ability. Many of the assistants have themselves not even got degrees. Their academic worth is highly questionable, but the professors have to recognise them. Moreover, their large number gives them a dominating position in the daily conduct of teaching. In 1957 there were more than 14,000 teaching staff at the Universities and colleges of East Germany, and a further 6,500 at the technical schools. On the average there is one member of the teaching staff to every eight students, while the corresponding ratio in the Federal Republic is one to fifteen or twenty. That is simply because in West Germany the number of academic assistants is much smaller.

The government of East Germany is by no means satisfied with the numerical preponderance over qualified scholars of teachers and teaching assistants who are not up to standard, and this unsatisfactory state of affairs certainly does not correspond to its wishes. What it is really aiming at is academic reinforcements of people who are not only loyal Party members but also good scholars. But in present conditions there is and is bound to be a shortage of such people.

To the regime the 'bourgeois' professors are a phenomenon of the past. Till their natural replacement they must put up with a state of affairs in which doubtful recruits participate in their teaching duties or even control them. At some East German Universities there are vice-chancellors who have not yet even got degrees. Other careerists belonging to the Party have somehow got themselves professorial chairs without the traditional succession of steps leading to an academic appointment. With the knowledge and approval of the SED, they use their positions of power to watch over, and on occasion to blacken the reputation of, their colleagues, whether senior or junior. This applies in particular to the Party functionaries installed as vice-chancellors. The chancellors are mostly personalities with prestige who have ceremonial functions. If they prove either in fact or appearance loyal to the SED, no conclusions as to their convictions can be made from this. The burdens the vice-chancellors pile upon them are heavier than many of these worthy gentlemen are able to bear without being obliged to yield. In the more than five-hundred-year-old University of Leipzig the office

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of chancellor is now held by Georg Mayer, who—sixty-seven years old, and a doctor of political sciences and professor of political economy—once had a great name. The classicist, Professor Werner Hartke, whom the central committee of the SED appointed chancellor of the University of East Berlin in 1957, was naïve and complaisant enough to let himself be briefed for several hours at Party headquarters before every public speech. The more such tools of the SED's aspirations to omnipotence are found in the ranks of the recognised professors, the more difficult becomes the position of the greater number of unyielding 'bourgeois' University teachers.

THE narrow specialisation to which studies in the 'socialist Universities' are restricted, would alone be sufficient reason for many University teachers to retire embittered or even to leave the country. However, what burdens them even more is the claim of 'communist science' to complete comprehensiveness, asserted on its behalf by the state. Every University maintains a social sciences institute. Officials of the SED who have never received regular University appointments and often do not even have a degree, occupy in the heart of these institutes the same position in relation to the rest of the University as that which used to belong to the professors of philosophy. They subject all students to a so-called basic course in the social sciences. The fact that theology is the only faculty whose students are exempt from this course is a result of the experiences that the SED ideologists had with precisely these students. In the intermediate examinations on the social sciences they usually got the best marks, an indication of the zeal with which they studied Marxist theory so that later they would be all the better equipped to discuss it from the pulpit. Now theology students have instead to undergo a course in politics.

The political lecturers, who are full members of the staff and are also represented on the Senate by a vice-chancellor for social sciences, implant the communist view of the world among the students. They explain nature from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, history from that of historical materialism, and the present according to the bolshevik version of the 'political economy of socialism and capitalism'. The students of all faculties are supposed to adopt a way of thinking which would allow them to see all scientific problems, including those of their own narrower special subject, exclusively in the light of Leninist philosophy. 'To teach people to think in a partisan spirit', is the direct task of the social science lecturers, and under their domination it has now become the duty of all professors as well.

There is still another 'proletarian' battering-ram which the SED has put into use to shatter academic autonomy, suspected of being reactionary. Since 1950 every University and many other colleges have had a 'workers and peasants faculty' (ABF). These establishments are supposed—as the slogan has it—to make a special form of study for

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workers and peasants possible. In fact this branch of the University is not a faculty at all in any normal sense of the word. It does not provide real higher education but simply brings its students up to the standard for University entrance. Young people who have been to primary school or have at most had an incomplete secondary education and have afterwards distinguished themselves either as apprentices or in their occupation get special certificates at these faculties, where the courses last three years.

The lecturers there consist in the main of people who had distinguished themselves for political reliability. Their academic qualifications played only a subordinate role in this context, which to some extent is justified by their task. All the same, these teachers have the same rights as the rest of the University staff; this is intended to alter the balance in the staff as a whole, and above all in the council of faculties, in favour of the SED. In the ABF one-time Nazi teachers can still often be found, former assistant masters who were not allowed to go back into regular teaching after 1945 on account of their political past.

The establishment of special faculties of education is in line with consistent communist aims. In these separate training institutes future secondary-school teachers are provided in the first place with didactical equipment for their career; at the philosophy faculties they acquire only the specialist knowledge for the subjects they are one day to teach. In this way the philosophy faculties, to which students of pedagogy used to be exclusively entrusted, were deprived of one of their most important functions; this was the regime's answer to the fact that, in virtue of their intellectual climate, it was precisely these branches of the University which till very recently harboured its strongest opponents.

However, the 'bourgeois' scholars have derived an unexpected compensation from these suspect areas: the students at the ABF are more critical than they should be. Again and again the professors find that their students, in particular those from the ABF and the institutes of education formerly employed in industry, are far more open-minded towards scholarship than the main body of the other students. The preliminary course of studies was a thoroughgoing trial of strength for them, and up to 40 per cent of all the participants generally give up before the end. But those who have withstood this intellectual strain are likely to have real intellectual gifts and are often personally more mature than the rest of the regular students; the majority of this class of students becomes more and more sceptical towards the regime.

The last peculiarity of the East German Universities which must be mentioned here is the system of correspondence courses. The academic teaching institutes provide these courses for adults, mostly between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, in all parts of the country and in almost all occupations. This characteristic feature has also been taken over from the Soviet Union where, as in the other countries of the Soviet bloc,

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it is very widely diffused. In 1957 almost 40,000 correspondence students were enrolled at the Universities and technical schools of East Germany. They receive in printed form the same material as the faculties cover in direct studies, and they must largely assimilate the subject-matter in the free time left to them after work. The course lasts one to two years longer than for full-time students. While they are following a correspondence course, working students are given one work-free study day a month, and in addition they receive supplementary leave for the seminars, which are held at the Universities or in external centres specially set up for the purpose, and also for the intermediate and final examinations. A successful correspondence course leads to a normal degree and gives its graduates the same professional prospects as every other regular student has. At the moment correspondence study is possible for technical and scientific subjects, economic sciences, and agriculture, for history, journalism, law, physical training, and pedagogy. It is a useful arrangement, allowing people who mature late and also men and women with genuine special gifts, particularly in branches of the economy, to work up an academic standard in their special field while still following their career. As the course is hard, it is valued as much as it is feared. The state, which is suffering from an acute shortage of qualified workers, does not shrink from using pressure to secure enlistment when, time and again, there are not enough candidates for correspondence courses in the state-owned enterprises.

OF the qualified Marxist University teachers in East Germany, only relatively few have decided to escape. Until Ernst Bloch decided last August not to return to the DDR from a visit to West Germany, the Germanist and literary historian, Professor Alfred Kantorowitz, was the best known. A few months before the sensational flight of the chancellor of Jena University this sensitive and psychologically most complicated old communist had already taken the same road to West Berlin, after coming to feel he could no longer cope with the sterile climate of the consolidated East German People's Republic. After six months' political asylum in the Federal Republic, another Party intellectual who fled, the agricultural theorist Professor Kurt Vieweg, decided to return to the Soviet Zone. Vieweg, one of the spokesmen of the revisionist aspirations of 1956, was condemned, after a short time in liberty, to four years' imprisonment. It is not that other Marxist scholars in the Soviet Zone feel unconditionally bound to the Party to whose statutes they have made a kind of oath. Many of them, like Hans Mayer and other ideological Party sympathisers, do not even belong to the SED. The unsatisfied, disappointed, embittered, or even despairing representatives of the old communist or pro-communist intelligentsia are, however, simply not able to get over their own past. From early youth onwards they have been pledged to

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the cause which they hold to be exclusively right and good. It has become their spiritual home. However disappointed they may now be by Marxism or its representatives in the country, their feelings are too deep for them to ally themselves with the 'enemy'. It would be utterly wrong to think of them as spineless or corrupt when they continue to serve communism according to their lights in the very modest framework of what is possible and at the same time do not despise material security. In their old surroundings they are shackled by prohibitions on speaking and writing; in the West which they could possibly choose they feel they may have small chance of making themselves understood. It is, moreover, virtually impossible for a person of fifty, sixty, or seventy years to change his point of view at will.

The conditions and opportunities for 'bourgeois' intellectuals from the Soviet Zone of Germany are quite different. From 1945 on it was they who formed the bulk of the professors crossing the frontier. Migration and natural losses among the older generation of scholars have greatly thinned the ranks of the non-Marxist professors. After the reopening of the Universities in the first post-war years it was only in exceptional cases that 'bourgeois' jurists were able to lecture in the faculties of law; in the eyes of the occupying authorities most of the former professors and lecturers were compromised by their activity in the Third Reich and were not acceptable. The SED immediately sent out its own cadres. Since then they have expanded so much that now, apart from a very few professors—Dr Erwin Jakobi, the Leipzig specialist on labour law, is one of them—there are no longer any active jurists representing the historical school of law or able to teach the concepts of natural or rational law.

The first regular campaign against 'bourgeois' scholars started in the years 1946 to 1948; like the second attack carried out ten years later, these measures were intended to limit and then put a complete end to the unbiased examination of intellectual problems in the Universities. The SED was both unable and unwilling to prevent almost all the leading philosophers and sociologists from leaving the country.

At first disciplines like philology, German and foreign, Oriental studies, the history of music and art, and librarianship, were not too severely hit. In contrast to philosophy, pedagogy, history, or psychology they were allowed some intellectual scope—but for a limited period only, as later appeared; the initiators of the socialisation of the GDR were reserving these fields of study for later clearing, when in 1957 the central committee of the SED issued the watchword of 'socialist Universities'.

In the scientific faculties the SED has a much more difficult job. If the regime does not wish to cut the ground from under its own feet, it must make every effort to hold the doctors, scientists, technicians, and mathematicians. Again and again the state sees itself forced to go halfway to meet them and to make what in its view are very far-reaching concessions. It exempts them almost entirely from political tutelage.

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They are not obliged to join the SED. It is overlooked if they let it be known that they are practising Christians. No one may spy on them or their families. The institutes and professors obtain foreign currency to buy the specialist literature of Western countries—a possibility which is almost entirely closed to the humanities and social sciences. Doctors, scientists, and technicians may also go to academic congresses in the Federal Republic of Germany or in other Western countries. The salaries of these University teachers are remarkably high; they vary from a monthly income of 2,000 marks for a lecturer to many times this sum for professors. Favourable individual contracts ensure the scholars a whole range of special privileges; for instance, a pension of the same size as their preceding emoluments and the best openings for the higher education of their children. These tactical concessions in favour of the scientists have their effect. In spite of the westward movement of East German scholars, which in absolute numbers appears alarmingly high, the University professors who have fled have in the last few years only made up 0·5 per cent of their colleagues remaining in the DDR, and this is due to the less acute urge to emigrate felt by the scientists and technicians, who form the great majority of the teaching staff.

* * *

The academic autonomy of the University has been lost. This was shown symbolically at the anniversary celebrations of the University of Jena, and even more at the jubilee of the University of Leipzig a year later. When, at the climax of the celebrations in October 1959, the doors of the main lecture hall opened for the principal ceremony, it was Walter Ulbricht who entered the assembly first; the senate of the University followed the officials at a distance. It was the same at the 150-year anniversary of the East Berlin Linden University in November 1960.

The SED has used all the appropriate organisational measures to make its claim on the Universities effective. The secretaries of the University party committees and the 'comradely chairmen' of the trade union committees have been given seats and votes on the senate and the faculty councils. Everywhere the chancellor has had no fewer than four vice-chancellors attached to him, and of these vice-chancellors as a rule at least three must belong to the SED. The right of appointment has been completely set aside; all vacant chairs, and the strategic positions of the institute directors, are in fact filled by the state secretariat for University affairs in conjunction with the Party committees—that means, in the final reckoning, by the central committee of the SED.

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HUNGARY

Five Years After

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INTRODUCTION

REVOLUTIONS in history have always been classified as either victorious or defeated, and there is no doubt to which category the Hungarian revolution of 1956 belongs. However, when one goes beyond the immediate political outcome of the struggle and begins to analyse its long-term effects, one realises that the historical consequences do not easily fit into the simple dichotomy of victory and defeat. They rarely correspond to the officially proclaimed goals of a victorious revolution, nor are defeated revolutions always entirely unsuccessful in bringing about some of the changes for which they were fought.

This is, of course, small consolation for those who took up the struggle against tyranny, who lost their friends, and of whom many had to flee their land to avoid the counter-revolutionary reprisals by the local quislings installed through foreign intervention shortly after the Hungarian revolution appeared to have won the day. We still remember the treachery of 'negotiations' with General Pal Maleter, the pathetic appeals for help by Free Radio Kossuth, the Judas act of Kadar, the 'safe conduct' for Imre Nagy and his judicial murder later on. And it is necessary to remember these things; otherwise no morally clean perspective is possible.

Looking today at post-revolutionary developments in Hungary, five years after the revolution was defeated, one is struck by their pronounced ambivalence. On the one hand there were repressions, posthumous honours for the fallen AVO 'heroes', imprisonment of and pressure on writers, enforced collectivisation, persecution of the churches. On the other hand there was a certain relaxation, some of the imprisoned writers were released after Western protests and appeals, the horrors of the Rakosi era were condemned, its political 'errors' were not repeated, and some of its economic abuses corrected. In general, the political and intellectual margin of relaxation in Kadar's Hungary is greater than in any other country in the Soviet bloc, except Gomulka's Poland. They are both at the 'liberal' end of the communist spectrum, and although political developments in the two countries in 1956 and after were different, there are many parallels despite the fact that in one a revolt was stopped half-way and in the other it was defeated. The contradictory pressures from outside and from below played a similar role, potential or latent, in both countries after the 1956 upheaval, and so of course did the need to preserve Party rule. There are obvious differences, but the resultant state of affairs is less dissimilar than many people who concentrated their attention on the immediate political outcome of the upheaval would have expected. Gomulka has disappointed many 'liberal' hopes of the optimists, Kadar has been less 'dogmatic' than the pessimists would dare to imagine. In both cases the perspective looks very different from what it did in 1956, but less different than in

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1957. To take just one instance: Hungarian contacts with the West, almost totally cut off at the time, are now on the increase.

The Kadar regime, anxious to establish its legitimacy and international 'respectability', was compelled to grant or tolerate some concessions to the population, and in particular to the intelligentsia, which are still beyond reach of the more rigid Czechoslovak, Rumanian, or East German regimes. This is vividly portrayed in Anthony Rhodes' travelogue.

Economic reforms, though inadequate and contradictory, have some positive effects. The planning system, as Mr Baracs points out in his essay, has been rationalised and streamlined, so that the worst deformations of Rakosi's planners have been corrected. The standard of living is rising although, as Mr Kende shows, not in the way it would without the shocks of enforced collectivisation. The integration of the Hungarian economy into the economic system of the bloc is analysed by Dr Kemeny, who indicates the limits of Comecon successes.

Nowhere is the contradictory character of the post-1956 developments more obvious than in the fields of literature and philosophy. As in Poland, the Party found it impossible to revive its ideology. The true New Faith is no longer in evidence. Nobody believes in communist shibboleths, but some are still used as protective colouring. In this situation the Party has had to accommodate itself to a permanent game of make-believe, in which verbal tributes are paid to ideology, but the possibilities of disregarding it are much wider than before. The real testing points are directly political; the Kadar regime is less concerned with their ideological reflections. This state of affairs is mirrored in literature and philosophy (described respectively by Paul Ignotus and Tibor Hanak) where, despite ideological pressures and campaigns, indifference and ideological apathy are prevalent. The writers have abandoned their conspiracy of silence, the regime has renounced its policy of direct persecution of the literary élite by police action. It still keeps some of the intellectuals and scholars arrested after the revolution in prison, while others who have been released are hard put to it to make a living, but it does not terrorise them any longer. Its attitude towards cultural life has changed, Zhdanovism and its Hungarian exponent, Revai, are dead, and although lip-service is paid to socialist realism, it is no longer the obligatory strait-jacket it used to be under Rakosi. Literary magazines publish writings which in that era would have been condemned as pessimistic or individualistic, and which are existentialist or even surrealist in character.

But as the price for this, the writers—traditionally the conscience of the nation—have been relegated to an insignificant place in public life. Here, too, the parallel with Gomulka's Poland is striking. Literary tolerance was possible once the Party had succeeded in 'liberating' literature from 'the burden and the euphoria of an unhealthy importance.' The men of letters who articulated the aims of the Revolution

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were to be left with only minor public roles and prevented from 'overloading the functions of literature.' Having achieved this by overcoming the writers' strike, the Kadar regime could afford to exercise a far smaller degree of control over the literary form, and even over some of its content.

ALL these factors point to the consolidation of the regime, which was of course inevitable in the circumstances after the defeat of the Revolution and the lack of an alternative. The Party has been resuscitated and has regained its position as the guide and controller of all aspects of public life. It has not purged itself of the old Stalinist members, and has permitted them to come back (except Rakosi, who remains in Soviet exile), but it has relegated them to minor positions and kept them away from the levers of power. Kadar, as Gomulka in Poland, firmly established his position as *l'homme de confiance* of Khrushchev, permitted to indulge in a far greater measure of tolerance than his predecessors, and committed to the common line of limited reform from above. The reaction of Hungary (and of Poland) to the 22nd CPSU congress illustrates this point. A balance-sheet of post-revolutionary developments in Hungary, drawn by Mr G. Urban, emphasises this by giving examples of Kadar's dual policy of consolidation of control and cautious reform in different walks of life.

But the resurrection of the Party and of its rule does not mean that all is well with it. There are too many skeletons in the cupboard to make its members easy, and the population is unlikely to accept that rule on any other grounds than the lack of an alternative, once hope was lost after the defeat of the revolution and the only thing for people to do was to adjust themselves to the circumstances and make the best of them. The Party is ashamed of its past; its first leader, Bela Kun, was an 'unperson' for twenty years; all its subsequent leaders, Rakosi, Gero, and Nagy, are now condemned. As Mr Meray points out in his essay, it cannot even refer to the circumstances of its rebirth, and, as Mr McCagg makes clear, it faces a more embarrassing situation in rehabilitating its past leaders than any other communist party in the world. The extraordinary ups and downs of their reputations was a parallel to the rapid circulation of its top personnel, which is described by Mr Schreiber.

Neither in regard to the Catholic Church, nor to agriculture, is the position comparable to that in Gomulka's Poland. Mr Veto indicates that the limits within which Catholics operate are far stricter, and Mr Urban expresses the opinion that its resistance is also less determined.

The general picture of life in Hungary five years after the revolution is less grim than might have been feared in 1956, but more depressing and less hopeful than some enthusiasts tend to imply in 1961. The standard of living has improved, but people have to work harder. Cultural life is less restricted than before the revolution, but it has been emptied of any political content. Did the revolution contribute to

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these limited changes? It is tempting to answer this question in the negative by saying that they would have occurred anyway, as they did to some extent in the Soviet Union itself. But against this, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, East Germany, where little stirring was visible in 1956, have remained unshaken in their totalitarian controls of culture and life.

It is possible to dismiss the revolution with 'realistic' arguments which question its connection with the post-revolutionary reforms. It is also easy to pay tribute to the victims of the revolution by some general statement that 'martyrs never die in vain.' But this kind of reasoning is too imprecise and betrays a certain lack of historical imagination. It is impossible to assess the extent to which the Hungarian revolution contributed to the changes in communist rule in Hungary, but the future historian will have also to assess its impact on the communist movement in general. And in the short run the consequences of a hopeless stand always look more futile than they eventually may prove to be. The Warsaw uprising of 1944 looked very foolish at the time and its victims seemed to have died in vain. But in the perspective of 1956 it was easier to see that it contributed to the maintenance of spiritual resistance. The events of 1956 in Poland were not unconnected with it. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak 1956 immobilism was connected with post-Munich inactivity. At present Hungarians may be disillusioned, but a nation never entirely loses hope, and the Hungarian Revolution may still be restored to its proper perspective.

(The editors wish to express their thanks to Mr Paul Ignotus for his help in the preparation of this symposium.)

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HUNGARY: THE BALANCE SHEET

G. R. Urban

THE Kremlin's intervention in Hungary on 4 November 1956 was followed by a prolonged searching of hearts both in Moscow and in Budapest. That the uprising fitted into no pigeonhole in the Marxist cabinet was clear though puzzling, but for Khrushchev the revisionist, blamed as he was for this unexpected offspring of his own policies, the theological point did not really matter. What were the practical lessons of the revolt and how were past mistakes to be avoided?

The 1956 revolution exposed the party's weakness at three essential points and confirmed its relative freedom to operate at others: the ferment which prepared the ground was the work of the intelligentsia, the first shots were fired by students, and the bulk of the fighting was borne by young men and women from the factories. These had to be won over or neutralised, at least until such time as the long-term policies of a purged and sobered party might begin to tell on them.

From the very beginning the white-collar man, the student, and young people in general were singled out for preferential treatment, and to this day they continue to enjoy some of the fruits of 1956. Neither attacks by dogmatists, nor approval from the right, has so far undermined their position.

Not so with those sections of the community which approved the revolution but took no active part in it. Here boldness seemed the better part of wisdom, and the farmers were the obvious choice for a try-out. Protesting but non-violent, they had been marched into the collectives under Rakosi, and in 1956 their contribution to intransigence was limited to feeding the Budapest fighters. No danger threatened from these quarters; nor did the older industrial workers present a more frightening spectacle. They had gone on strike, to be sure, as had the whole nation, and they were none too easy when the Workers Councils were dissolved; but, by and large, they had left the fighting to the young. The Churches, on their part, had proved amenable to rectification and their power to sway opinion could be safely discounted.

Since 4 November 1956, therefore, Hungarian communist policy has been to pander to the 'dangerous' and divert pressure to the 'soft' classes of the population. And this they have done with some success. At a time when only the most painstakingly slow reform of education is thought capable of weaning the young away from the spirit of opposition, the industrial worker has had labour-competitions, higher norms and an

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enlarged plan foisted upon him. While the government's hand weighs heavily on the peasants in the collectives, existentialist writing (although criticised) is allowed to flourish, and the public feels confident enough in its fragile liberty openly to admire and spend its money on the neurotic, self-tormenting, even decadent products of assorted 'angries', mystics, and other unwanted apostles of modernism. Snobs add to the chorus of veneration—only the Party's sacred cow, socialist realism, is left out in the cold.

Yet the present mixture of policies may prove a blessing in (admittedly heavy) disguise, for the permissible limits of expediency are not sharply defined, and it is always possible that the cunning of the more tenderly treated classes, complacency in the government, or a change in the international situation may gradually unlock doors which the October explosion blew open but sucked in again.

* * * *

IN A STRUCTURAL sense, Hungary is now closer to the Soviet model than she was under Rakosi. The collectivisation of agriculture has completely, and perhaps finally, changed the country's political, social, and economic profile. Traditional centres of individual thinking and behaviour have been disrupted and a once proud peasantry turned into an agricultural proletariat. When industry is nationalised, the operation has little influence on the men who work the machines and run the management; but when the peasant's land is collectivised, his home and private life are deeply affected.

The last phase of socialisation was undoubtedly less brutal than the initial onslaught. Yet, for the farmer, the milder course posed a host of problems with which he was ill-equipped to cope. Strong-arm methods were now replaced by sophisticated and less sophisticated propaganda, ranging from mass visits by 'patronising' factory teams, to threats, bribes, and promises, mixed with appeals to reason and to the farmer's self-interest and patriotism.

By instinct and tradition the Hungarian peasant is a man of strong but simple responses. He can deal with an insult, but persuasion is a cruelty which is foreign to him. When, in 1958 and 1959, he was being openly bludgeoned into the kolkhozes, the Party relieved him of any personal responsibility for what he was doing. Now it was ostensibly left to him to make the agonising decision. But how was he to account for it to himself and his family? What, in the absence of physical duress, made him renounce what had been dearest to him and his ancestors? Who was going to sign first in the local community? Where exactly was the chain to break in the intricate and familiar social pattern of the Hungarian village, and who was going to get the blame for it?

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Today all land is public property in Hungary and the young and healthy have been voting with their feet, leaving the misery and muddle with which kolkhoz farming is unalterably (and often unjustly) associated in Hungarian minds. Of those who are left in the kolkhozes three quarters are in their forties and older. Hungarian yields in cereals are just above pre-war level and lag 50 per cent behind the Western average. The erstwhile granary of Europe is a heavy importer of wheat and other basic commodities.

In other fields, too, the regime is doing its best to remould society from its very roots. School reform, the re-education of parents, the campaign against religion, and the slow extension of the Party's control to every walk of life are all part of the government's plan to eradicate non-conformity and shape the public in its own image. Unlike Rakosi, Kadar is well versed in the ways of the Hungarian psyche. He is aware that in economic harassment and sheer physical toil Hungarians can be used and abused in a great many ways, provided that the top dressing of life remains tolerable, and elementary principles of dignity and personal choice are not too obviously trampled underfoot. Here, the safe limits of manoeuvre have so far not been transgressed : parallel with the corrosion of the material base of Hungarian life, a good part of the superstructure has been allowed to remain surprisingly intact.

The unwilling Party member may proceed from the drumhead meeting straight to the theatre to see Mr Priestley's *Dangerous Corner*, although he is well-advised not to turn the corner that leads to the local church. For an intelligentsia which has always despised the necessities so long as it could indulge in the luxuries of life, Kadar's approach is shrewd and dangerous.

Some of this relative freedom, particularly in the upper crust of city life, is the first to attract the attention of foreign visitors. Many of Kadar's concessions are frankly a sop to the dangerous white-collar element, but others may cut more deeply. The regime panders to the foibles of suburbia (in the Central European sense), offering it a variety of cheap anodynes (foreign films, jazz, coffee-shops, even winkle-pickers and drain-pipe trousers) to make the basic operation less painful, even unnoticed. On the more serious side, the population has been allowed to maintain and acquire tastes in the arts, literature, housing, and consumer goods which it would be very difficult to reverse.

At a level sufficiently removed from the language and understanding of the man in the street it is now possible to publish non-communist and, by implication, anti-communist literature. This is meant to be a temporary concession, and once conditions at the grass-roots of society are ripe for socialism, the rest, it is hoped, will follow. Writers of the liberal and nationalist school are the waste-material of history—they will, on

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this showing, fall by the wayside as soon as they cease to satisfy the needs of society. Until such time, however, the government is careful not to cut off its nose to spite its face.

But there is another side to this picture. Having gained a measure of liberty to air their views in public, the writers have a weapon in their hands powerful enough to maintain national views and values in healthy (if restricted) circulation. That they have to veil their meaning is nothing new in Hungarian literature. For decades after the 1848 revolution some of the finest and most effective patriotic verse was written *sub rosa.* Everyone understood it, as everyone who is meant to understands the current variety today.

True, the writer's freedom is, on the whole, still confined to the ivory tower. To this, the government hopes, there is no popular escalator and those who care to mount the steps are small in number and have no formative influence on the base-building operation. To judge from past experience, this need not be so.

* * * *

SOME OF THE more jarring eyesores have been removed from the landscape, others have been toned down in colour: russification has almost disappeared, the secret police has lost some of its teeth, and in the mood of the urban population there has been a return to that genial combination of irony and fatalism which makes Hungarians impervious to the heavy stuff of communist propaganda, and is their special contribution to the art of civilised resistance.

When the trials of 1957 and 1958 were over, the government decided on gentler methods of coercion, trying to cure the cause rather than juggle with the symptoms of disloyalty. Today, security is guaranteed by a mass of interlocking checks and controls which, helped by the apathy that followed the 1956 disaster, enable the authorities to perpetuate a mood of practical lifemanship. The heroic pose is dated and where freedom is in short supply social ambitions centre increasingly on refrigerators, motor-cars, and other symbols of an acquisitive society.

Nevertheless, the extension in May 1961 of the death penalty in Soviet Russia to discourage crimes of a purely economic nature shows the extent to which communist legislation oscillates with the needs of the hour. Cherished theories of the gradual disappearance of crime under socialism have not been allowed to stand in the way of a very real regression. In Hungary a reform of the penal code on lines similar to those adopted in Russia in 1958 is currently under discussion and some of the suggestions aired would seem to betray an anxiety to match the alleged social advance with measures that are preventive and therapeutic rather than punitive in character. Should the cooking of statistics and the misappropriation of public money assume proportions similar to

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those which appalled Khrushchev on the Soviet farms, the Hungarian legal pendulum, too, may swing back to harsher measures, including the more frequent imposition of the death penalty.

Some of the legislation currently advocated is unprecedented in its harshness. Paragraph 115 of the new penal code extends criminal responsibility from crimes committed against the state of Hungary to those endangering the security of a foreign country: 'Acts directed against the state, social or economic order of another country are also punishable', provided that 'the country affected requests that legal action should be taken'. Another provision widens the scope of 'incitement' in a way which imposes thought-control on Hungary's relations with other members of the communist bloc. Persons found guilty of 'inciting against those of Hungary's international commitments which promote her alliance, friendship, or peaceful cooperation with others' may now be sent to prison for a term not exceeding eight years. Paragraph 204 in the same draft makes it culpable to use offensive or derogatory language against the state-order or institutions not only of Hungary, but also of other communist countries. Any such country is entitled to request of the Hungarian authorities that a Hungarian subject be tried on a charge of conspiracy, although he may, technically, be entirely blameless as far as the security or interests of Hungary are concerned. Criticism of the rights (or of their absence) of the Hungarian minority in Rumania or Czechoslovakia, for instance, could make its author liable to be tried under the Hungarian conspiracy Act, if so requested by either of these two countries. A good deal of hind- and foresight is shown here, because had this provision been part of Hungarian law in 1956, Imre Nagy could have been indicted under Paragraph 115, or even extradited to the USSR on a charge of having abrogated the Warsaw Pact, or (under Paragraph 120) sent to prison for declaring Hungary's neutrality.

This division of legal labour is clearly anticipated in the recent Hungarian-Bulgarian Legal Convention, which makes extradition possible if an act which may, at present, be no crime at all in Hungary, but is criminal in Bulgarian law (and vice versa), is committed, provided that the act is directed against the social order of the country requesting extradition. Both parties appear to have abdicated their right to see that the other party's request for criminal proceedings is substantiated by evidence.

* * * *

BY 1958 ECONOMIC consolidation was well advanced; the Party, licking its wounds, was beyond the point of danger, and retribution, too, had run its course. More ambitious schemes could now be taken in hand.

A three-year plan was put on the statute books, followed early in 1959 by a drive for collectivisation. The campaign was, if anything, too

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successful, and the Party got more, both in the number of freshly formed collectives and the burdens they imposed on the economy, than it had bargained for. By the end of 1959 and, more emphatically, by the middle of 1960, it was clear that collectivisation was overtaxing the country's resources.

But the programme was irreversible and, coinciding with the third and final lap, the heat was turned on industrial labour, in addition to the extra burdens imposed by the accelerated phase of the three-year plan. Previously, industry had ridden to comparative success on the backs of an underprivileged and capital-producing agricultural population. Now, for the first time, agriculture was put through its socialist paces and the factory worker asked to pay the bill. In 1960 output norms were put up, wages frozen, and a period of renewed austerity forecast for all engaged in industry.

In all this Kadar claims to have had a united Party behind him, certainly since the June 1957 conference. Yet his establishment is not as monolithic as it is trying to appear. While one cannot speak of dogmatic and revisionist factions in the Hungarian Party, public criticism of both extremes has been so frequent and sometimes so acrimonious, that the existence and attraction of these rival tendencies (if not actual groups) cannot be doubted. It is not clear where the Party divides into those who stand to the left and those (if any) who stand to the right of Kadar—at the top level at any rate. What is clear is that status and interest alike have a natural way of propelling men at the lower rungs of the hierarchy towards a more dogmatic outlook, while writers, journalists, and intellectuals sympathise, as they usually have done, with a more liberal interpretation of the Party line. The Communist Party is still rather small and it appears to be Kadar's intention to keep it that way. It embraces less than five per cent of the Hungarian population and Kadar is probably right in thinking that this number includes all genuine communists as well as those who may be of use to the Party in any future emergency.

The consolidation of Kadar's power may be counted from the 7th Party congress in December 1959, at which Khrushchev was present. Kadar's trump card in his negotiations with his lieutenants is his closeness to, even personal friendship with, the Soviet Premier, for whom Kadar represents just about the right mixture of addiction to principles and flexibility in execution; proletarian internationalism and patriotism in the small change of politics; detachment from intellectuals but a healthy respect for the powers of the mind, not necessarily those of the communist mind.

Kadar advocates a battle to be fought on two fronts, with the weight of his defences switched to whatever point is threatened by one or other

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of his adversaries. After the revolution, he argues, the Party had to take up a fundamentalist and militant position because it had just emerged from a battle completely, and a war almost completely, lost. This has been done in agriculture and ideology, entrenched articles of the communist faith to which only a purist approach can do justice. In other fields, however, there is room for tactical finesse. Kadar's ambition to cut a more human and less austere figure in the popular imagination has been carried forward since the 7th Party congress. In one of his speeches he said : ' We don't want to fight people, only their mistakes ', and throughout his performance there is a tendency, more in his style than in his actual message, to rid communism of some of its foreignness and to bring it down to a level where ordinary people can feel it to matter to the business of living. Paradoxically, the years he spent in Rakosi's prison, the population's known disappointment with the West, the apparent consolidation of Hungary's colonial status make it possible for him to carve out for himself an area, if not of popularity, at least of grudging tolerance. Today he is looked upon as the lesser of several possible evils. For a man whose treason recalls Quisling, this has not been a bad performance. His personal acceptance is a sore point to the Hungarian emigration and a puzzle to outsiders, but given Hungary's international position it is not difficult to understand. If there are forces to the right of Kadar in the Party leadership, no one knows who they are. It is not that Hungarians are prepared to embrace communism any more than they were in 1956, but having done their bit during the revolution, they are now seeking a respite on terms that are harsh but not shameful. It is now more clearly realised that the heady sentiments of 1956 are of little avail unless they can be translated into a cool formula in a larger international equation.

* * * *

AFTER A BRIEF respite in 1957, the Hungarian Churches came under increasingly heavy pressure, and the last eighteen months have seen a revival of intense atheistic propaganda. Having reappointed its nominees to key posts in the Protestant Churches, the government brought a progressively irritating selection of weapons to bear on its last organised antagonist, the Roman Catholic Church.

Catholicism is accorded grudging toleration within strictly defined limits. The government's official position is that freedom of conscience implies the freedom to hold no religious views, or anti-religious ones, and that the establishment of the Church before 1945 was an abuse not only of socialist, but also of Western democratic traditions. Today the Bench of Catholic Bishops is virtually non-existent, as most of its members are either physically prevented from performing their duties or are hampered

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in other, but equally effective, ways. Church appointments are subject to government approval down to the nomination of parish priests. With Archbishop Groesz (until his recent death) deputising for Cardinal Mindszenty as head of the Hungarian hierarchy, the Church has been made to support regime propaganda, both on national and international issues.

Yet there is something to be said for the view that under the late Archbishop's pontifical care the Hungarian Church has been unduly cooperative. Having allowed himself to be manipulated into *Opus Pacis*, the Archbishop found himself sharing a platform and drafting resolutions with priests excommunicated by the Vatican. The differences between the government-sponsored 'peace priests' and *Opus Pacis* have seldom been clear enough to make it possible for ordinary Catholics to see how far, and in what manner, they were expected by the Church to support or refrain from opposing government policies. Frequently the Archbishop expressed sentiments which, although entirely laudable in a politically neutral context, could only be read in Hungary as giving Church support to communist propaganda, particularly on foreign affairs, nuclear tests, and the collectivisation of agriculture. The difficulties under which the Hungarian Church has to labour can hardly be overestimated, yet disapproval of the hierarchy's attitude is widespread.

One of the regime's aims in pushing the clergy into the peace movement is to provoke a break with the Vatican, involving not merely the handful of apostate priests, by now completely discredited, but the clergy as a whole. Rome is conscious of the need to prevent a schism, and at no time has the Holy See openly admonished the hierarchy as such for being too anxious to cooperate. But on one point at least the differences are clear: Rome is uneasy about *Opus Pacis*, of which the Hungarian Church has been the admittedly unwilling, but none the less responsible, architect. There can be no question that the Archbishop was led by the best of motives, but it may be questioned whether, in trying to parry communist tactics, he did not allow himself to be tempted too far in pleasing or appearing to please his adversaries. The Archbishop was jailed in 1951 on a trumped-up charge of conspiracy and pardoned in 1956. On his seventieth birthday, 5 December 1957, he was decorated by the government with the Order of the Banner of the Hungarian People's Republic Second Class (a distinction he shares with the excommunicated priests, Horvath, Beresztoczy and Mag) for his part in promoting understanding between Church and state. In decorating the prelate, President Dobi said that the Archbishop had rendered great service both in 'resolving relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church and in the sphere of the peace movement'. There would seem to be some truth in his citation, but the Hungarian hierarchy

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has done what it could to prevent the worst communist inroads. As neither Mgr Endrey nor Bishop Schvoy would assign posts to the peace priests, the Government's Office of Church Affairs was forced to attach them as 'Church managers' to parishes where the priest's position had fallen vacant. Here they continue to celebrate Mass, but, although no excommunication can undo a priest's consecration and invalidate his Mass, they have, in Church law, forfeited their right to administer absolution. The hierarchy cannot physically prevent the three men from using the Church for propaganda, but the congregations are well aware of the position and attendances are meagre.

The recent trials of priests and lay persons associated with the Catholic Church have provided fresh evidence of the regime's inability to capture the minds of the young. Religious, nihilist, existentialist, or plain indifferent, Hungary's young men and women have proved the most unrewarding field for ideological investment. Work they will and cooperate they must, but nothing has so far managed to kill that most deadly of Hungarian political qualities, the people's sense of humour. The laughter behind the back of the party-man is the despair of Kadar's educators.

Despite the grievous limitations imposed upon them, the Christian Churches, and the Catholic Church in particular, are not entirely helpless in fighting off the government's attacks, and much of the Church's contest with atheism is looked upon by the younger generation of priests as an almost welcome challenge to their faith and ingenuity. Evading a regulation or browbeating a materialist opponent is often an exercise in gamesmanship, and although this is a battle in which both sides are seriously engaged, neither is in dialectics allowed to assume the final collapse of its adversary. The communists do not claim that the battle against religion is central to the class struggle; they hope that by education and by exposing people to the right kind of environmental influences and depriving them of wrong ones, religious beliefs and observances will die a natural death. In the meantime the Churches are harnessed to the government's day-to-day policies and exploited in other ways, wherever this can be done without flying too brutally in the face of the Churches' witness. The Churches, on their part, believe that toleration should work both ways and that Christianity, even when confined inside the walls of the Church, is inherently closer to the nature of man than the drab materialism communism offers as a substitute. In Hungary Christianity has also a poetic appeal with which no embellishment of state weddings and name-giving ceremonies can hope to compete.

Seen from abroad or from a purely institutional angle, the Catholic Church's position is much worse than it is in its daily ministry. The Bishops are allowed no contact with the Vatican, their five-yearly visits

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to the Holy See were stopped in 1945, their mail, their telephone conversations, and even their contacts with the clergy are censored. Their statements are misreported and they are being pressed, threatened, and irritated in a thousand and one ways. Yet the churches are full, and if the contest is allowed to run its present course, the Churches may emerge from it strengthened and purified. Today they are symbols of national as well as spiritual resistance, and what they have lost in their worldly freedoms they stand to gain in ways which are ultimately more important to their survival. The hardships the Churches share with the people of Hungary may well forge between them a unity less fallible than that of which their opponents boast.

* * * *

IN EDUCATION, Hungarian developments follow the bloc pattern in almost every detail. The current school reform is still in its infancy, but it is clear that the regime's intention is to raise a generation of specialists and to pay diminishing attention to the education of the rounded man.

Realising that what goes on out of school is at least as important as what goes on inside in forming the character of the young, the Government has turned its attention to these external influences. The improvement of society is already being relentlessly pursued by newspaper editors, publicity chiefs, trade union leaders, and all the other propaganda agencies the regime has at its disposal. Only in two fields has it so far been unable to propel the young in the desired direction : in the home and among the teaching staff. It is admitted that the influence of parents and, unofficially, of teachers, too, is almost solidly against official ideology. In Hungary where, in the majority of cases, education is conducted in day-schools, it is almost a truism that society and parents influence education more than education influences society. The Soviet Union faces a similar problem, hence Khrushchev's 1956 project to send increasing numbers of children to boarding schools where they are inaccessible to the influence of parents and society. Kallai, then Minister of Education, confessed at a teachers' conference on 31 May 1958, that, because of the parents' attitude, 'all our efforts come up against a blank wall, and we shall make no progress . . . until we have formed a correct viewpoint among teachers and professors'. As *Kozneveles* pointed out on 17 September 1958 : 'The socialist education of our children . . . is in the hands of teachers, the majority of whom are not Marxists'.

The government's problem is, therefore, one of eliminating this duality, as the result of which all the good work the state's social agencies are doing for the education of youth is undone in the home insofar as it has not been already damaged at school.

Here again the superficial approach of orthodox Marxists has come in

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for some disappointments. It is being slowly realised and reluctantly admitted that a child born into a socialist society is not putty in the hands of his educators, and that ideas are generated, character formed, and knowledge pursued under influences much more complex and numerous than determinists would like to allow. The most that can be achieved, as far as one can gather from current experience, is that polytechnical education will produce specialists uncommitted to any particular set of ideas, but it is being openly questioned whether educational and social processes can, in themselves, induce the loyalties which the regime ultimately requires.

* * * *

WHAT OF Hungary's future ties with the Western world? An article in *Foreign Affairs* (July 1961) argued that 'peaceful engagement', if shrewdly conducted, might eventually produce splits in, or at least soften the fabric of, the East European monolith. Visits by statesmen, exchanges of goods and sentiments are advocated to stimulate diversity and rub the edges off the more rigorous official attitudes. All this, it is contended, should ultimately encourage the growth of a neutral belt of nations, free internally, but friendly to Soviet Russia and prepared to respect her desire that their area shall be denied to hostile military or political groups. To the crucial question: would this not deprive the peoples of Eastern Europe of their remaining hope that a change may yet be effected in their fortunes, the authors answer:

> People in Eastern Europe are sophisticated enough to be able to distinguish between formal American relations with the regimes that rule them and American approval of those regimes, with an implied falling off of interest in their own welfare. The enthusiastic reception given Vice-President Nixon in Warsaw in 1959 was not due to or affected by any formal relations with the Polish communist regime, but a popular response to what the Poles construed as evidence of continuing American interest in them.

This may well be true in the case of Poland, but the standing of the Polish Communist Party and the stature of Gomulka are very different from those of the Hungarian Party and of Kadar. The spectacle of President Kennedy or Mr Rusk hob-nobbing in the full limelight of communist propaganda with the Hungarian Premier and Mr Marosan would produce different repercussions. Kadar is hard put to it to appear in good company. His courting of figures of standing and respect in the literary world reflects the political upstart's campaign for recognition. If to his grudging acceptance by the nation he could add a measure of international respectability, what would there be left to stop the Hungarian people from thinking that communism was there to stay, and that the

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best they could hope for was a slow amelioration in their position within the framework they rejected arms in hand in 1956?

The educational reform, the regime's fresh campaign against the Churches, and other facets of its propaganda are designed to stamp out support for what is probably the most widespread feeling in Hungary, and (as Mr Khrushchev well knows) in the other satellites too: an expectation that things may yet change, that some future crisis may perhaps make the Russians, or the West, or both think and act again. In his small way Kadar is out to convince the nation of the same things which Khrushchev would like to have the West endorse on a larger scale: that the future of Central and Eastern Europe is unalterably riveted to the fortunes of the Soviet empire.

Lack of sophistication has never been a Hungarian shortcoming, but there is a point where sophistication ceases to work. And in reality, it would be rendering the Hungarian people a real disservice if the leaders whose legitimacy is still questioned in the United Nations were seen to be entertaining the United States President in the same Parliament building from which Imre Nagy uttered his last and futile cry on 4 November 1956. To have no policy towards Eastern Europe may be frustrating for the policy-makers, but it is preferable to a bad, and certainly questionable, policy.

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issued monthly by
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Amsterdam-West,
Da Costastraat 25/I

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LITERATURE BEFORE AND AFTER

Paul Ignotus

THERE have been, broadly speaking, four periods in Hungarian intellectual and literary life since the establishment of Russian power there at the end of the second world war.

First came coalition, with the cry for liberty and national unity, a liberalism conditioned by ruin and ruins, by misery, the black market and spiritual chaos rather than by any positive movement. It was a period also of *attentisme*, with people undecided whether to rely on the goodwill of the Russian conquerors or on the Western promise not to accept that conquest as final.

It was not altogether a bleak moment in Hungarian cultural history. To pay off old scores is an unattractive passion, but it can inspire quite good poetry, and even more, documentary recollections. A genius in that *genre* was the 'bourgeois-radical' writer, Bela Zsolt, and the retrospective diaries published at that time included interesting writings of the communist Lajos Nagy as well as of the emphatically non-communist Miksa Fenyo. (The two, by the way, were close personal friends and had run a semi-legal periodical together during the war.) From underground emerged Tibor Dery, from abroad returned George Lukacs, Bela Balazs, Andor Gabor, Gyorgy Boloni, Bela Illes, Sandor Gergely, Gyula Hay—most of them from Russia, but some from the West. The English reader may by today be familiar with several of these names, all of them linked with the intellectual history of communism either as thaw-makers, revisionists, or orthodox Stalinists. At that moment, for all their partisanship, they added new colours to the Hungarian literary spectrum. So did the publication of works by Milan Fust, up to then suppressed, and Lajos Kassak, doyen of the Hungarian *avant-garde*, both highly appreciated in France today, and Jeno J. Tersanszky, unfortunately too idiomatically Magyar in style to be translated successfully. But these three eminent authors, as well as Lukacs, Lajos Nagy, and Fenyo, had already been in the vanguard of Hungarian literature during the first world war.

As to the middle-aged, some were silent because of their association with pro-fascist trends of the recent past. Others seemed simply staggered. Gyula Illyes—by then the most important figure on the literary scene—could carry on unmolested, but his most interesting work during the period was an autobiographical novel, one which but for technical difficulties could have been published years before. Among those slightly compromised, the very gifted poet, Lorinc Szabo,

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published a volume of versified autobiography with an implicit self-vindication, a remarkable achievement but one that opened no new perspectives. The younger writers, that is, those under forty at that time, had not on the whole progressed beyond the stage of 'promise'. Some of them were indeed promising; some were refreshing and some over-mature, but all were either conspicuously experimental or conspicuously traditional. The greatest influence on the young poets was the late Attila Jozsef, who had committed suicide at the end of 1937. The Communist Party paid high tributes to him because he had been in the communist underground; others joined in because they knew, what by then had to be obscured in conformist literature, that he had fallen out with his comrades and been denounced by them as a 'fascist' for his heretical attempts to combine Marxism with psychoanalysis.

The second period began in 1949. Officially, 'the year of the turning-point' came in 1948, with the liquidation of the Social-Democratic Party and the proclamation of a 'People's Republic which performs the function of the dictatorship of the proletariat without Soviet form'. But *Gleichschaltung* of the mind followed somewhat later, with the Mindszenty trial, the Rajk trial, the persecution of religion, the witch-hunting among communists, the mass deportations and mass-imprisonments. Professor Lukacs, the eminent Marxist philosopher, was now made the whipping-boy for Marxist-Leninist zealots. In vain had he proclaimed that Soviet culture compared to any other is as the highest mountain to the hills: his complementary remark that giants such as Balzac or Thomas Mann were giants even if only on lower hills, whereas not everybody standing on the high mountain was necessarily tall, and similar expressions of his unconquerable heterodoxy, made the regime most sceptical about his faith. Within a year or two, literature was as it were completely Zhdanovised.

TOO much is known by now about the silliness of Zhdanovist scholasticism and its deplorable effects on the creative arts to warrant further elaboration here. But the loopholes in this system deserve to be indicated for their effects on, and analogies with, later developments. That period of indiscriminate intolerance in the service of 'socialist-realism' was very tolerant vis-à-vis the *past*. It allowed and indeed encouraged the cult of the classics, irrespective of their political colour; dialectically, it could always be proved that in their own time and in their own way, those classics had been 'progressive'. If one classic was preferred to another, the difference was due not to retrospective leftishness, but rather to retrospective nationalism. The

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greatest men of the past had been Russians; second came the Hungarians, at the bottom came the Americans and the Yugoslavs.

Another loophole was the comparatively tolerant attitude vis-à-vis non-communist writers. It all depended on the role accepted in the big cast. Those destined and willing to carry on as 'petty-bourgeois entertainers' could get away with it if they added a few cracks against the Americans to their innocent funny stories about lazy husbands and spendthrift wives. Those writing as 'representatives of the peasantry' could fare even better; once it had been proclaimed that they were a 'class' working 'in alliance with, but led by, the proletariat', their occasional deviations could be condoned as deriving from the nature of their social function. The peasant-writer Peter Veres, censured now and then and ultimately always vindicated, was perhaps the most typical example. A non-communist writer could differ provided he accepted defeat in advance before the Tribunal of History. But once he joined the triumphant proletariat, he had to toe the line without reservations. For him the only loophole—or comfort, if you like—was provided by the Zhdanovist axiom that although literature must be 'party-minded', it must not be 'schematic'. Some hoped this might prove an excuse to be a little human.

The heresy of the communist Tibor Dery came into the limelight in that period. His great novel *The Answer* went too far in challenging the Stalinist dogma to be swallowed by the leading ideologist, Jozsef Revai, and other conformist critics. His failure to see the 'leading role of the Party' in the development of character in pre-war Hungary provoked great misgivings. As time marched on, some 'petty-bourgeois deviationism' could also be traced in such formerly orthodox communist poets of the younger generation as Zoltan Zelk and Laszlo Benjamin.

The third period opened, after Stalin's death, with the first premiership of Imre Nagy. This was a blessing to the non-communist writer but much more so to those writers in the Communist Party who, in spite of their high honours and revenues, disliked the role of glorified yes-men allotted to them. They were relieved to see that the nightmare of compulsory 'socialist-realism' was dissipating. In the meantime, they were faced with the necessity to take account of their own past, to revise their attitudes (which turned out to have been 'dogmatic' even by Moscow standards). This was a time fertile in protests. On the part of some, the protest took the form of literary heresy, deviation in style; most important of these was the young poet of peasant origin, Ferenc Juhasz, 'the son of the Party' as he had previously been called, and whose poems now showed a resemblance to the visions of some Western 'formalists'. Others took an active part—within the

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Hungarian Writers' Association and as far as possible in the press—in the efforts to liberalise Hungarian cultural policy. Again, these trends have been discussed at great length and need not be summed up here[1]; but the fundamental change they illustrated was that, for the first time since 1948, the right to differ about the trend of history could be claimed. In 1956, after the twentieth CPSU congress, this claim to shape the future according to conscience and not as ordered from above, swelled into the cry that united first the writers, then the readers, and then even the non-reading public.

This spirit survived for some months the military defeat of the revolution. At the beginning of 1957, to be faithful to the spirit of October 1956 was counted a merit—even by some of the new secret police officers who interrogated the writers about, for instance, the 'links between the Writers' Association and the American Legation'.

THEN the fourth period began. In detail it has changed from year to year, from month to month. But its fundamental features can, perhaps, be best defined by comparing it with the former three periods. What has it in common with the coalition period? With the Zhdanovist years? With the years of the Thaw?

As before 1949, various styles of expression are again tolerated; indeed, in greater measure. The 'co-existence' theme of 1953–56 has also been revived, to the extent that the Hungarian authorities make conspicuous efforts to establish cultural links with the West. Their attitude to the PEN Club may serve as an example. From 1945 to 1949 it was tolerated though not encouraged. From 1949 to 1953 it was *de facto* banned, although never technically dissolved. From 1953 to 1956, no one in authority would have objected to it, but nothing was done to revive its activities. Since 1957, every possible step has been taken to make it active—everything short of allowing 'interference with Hungarian domestic affairs'. A symbolic act of *rapprochement*, arranged in part by PEN, was the visit to Britain and France in 1960 of a Hungarian 'cultural delegation' which included the distinguished novelist Aron Tamasi, and the poet Ferenc Juhasz. On their return, Juhasz published an article recalling the memory of Dylan Thomas, and his colleague Geza Ottlik wrote of Dickens, their shadows conjured up by the London streets; there was no censorious word about imperialism and the rest; that would have been unimaginable ten years ago.[2]

There is no longer any question of banning either 'formalist' or

1 Perhaps the best account can be found in *The Revolt of the Mind*, by Thomas Aczel and Tibor Meray, London, 1960.
2 *Elet es Irodalom* (Life and Literature) 23 December 1960.

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other modern Western literature as in 1949–53. It is treated as tolerantly as in 1945–48, and regarded with the sort of awe and hopefulness that was characteristic of 1953–56. Of course authors sharply critical of capitalism or its morals, from Bernard Shaw to Dürrenmatt, are given preference, and their success, largely due to the audience's thirst for anything Western and lively, is mechanically interpreted by the spokesmen of the regime as a victory for socialism over the disintegrating world of bourgeois hypocrisy. The number of works from the communist bloc is still disproportionately large, but it is freely admitted that interest in these is far smaller than in those coming from the capitalist world.

A similar loosening of restrictions is manifest in the publishing of modern Hungarian literature. Works in conformity with Zhdanovist postulates are given preference, but not exclusive rights. Almost every type of subject-matter and style is represented in the novels published, the plays performed, and the poems printed. But writers are expected to deal with contemporary themes on approved lines. In the winter of 1960–61, when every effort was being made to complete the collectivisation of the land, the blessings of the collective farm were on the agenda. A striking literary offering on this theme was *The Family Hearth,* a short story by Imre Dobozy in which the collective farm organiser saves a good wife from the brutality of her husband and even succeeds in improving him. (This story is accessible to the English reader in *The New Hungarian Quarterly* published by the Hungarian authorities for English consumption and compiled with much care and as little 'dogmatism' as possible.)

Then there is a kind of watered down Zhdanovism. Jozsef Darvas, ostentatiously peasant rather than proletarian, published a short comedy about the village [3] in which the *kulak* is no longer necessarily a scoundrel, the opponents of socialism are no longer all wicked, nor is 'sexy' language banned.

In a modified form, Zhdanovism also survives in essays and reviews. It was expounded by Laszlo Boka (in the *New Hungarian Quarterly,* 1960, No. 1), who wrote that although 'the liquidation of dogmatism and schematism' was necessary, Bolshevik guidance of literature, under which these mistakes throve, was basically right. Orthodoxy, however, is different things to different men. Some seem to refer to Marxism simply to give emphasis to their arguments. For instance, L. Kardos, in a philological essay on the nature of rhymes which illustrates in some 7,000 words that there can be no hard and fast rule for determining which rhyme is appropriate in a given poem,

[3] *Kortars* (Contemporary), December 1960.

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concludes: 'If this is so, the new method of research comes nearer to Marxist thinking than did the old one' (*Kortars*, January 1961). Similarly, critics holding opposed views will each claim to interpret Marxism-Leninism correctly. P. E. Feher (*Kortars*, October 1960), argues that since the ideas of socialism have to a large extent been realised, propaganda poetry has lost its point; to which Tamas Kiss replies (ibid. January 1961):

> Let us think of events such as the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow, and its historical Statement and Manifesto. If poetry helps to popularise—of course in its own specific ways—the magnificent ideas of these documents, could one say that such an activity is out of date?

SO long as debate can go on, appearances are maintained. The trouble starts when argument stops. In one respect the present period has completely revived Stalinist practices: in being far more severe on ideological deviation, or attempts to liberalise communism itself, than on avowed ideological opponents or neutralists. Accordingly most of what is written shows a painful and inhibited spirit, a constant beating about the bush. For both readers and writers today, the great experience was 1956. And this is precisely the event about which nothing can be said, except to repeat the official propaganda abuse of fascist and imperialist plotters, counter-revolutionaries, etc. etc.[4] There is no reason why other subjects should not be discussed with equal interest, but since it is *the* thing which must be avoided or falsified, it hangs like a nightmare over every word.

The persecution of the revolutionary intellectuals has decimated the ranks of creative writers. Tibor Dery, Gyula Hay, and Zoltan Zelk, though released from prison, have not yet reappeared on the literary scene. To stage a come-back, Communist Party members had to be more than ever Party-minded. It was easier for non-communists. Old liberals and radicals, snubbed or silenced in the Zhdanov period were now granted high literary honours and on their death received state funerals (Jeno Heltai, Louis Hatvany), and some mild conservatives were given an opportunity to publish their charming memoirs (Kalman Csatho). Of the older generation, the poet and author Gyula Illyes was the one to whom most attention was paid. He had for a long time been conspicuous by his silence, but has recently published some fine poetry. In his early youth he lived in Paris and was associated with the communists. 'Paris, love, young workers'

[4] A grotesque example of propaganda turned into fiction can be found in the novel *October Storm*, by Andras Berkesi: 'Woe is me! I have become the mistress of a counter-revolutionary!' the heroine cries at the climax of the drama.

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movement, farewell'. This line from one of his recent poems [5] may be interpreted as an expression of sympathy for what has sprung from that movement; or as a sigh of disappointment, or as nostalgia for the West. Of course it should first be seen as a good poem. But it is difficult to do so; in that series of mutual alibis into which Hungarian literature has been turned by taboos on the one hand and the prospect of new possibilities on the other, it is impossible to read two lines without reading between them.

Other 'populist' writers, like Laszlo Nemeth and Aron Tamasi, have been less reticent; they have even made some acknowledgment to the existing regime in statements that disappointed their anti-communist admirers but did not in fact go far beyond ordinary courtesy. Nemeth's interesting play, *The Two Bolyais* (father and son, eminent nineteenth-century Hungarian mathematicians), was a great success with the audience as well as the reviewers. Some writers with a more marked right-wing past, such as the novelist and playwright Janos Kodolanyi, re-entered the scene after long years of silence as benevolent observers of communist youth; and Ivan Boldizsar, a weather-beaten non-communist official, made an attempt to dramatise that most delicate subject, the life of a 1956 refugee, advocating the cause of staying home or coming home, without however representing the exile as necessarily a scoundrel. Both Kodolanyi and Boldizsar were reproached by the reviewers for their inability to make vigorous drama round their interesting subjects.

APART from Illyes, the three poets of highest repute in the middle generation are Sandor Weoros, Janos Pilinszky, and Laszlo Benjamin. Their popularity with the intelligentsia is natural and well deserved; but that these essentially non-popular poets should win a large following from the Hungarian populace reveals how widely shared is their spiritual longing.

Weoros, a visionary and 'formalist' by nature, never took any part in politics, but his consistent refusal to participate, under both the fascist and the communist governments, required a greater bravery than cautious resistance. In the last years of the Horthy regime, he sided gallantly with his leftist literary friends, ignoring threats and warnings. Under Rakosi's rule, he retained what a conformist critic of his poems once called his 'disreputable belief in art for art's sake'. In fact this is not an accurate description of Weoros' belief. He is far more interested in—indeed obsessed by—the meaning of myths and symbols and their bearing on ethics, than in inhabiting an ivory tower. But it is a clear enough reflection of his refusal to be engaged, as

[5] *Kortars*, December 1960.

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practically everybody had to be, in flattering the Rakosi government. He was popular during the Thaw and the Revolution, and as he has remained outside politics the Kadar government allows him to work on unmolested. His only concession (if it can be called that) was to accept an invitation to visit China. On his return he published some translations of Chinese poetry: modern as well as classical.

The case of Pilinszky is not dissimilar, but he is even more of an idealist (in the philosophical sense), and one with Catholic leanings and an esoteric imagery.

As a young poet, Laszlo Benjamin began in one of those little island fortresses of the left-wing intelligentsia. His poems have always been outstanding for clarity, their often very sophisticated innuendos hidden, as it were, behind photographic representations of well-known events rather than behind phantoms and shadows. After the war he became a communist party poet. During the Thaw, he was one of the more eloquent fighters for democratisation. After the Revolution, it was thought that he would be arrested, or make a spectacular 'confession of error'. Neither of these happened. He did not rejoin the CP, and was allowed to live freely in Hungary without a job, without means of livelihood, and apparently without a chance of publishing his poetry.

Then, in the spring of 1961, the ice around him began to melt. A new periodical, *Uj Iras* (New Writing) published a good deal of his recent poetry, which aroused great interest, particularly among the young intellectuals and workers. One of these poems, *Kezesseg* (Token), was reprinted both in the London *Irodalmi Ujsag* and also in *Magyar Hirek* (Hungarian News), the journal run by the Hungarian authorities expressly for Hungarians in the West. Benjamin is no longer in any sense a party poet, but his nature does not lend itself to a writing which ignores the existence of politics. In an account such as this, more attention is bound to be paid to these political difficulties and the way they are met than to the poetic values proper which distinguish Benjamin. This is a pity; but it cannot be helped.

A beneficiary of the interest in Western-type literature is the novelist Geza Ottlik. *School on the Frontier* (1959), a non-conformist though non-provocative novel, describes the life in a cadet school during the Horthy regime, attended by the sons of a privileged caste who as he sees them were taught to become brutes by brutish NCOs. For all his condemnation of the past, however, he does not represent these boys as devils, nor as the happy oppressors of the common people; and this rates as a non-partisan gesture today. So does his imitation of modern Western style, mainly of the English novel; his determined juggling with time (somewhat reminiscent of

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Eyeless in Gaza) and his colloquial sexiness, which under Zhdanov was condemned as 'naturalism', as distinct from 'realism'. He attempts to evoke the atmosphere of the time by using colloquial synonyms for 'four-letter words' (which have four or five letters in Hungarian as well as in English), and his scenes of everyday life are permeated with a sense of tragedy once condemned as 'idealistic' and 'pessimistic'. It should perhaps be appraised as an attempt to differ in an up-to-date way, rather than as an achievement.

THE most important new name in Hungarian literature seems to be that of a woman writer, Magda Szabo. She is in her early forties, and has for many years been writing poetry, fairy tales, and stories; but not much attention was paid to her until recently. Of her four novels, the most interesting to the present writer is *The Deer* (1959), an original and powerful piece of writing. The story is told in the form of a monologue, a speech made by a woman at her lover's tomb. It is she who has caused his death, by accident or subconscious wilfulness, and she has done so in jealousy and hatred of his wife. She recalls her own childhood under the *ancien régime* and her own successful career as an actress under the communists, a life of misery, of humiliating struggles, and of lies. At times she is breathtakingly outspoken about the world she lives in. So often has she been asked to hand in 'sincere' *curricula vitae*, to fill in forms about her personal affairs for the official files:

> They handed me a sheet, heaven only knows how many questions. Have I got any relatives abroad, or interned, or imprisoned? I ought to have a spare sheet to answer that question, to answer that Gyurka Palmai was arrested on the frontier, Evi Dolhai trod on a mine and had her feet torn off, my uncle Bela was thrown down the stairs of his castle, Alexandra has been in gaol for years, the rest of my relatives deported; they are living on farms somewhere between Kovar and Kutas; perhaps Juditka is the only one who got by; she managed to get to America . . .

She does not hesitate to lie to the Party Secretary, lies not unlike those she used to tell in her youth to the priest when she confessed to sins never committed in order to be left alone with those she really had committed but was unable to feel guilty about.

This selection of a political passage does not do justice to this book which is, above all, a masterpiece of psychological fiction. Nevertheless, it is clearly political in its implications. What it illustrates through the collapse of one world and the convulsions of another, is that, at least for a woman like herself, *plus ça change* . . . The Hungarian reviewers greeted the book with applause, practically all of

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them pointing out, however, that 'it is not a typical but an extreme case' that it describes.[6] It was not surprising that in the debate on the contemporary novel at the re-formed Hungarian Writers Association, the Party speaker, Dezso Toth, severely condemned the novel: 'Magda Szabo subordinates reality to the passions and to the sketches of some characters. In doing so she is creating a myth'.[7]

No one is allowed to contradict the Party about what is reality; but myth-making at least is tolerated.

IT is almost impossible for the outside observer to assess the tremendous results of the relaxation of control over the arts and letters, without either being misled by the smooth surface of Hungarian cultural policy, or sliding into the even greater error of ignoring improvements and achievements altogether.

There is infinitely more tolerance and generosity in Hungary today than in the years of Stalinism. But there are two decisive reasons why this should not be overestimated, or mistaken for a repetition of even that qualified liberty that existed from 1954 up to the revolutionary upheaval of 1956.

In the first place, tolerance today is presented as an act of charity of the rulers; everybody is made to feel that more or less of it can be allowed, or the whole wiped out, whenever it so pleases the Party. At certain times, lengthy documents are issued on cultural questions by some Party official speaking in a tone of authority to writers who must be kept in their place, comfortable though that place may at the moment be. The last one was a document issued by 'The Cultural Theoretical Community of Work' affiliated to the 'Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party' on 'Some Deficiencies of our Literary Criticism'. This document, published in the early spring of 1961, was longwinded and dull rather than blood-thirsty in tone; but its essence was the opinion that hardly any of the reviewers of novels, poems, plays, etc. were toeing the line with sufficient zeal. The document claimed to 'fight on two fronts', that is, against 'dogmatism' as well as 'opportunism', 'revisionism', etc. but in fact only one-tenth of the 'errors' singled out in it were attributed to dogmatism, and the rest to deviations in the opposite direction. More interesting still, most of the reviews condemned for their 'rightist' deviations were taken from the weekly *Elet es Irodalom* (Life and Literature), often ridiculed for its conspicuous association with the literary bureaucracy. The document says:

[6] *Elet es Irodalom*, 10 July 1959; basically the same tone is adopted by Gyorgy Bessenyei, *Kortars*, May 1959.
[7] *Cf. Elet es Irodalom*, 23 December 1960.

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> The conciliatory attitude on matters of principle, the concessions made in reviews to revisionist, bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, decadent tendencies, can often be traced in the writings even of leading Marxist critics and responsible guides of our literary life. This is especially harmful in the pages of our literary periodicals such as *Elet es Irodalom*, *Kortars*, *Nagyvilag* (The Vast World), and the reviews run by the Institute of Literary History . . . These liberal practices can now and then be found in the cultural columns of *Nepszabadsag* (People's Freedom, the official Party newspaper),

Tolerance, clearly, is tolerated only for the time being and must not be taken for granted.

A long essay on 'Existentialist Phenomena in Present-day Hungarian Literature' by Bela Kopeczi, the director of the state publishing house, in *Elet es Irodalom* (5 and 12 May 1961), underlined this tendency on a higher theoretical level. Again, its tone shows a degree of moderation which could not have been imagined between 1949 and 1953. The existentialists are mentioned with respect: particularly Sartre and Madame de Beauvoir of course, but also Camus and Jaspers. But then practically every Western writer turns out to be an existentialist (Graham Greene, Dylan Thomas, Colin Wilson among the British), and since most Hungarian writers reveal the influence of one Western author or another, all could be thrown into the existentialist basket. It is an essay that does not offend anyone but reminds everyone of the principle that even in the fields of thought and art, the party must be the master.

The second reason why the toleration of tolerance must be accepted with caution is that it is, politically speaking, a bargain between the conformists of the Soviet world and those who it is hoped will become conformists. Most of the writers silenced under Rakosi and now readmitted to the literary scene were linked with some conformist trend of the *ancien régime*, either liberal and conservative, or anti-conservative but anti-liberal, with some racial or national *mystique*. Nazis proper are not included. On the stage some gifted actors previously listed with every reason as fascist are today again among the stars, but in literature, forgiveness and ostentatious generosity take a rather equivocal form. But in any case, the anti-communism of 1943 is far more readily condoned than deviation from communism in or since 1956. In a word, to be right-wing without fighting spirit is tolerated; to be left-wing without subservience to the Communist Party is not. The crusade against 'revisionism' is as violent as ever, which means that tolerance is shown to all except those who would like it to become an organic part of the social

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order. The 'non-communist left', whether socialist or liberal, does not fare any better.

Thus, the general atmosphere of the literary scene is conformist, to some extent a co-existence of differing conformists. There are exceptions to this rule however; the recently published poems by Benjamin, the novels of Magda Szabo, to some extent the writings of Illyes, and also the incurably old-radical flavour in the works of those *doyens* Milan Fust, Lajos Kassak, and Jeno Tersanszky, illustrate the survival of freedom in its own right.

political science in western europe

Jan Barents

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The applied understanding of politics can help man come to terms with his society and one society with another. This study by the late Professor J. Barents, of Amsterdam University, reports on the current state of political knowledge, research and teaching in Western Europe, as revealed in journals and larger published works.

The study covers the period from the Second World War. It reveals, for instance, that much research has been undertaken in relatively new fields; political parties, pressure groups, and the formation of political opinion. The reader is referred from the text to the bibliography for the relevant publications.

The report was commissioned by the International Political Science Association in consultation with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.

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GENEALOGICAL TROUBLES

Tibor Meray

IN Marxist theory, communist parties come into existence to fight against and overthrow the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party was born on 1 November 1956 in the middle of the revolt against the Communist Party dictatorship. The declaration announcing its birth, read by Janos Kadar over the Budapest radio, started as follows :

> In a fateful hour we appeal to those who, inspired by a desire to serve the pure ideals of socialism, were led to a party which degenerated into a medium of despotism and national slavery. This came about through the criminal policy of Stalinism's Hungarian representatives—Rakosi and his clique. This adventurist policy unscrupulously frittered away the moral and ideological heritage which you acquired through honest struggle and sacrifice of blood in the old days, fighting for our national independence and democratic progress. Rakosi and his gang gravely violated our national decency and pride. They disregarded the sovereignty and freedom of our nation and lightheartedly wasted our national wealth. In their glorious uprising our people have shaken off the Rakosi regime. They have achieved freedom for the people and independence for the country. Without this there can be no socialism.

Communist parties as a rule take pride in the memory of their heroes and martyrs who were in the vanguard of the fight against capitalism. The first declaration of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party gives the laurel to those who distinguished themselves in the fight against Communist Party dictatorship :

> We can safely say that the ideological and organisational leaders who prepared this uprising were recruited from among your ranks. Hungarian communist writers, journalists, university students, the youth of the Petofi Circle, thousands and thousands of workers and peasants, and veteran fighters who had been imprisoned on false charges, fought in the front line against Rakosiite despotism and political hooliganism. We are proud that you have honestly stood your ground as well as led the armed uprising. You were filled with true patriotism and with loyalty to socialism.

Communist parties as a rule look upon the Soviet Communist Party as their model, and the fundamental rule of their policy is unconditional

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fidelity to the Soviet Union. The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party showed unmistakable traces of anti-Soviet feelings at the moment of its foundation. Janos Kadar ended his speech launching the new Party with the words :

> Our people have proven with blood their intention to support unflinchingly the government's efforts aimed at the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces. We do not want our country to become a battlefield. We do not want to be dependent any longer. I am speaking to every honest Hungarian patriot. Let us join forces for the triumph of Hungarian independence and freedom.

It was always the fashion for the victorious faction in internal Communist Party fights to ' liquidate ' their defeated rivals. In this respect a record was set by the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Of its first seven leaders, six were deported and imprisoned in the first four weeks, and two killed in the first eighteen months of its existence. At the beginning the Executive Committee had seven members : Ferenc Donath, Janos Kadar, Sandor Kopacsi, Geza Losonczy, Gyorgy Lukacs, Imre Nagy, and Zoltan Szanto. Of these, Imre Nagy was executed, Geza Losonczy died in mysterious circumstances in prison, Sandor Kopacsi is serving a life sentence, Gyorgy Lukacs and Zoltan Szanto have returned from deportation to Rumania, and Ferenc Donath was released after four years' imprisonment. Only Janos Kadar has remained untouched.

How then should the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party write its own history ? This is a serious problem. In Budapest in 1959 the Kossuth Publishing Company put out the collected speeches of Janos Kadar, the First Secretary, under the title *Firm People's Rule: Independent Hungary.* This 430-page volume does not contain the speech quoted above, the foundation document of the present Party.

Nevertheless, a communist party has to have a certain past and traditions. For this reason the *first* congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, which met in 1959, was declared to be its *seventh* congress. With this gesture, the Party accepted the whole past of the communist movement from 1918–19, its ' historical continuity '. It accepted Bela Kun's dictatorship of the proletariat of 1919, no less than Bela Kun's subsequent assassination in the Soviet Union ; it accepted the recruitment of volunteers for Spain in the thirties, no less than the execution of these volunteers in 1949–50 ; it accepted even the ten-years dictatorship of Matyas Rakosi, previously denounced by Kadar as the blind and reckless policy of guilty men, but now vindicated in the theses of the congress with the usual qualification that ' though some mistakes had been made, it nevertheless had been an era of great democratic and socialist achievements under the guidance of the Party '.

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A new theory was needed to account for the foundation of the party. This was provided by the theses, the relevant passage of which reads :

> The crushing of the counter-revolution required the foundation of a new revolutionary centre, one able to give clear-cut instructions in the fight, to lead the forces of the revolution into battle to restore the lawful order of the People's Democracy, to defend our national independence, to preserve and develop our great achievements and to serve socialism and peace. Under the leadership of Janos Kadar, Ferenc Munnich, and Gyorgy Marosan, this revolutionary centre was founded, and on 4 November 1956, the Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government was set up. The revolutionary forces went to fight at the appeal of the new, interim central committee of the Party and the new Revolutionary Government. . . . The Hungarian communists are proud that their revolutionary policy secured the co-operation of such a powerful ally of the Hungarian nation as the Soviet Union, prepared to come to the aid of socialist Hungary without hesitation.

All this would seem to suggest that the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party was not founded on the 1st but on the 4th of November, and its first leaders—besides Kadar—were not Nagy, Losonczy, Lukacs, but Ferenc Munnich and Gyorgy Marosan. Furthermore, we learn that it was these Hungarian communists who procured the aid of the Soviet Union.

Apparently the Soviet leaders had not studied the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party's history as written by itself. For when Khrushchev attended the seventh Party congress in Budapest and made an apparently impromptu speech to the workers of the Mavag-Ganz factory, he recalled the 1956 October-November events in these words :

> In those critical days, we Soviet communists discussed how we could help the Hungarian working classes, the Hungarian people. Some of us wondered whether the Hungarian comrades would react positively to our helping. We knew that there were some workers who, misled by the counter-revolution, stood on the side of the fascist conspirators. Nevertheless, we, comrades, knew for certain that our help would be going to comrades, to fellow-workers, to the working classes of Hungary, to the working people, and we had no doubts that this working class, the working population of Hungary, would consider our move as right, and our aid as a gesture of brotherhood.

The speech made no mention of any 'Revolutionary centre' that might have been in existence at that time in Hungary ; and there was nothing in it about any 'interim central committee' which may have

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asked for Soviet aid. As Khrushchev put it, frankly and plainly, this intervention was decided *by the Soviet communists*, without a Hungarian request, and with the calculated risk of causing ill-feeling among the 'Hungarian comrades'.

The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party repudiated its real service, that of supporting the 1956 revolution, while the Soviet comrades deprived it of the extremely dubious and in any case fictitious merit of soliciting foreign intervention. The foundation of the party on 1 November is denied by the present leaders; its foundation on 4 November is put in doubt by Khrushchev's words; thus the date of the foundation of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party remains a mystery.

The Party's Development and Structure

The Hungarian Workers Party, the party of Rakosi and Gero which disbanded during the revolution, had about 900,000 members. No figures are available of the membership of Kadar's Hungarian Socialist Workers Party until May 1957. Until that date the party enrolled, individually, all members of the Rakosi Party who presented themselves voluntarily and accepted the official line.

According to the latest (June 1961) issue of the Party's theoretical journal, *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, the new Party had 283,000 members on 1 May 1957; that means that more than two-thirds of the pre-revolutionary membership did not re-join. In subsequent years membership rose from 346,000 in June 1958 to 402,000 in December 1959, and to 478,000 in January 1961. *Tarsadalmi Szemle* declared that 'our Party has reached approximately the desirable membership in the present circumstances', and 'in the near future, no considerable increase is to be foreseen'. The official explanation of the fact that before the revolution, membership was twice as large as it is today, is that it was packed with unreliable, wavering, careerist elements who later hastened to desert it. There is a good deal of truth in this statement; of the nearly one million members (in a country with a population of ten million) very few were convinced communists. The chief of the central committee's mass-propaganda department says in *Tarsadalmi Szemle* that the present Party 'represents an incomparably greater force than did the Hungarian Workers Party in its time'. This may or may not be so, but in any case it is a force established by a community of interests and guilt rather than a community of belief.

The party's social composition, according to the same article, was, at the beginning of 1961, as follows, according to 'original occupation': 58·8 per cent industrial workers, 15 per cent peasants, 9·1 per cent intelligentsia. (The origins of the remaining 17·1 per cent are not given.) Nothing indicates the proportion still actually working in factory and

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field ; the cobbler who has been a ' professional revolutionary ' for forty years and is now secretary of the central committee, or the carpenter who has not had a plane in his hands for thirty years and is at present Deputy Prime Minister, are still counted as workers, so that every Party and trade union official is a worker, every kolkhoz official a peasant, etc. With 16,805 Party cells, each probably counting three officials, there are roughly 50,000 Party functionaries. Kadar stated on 11 December 1960 that 25 per cent of the 250,000 trade union functionaries are Party members, giving a total of more than 100,000 for communists employed in the Party and trade union apparatus. If to this figure we add the communist officials in the youth movement, those in the central and local administration, in the collective farms and the trade network, in education and in cultural organisations, it is clear that the characteristic feature of the Party today is that it is a *party of functionaries*. The rank-and-file has practically vanished. In some ways this gives the Party strength, for it represents the community of interest of people promoted by the Party to good jobs and various privileges, and the Party can count on their loyalty if their privileges seem in danger. They are bound together also in complicity in suppressing the revolution and executing its leaders. Party members today are even more a ' sect ', and live at an even greater distance from the people, than the looser and broader Party membership before the revolution. There was no glory then in being a Party member, but neither was there shame.

' The Fight on Two Fronts '

The ideological position of the Party, as formulated by the central committee in its report to the seventh congress, reads :

> The Party, in order to preserve the theoretical basis of Party unity, has fought in the past three years on two fronts for the purity of Marxist-Leninist ideology—against revisionism and against dogmatism . . . the need to raise the ideological level of Party members has meant a persistent battle against revisionism, dogmatism, subjectivism—all manner of distortions of Marxism.

What does ' fight on two fronts ' mean ? On 14 November 1956, ten days after the Soviet intervention, the Party passed a resolution that those persons who bore responsibility for the mistakes and crimes committed in the Rakosi era should in future hold no position either in the Party or in the state apparatus, and should not even be admitted to Party membership. A list was published of these persons ; the majority had by then fled to the Soviet Union. Since then, however, many of the former ' dogmatists ' have re-emerged in Hungary, though in less important positions. They include Laszlo Piros, former Minister of the

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Interior ; Bela Szalai, once in charge of economic affairs ; Istvan Bata, former Minister of Defence ; Istvan Kovacs, Secretary of the Budapest Party committee ; Lajos Acs and Bela Veg, members of the Secretariat ; and Andras Hegedus, the former Prime Minister who had appealed for the first Soviet intervention. Erzsebet Andics, who during the Revolution (together with her husband, Andor Berei, former President of the Planning Office) asked—and was granted—safe conduct on the grounds of their Soviet citizenship, has resumed her literary activities in Hungary. Permission to return to Hungary was granted in January 1961 to Erno Gero. After the crushing of the revolution, only two persons were tried for ' leftist ' crimes : Mihaly Farkas, one of the main organisers of the fake trials, and his son Vladimir Farkas, who had himself tortured Kadar ; but both have been released under an amnesty. The dreaded chief of the secret police, Gabor Peter, whom Rakosi imprisoned some four years before the revolution, partly in order to conceal his own crimes, has also been released. The sole ' dogmatic ' figure of the past unable to return to Budapest is Rakosi himself. He is living in the Soviet Union.

' Revisionists ' fared less well. Imre Nagy, Miklos Gimes, Pal Maleter, and Jozsef Szilagyi were executed. Geza Losonczy met a mysterious death. Tibor Dery, Gyula Hay, and a number of other prominent writers were imprisoned for a long period ; and such well-known figures of Hungarian cultural life as Professor Ferenc Merei, the economist Gyorgy Adam, the historian and journalist Sandor Fekete—to mention only those with a communist background—are still imprisoned.

The ' fight on two fronts ' shows a similar ideological balance. There has been no single Party decision in these last five years directed mainly against the dogmatists ; on the other hand, dozens of decisions, essays, and articles have appeared attacking the ' revisionists '. Cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, literary historians, and the entire Party press have been fighting the views of Gyorgy Lukacs for years ; and though in the last year or two the intensity of this campaign has been eased, sharp attacks on Lukacs still crop up in speeches or articles when the opportunity seems appropriate. The relative proportions of this ' fight on two fronts ' are clearly shown also in the theses on literary criticism in Hungary, published by the Party early in 1961. ' The aesthetic conceptions which conceal their fundamentally anti-Marxist, revisionist views under a Marxist cover, in the attempt to give them a " creative ", " progressive ", " Marxist " appearance, are most dangerous and harmful and impede our literary progress '. Even the central Party newspaper, *Nepszabadsag,* does not escape criticism : ' We can find a tendency towards conciliation at the expense of principle, a leniency towards petty-bourgeois trends even among leading Marxist critics and responsible

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literary figures. . . . The practice of liberal editing can even be found sometimes in the cultural columns of *Nepszabadsag*.' Of the twenty pages of the theses, eighteen deal with revisionism and other so-called rightist deviations, and only two are used to rebuke the dogmatists ; and whilst ' rightists ' (dead and alive) are pilloried by the dozen, not one ' dogmatist ' is mentioned by name.

It is understandable, from many points of view, that the Hungarian Communist Party should do its utmost to fight revisionism and revisionists. There are many in its leading bodies who were ardent supporters of Rakosi and Gero until the bitter end ; how can they be expected to fight ' dogmatism ' with equal consistency? It is this which accounts in part for the gulf between speech and action within the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. A Party responsible for restoring its dictatorship with foreign help is bound to fear revisionism and to fight it with all possible means.

There is one curious constitutional feature distinguishing the present Party from its predecessor, which dwindled away in a few hours during the revolution. Party members now have the right to resign from membership (there has been no report of anyone making use of this privilege in the past five years). Broadly speaking, the main trends of Party activity are unchanged, but some improvements are noticeable. The present Party, though it has not dropped its old slogans, is not as vociferous and haughty as it was in former years. Party members do not feel the pressure from their leaders so intensely in everyday life, nor do those outside it feel the constant pressure from Party members that was common in Rakosi's time. Propaganda has become quieter ; the ubiquitous bombardment with slogans, day by day round the clock, has ceased. Homes are no longer invaded by a constant stream of ' house-propagandists ' and ' people's educators ' trying to force elements of Marxism-Leninism and doses of enthusiasm into tired people coming home from work. In Rakosi's day the Party's attitude was : ' Who is not with us is against us ' ; today it has been changed to : ' Who is not against us is with us '. Some manifestations of the ' personality cult ' have in fact been toned down : photographs of the leaders are not seen everywhere in the streets, in public places, and on office or workshop walls ; and when they are referred to in speeches, the audience need not jump to their feet and clap for minutes on end.

Generally speaking, the Party has become more modest. In the past, Stalin's well-known saying decorated thousands of party offices : ' We communists are special people. We are made of a special material '. But in his closing words to the seventh Party congress Kadar said : ' Communists need not be different from other people ; they need not be special—they need only to be human in the right sense of the word '.

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Rakosi used to say ' We communists are responsible for everything that happens in this country ', and his favourite slogan for economic plans was : ' Our ceiling is the sky '. Kadar, during a visit to the Csepel motor-car factory in May, used a much quieter style when he said : ' In our majority we are simple communists, workers ; we cannot work miracles. What we can do is to give the right advice ; nevertheless the real values, the basic things of life are born in the factories, in the fields, and in the planning offices '.

That the Party has ceased to claim the power of performing miracles is a real improvement, but the legacy of the past prevents the possibility of any real understanding between the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and the Hungarian people.

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CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP

T. Schreiber

WHEN, in the last weeks of 1944, the combined German and Hungarian Nazi power collapsed in the eastern counties of Hungary, and the reorganisation of the underground democratic parties was getting under way, the Hungarian Communist Party, whose ranks had been decimated during the twenty-five years of the Horthy regime, found itself in control of an extremely slender 'cadre' to build on. From the very first it was clear as day that the Party helm would slip into the grasp of a group of repatriates just back from Moscow. After 1945 the notorious 'Muscovite foursome', Matyas Rakosi, Erno Gero, Jozsef Revai and Mihaly Farkas, with a few other ex-émigrés thrown in for good measure, gained complete mastery of the Party machinery. These Moscow extras included Imre Nagy, Zoltan Vas, and a nonentity, Istvan Kossa, who had found his way to the Soviet Union only in 1943, as a prisoner of war. All other communists, whether they had spent the war years in Hungary, like Gyula Kallai, Ferenc Donath, Sandor Zold, Laszlo Rajk and the rest of what was known as the Debrecen group, or had returned from the West after active participation in various anti-fascist movements, were destined to play second fiddle to the Muscovites.

In the 1945 parliamentary election (in spite of the presence of the Red Army the only free election in the whole history of the nation), the Communist Party won 67 seats, which were allotted, without exception, to seasoned and time-tested Party members, all of them recognised by the Party press of the time for their record of militant anti-Nazi resistance.

It may not, accordingly, be idle to examine the changes that have occurred in the leadership of the Party since 1945 primarily in the light of the fortunes of this 'élite corps'.

Today, sixteen years later, a mere 23 out of the original 67 are still holders of some higher or minor office, and that not necessarily within the Party machine.[1] Here is a list of them: Antal Apro, Istvan Birkas, Jozsef Gabor, Janos Kadar, Gyula Kallai, Istvan Kiss, Karoly Kiss, Istvan Kossa, Erik Molnar, Aladar Mod, Sandor Nogradi, Janos Oczel, Karoly Olt, Laszlo Orban, Laszlo Papp, Jozsef Prieszol, Istvan Rusznyak, Miklos Somogyi, Istvan Szabo, Janos Szipka, Istvan Szirmai, Andras Szobek and Istvan Varga. Of these, Janos Kadar and Gyula Kallai

[1] Holders of 'some higher or minor office' include members of the government, of Parliament, of the Presidential Council, the Press Council, the editorial board of a Budapest daily, executive members of trade unions and other 'mass organisations', ambassadors, etc.

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served long terms of imprisonment in the Rakosi era as ' enemies of the people and imperialist agents '. The roll of M.P.s ' elected ' in November 1958 contains the names of only 19 of the original communist representatives of 1945. With some exceptions, these representatives had been members of the central leadership, and the first congress in September 1947 still found them going strong.

' The year of the great switch ' as it was called, 1948, ushered in a new epoch in the life of the Communist Party as well as the Hungarian Republic in general. By June of that year Matyas Rakosi, using his ' salami-technique ' of sinister notoriety, had contrived a merger of the two working-class parties into what was to be christened the Hungarian Workers Party.

The new central leadership, elected on 14 June, had 64 members. A roll-call of the central committee of the present Hungarian Socialist Workers Party would be answered by not more than 15 of those 64,[2] four of whom [3] had been in jail during the fifties. Another eight members of the 1948 central executive retain some government function or other at the present time [4]; the fate and whereabouts of the others are not known. In all likelihood, the majority of them fill some minor posts as local council chairmen or secretaries, ' mass ' (i.e. youth, women's, etc.) organisation officials and the like, but have no say in the conduct of the nation's business.

A comparison of the names of 1948 leaders responsible for handling the actual power controls of the Party with those of their present-day successors is even more revealing. Of the members of the then Secretariat, for example, Mihaly Farkas was kept under lock and key until April 1960, Erno Gero receives a ' Party pension ', Matyas Rakosi has sought and obtained asylum in the Soviet Union, Laszlo Rajk has been executed, Jozsef Revai is dead, while Janos Kadar, Gyorgy Marosan and Arpad Szakasits have spent long years in prison. To take the members of the 1948 Political Bureau : Imre Nagy has been put to death, Jozsef Harustyak and Imre Vajda (another former ' convict ') have been shelved, and Istvan Kossa, though a member of the present central committee, wields no lever of power within the Party apparatus.[5] On the

2 Antal Apro, Gyula Dabronaki, Imre Dogei, Istvan Friss, Sandor Gaspar, Janos Kadar, Gyula Kallai, Karoly Kiss, Istvan Kossa, Gyorgy Marosan, Sandor Nogradi, Laszlo Orban, Jozsef Prieszol, Sandor Ronai, Arpad Szakasits.

3 Janos Kadar, Gyula Kallai, Gyorgy Marosan, and Arpad Szakasits.

4 Dabronaki, Deputy Minster of Food Supply, Keresztes, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Kobol, Deputy Minister of Housing, Mekis, member of the Labour Council, Istvan Peteri, member of the Central Control Commission, Istvan Szabo, member of the Press Council, Mrs F. Szasz, trade union secretary, Szobek, member of the Presidential Council, Tausz, Minister of Internal Trade. (Until October 1961 Jozsef Harustyak and Karoly Olt were members of the Presidential Council; K. Olt was also head of the State Bureau of Church Affairs.)

5 He is at present Minister of Posts and Transport.

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other hand, Sandor Ronai—of whom more is to follow—was still a member of the Political Bureau in December 1959. The three co-opted members of the 1948 Political Bureau, old-time communists to a man, have been relegated to the political limbo as minor functionaries with no real authority.[6]

THE three-year interval between the first congress of the Hungarian Workers Party and the second, convened in Budapest at the end of February 1951, was a period of repeated purges in the ranks of the Party upper crust, leading to the arrest and trial of many members of the central leadership. The hanging of Laszlo Rajk in September 1949 was followed by the execution of Tibor Szonyi and another member of the central committee, Major-General Gyorgy Palffy.[7] Paul Jusztus received a life sentence.

The next phase of the Party purges was designed to liquidate those left-wing social democrats who had been instrumental, by playing into the hands of the communists, in bringing off the fusion of the two workers parties. The following members of the leadership were jailed in 1950: Arpad Szakasits, chairman of the Hungarian Workers Party and of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic, Gyorgy Marosan, deputy secretary-general of the HWP and Minister of Light Industry, Istvan Ries, Minister of Justice, Imre Vajda, president of the National Planning Board, and Ferenc Revesz, former M.P. The subsequent wave of arrests rounded up the members of the 'Debrecen

[6] Marton Horvath, former chairman of the editorial board of *Szabad Nép*, the official pre-revolution party daily, is now director of a museum, while Istvan Kovacs and Zoltan Vas are said to be working as ordinary employees of a state enterprise.

[7] The following other high officials (all of them long-standing members of the Hungarian Communist Party) were arrested in 1949 and 1950:

Endre Szebenyi, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of the Interior, Jozsef Rex, Foreign Ministry Councillor, Gyorgy Heltai, head of the Political Section of the Foreign Ministry, Frigyes Major, Interior Ministry Councillor, Karoly Rath, Foreign Ministry Councillor, Jozsef Kalcsics, Interior Ministry Councillor, Istvan Mate, head of department at the Foreign Ministry, Peter Balaban, head of department at the State News Agency, Sandor Cseresznyes, head of the Press Department of the Ministry of the Interior, Laszlo Zilahy, Councillor, Bela Szasz, Foreign Ministry Councillor, Janos Beck, Foreign Ministry Councillor (now Ambassador to Cuba), Ferenc Kovacs, Ministry Councillor, Gyorgy Adam, Ivan Foldi, Gyorgy Hodos of the National Planning Bureau, Superintendent Jozsef Babos, Ferenc Vagi of the Prime Minister's Press Department, etc. Zoltan Horvath, chief editor of *Népszava*, was also jailed about this time.

The following high-ranking police and army officers disappeared without warning: Police Colonels Otto Horvath-Konigsberg, Andras Villanyi, Miklos Reti, Laszlo Marschall; Major-General Laszlo Solyom, chief of staff, Major-General Laszlo Kuthy, army superintendent, Colonel Kalman Revai, commandant of the Kossuth Military Academy, Lieutenant-Generals Gusztav Illy and Gusztav Scholz. All had taken an important part in recruiting and organising the new democratic police force and army in 1945. Many of these officers were liquidated, then posthumously rehabilitated in September and October 1956; their names are never mentioned in the present-day Hungarian press.

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group ', except Kadar and his associates, whose turn came only *after* the second Party congress.[8]

The reshuffle carried out at this congress introduced into the Political Bureau chosen on 3 March 1951, a new set of Rakosi creatures, all of them raw recruits even to the central leadership, who were to become leading actors in the later acts of the drama : Andras Hegedus, Istvan Kristof, Mihaly Zsofinyecz, Istvan Denes, Laszlo Piros, Istvan Hidas were making their début in the limelight of public affairs. At the same time few changes occurred in the composition of the central committee, where the newly co-opted were merely called upon to fill the places left vacant by the imprisoned ' traitors '.

Arrested two months after the second congress, Sandor Zold, member of the Political Bureau and Minister of the Interior, committed suicide in his prison cell. On 12 May followed the arrest of Janos Kadar, member of the Secretariat and the Political Bureau, and of Gyula Kallai, member of the central committee.[9]

The third Party congress was held some two years after the second. Meantime, in Hungary as elsewhere, Stalin's death had touched off a ferment, though at first the process was rather slow to gather momentum. 4 July 1953, when Imre Nagy came to head the government, was practically inaugural day for a revision of the past years' miscarriages of justice, whereby hosts of people, an appreciable percentage made up of Party members, had been imprisoned on trumped-up charges.

When, in May 1954, the third congress of the HWP met, the rehabilitation of the framed Party members and leaders was already in progress, though far from being complete. The newly elected leadership showed drastic changes. The membership of the Political Bureau was reduced from the 1951 number of 17 to a mere 9, with such first-flight ex-Muscovite luminaries as Jozsef Revai and Zoltan Vas thrown overboard, although both of them retained their membership of the central committee. This did not alter the fact that the tone and pace in the thinned ranks of the Political Bureau continued to be set by Rakosi's personal adherents, or rather creatures, like Lajos Acs, Istvan Hidas, Andras Hegedus and Bela Szalai, who had bobbed up to the surface from the anonymity of the Party's lower reaches. Still, the ' roping-in ' of the ' middle cadres ', especially county secretaries, put a new face on the

[8] Ferenc Donath's and Geza Losonczy's arrest was not entirely unexpected. On publication of the list of new deputy ministers on 26 January 1951 (when the title of under-secretary of state was abolished), both of them turned out to have lost their posts as Under-Secretaries of State of, respectively, Agriculture and Popular Education.

[9] Mihaly Erdei, member of the central committee, was spirited away from his flat on 11 November 1951. Among others, Police-General Istvan Ratulovszky and the military commanders of Pecs, Szombathely, and Kaposvar were liquidated at about the same time.

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central committee. It was about this time that such second-line men as, say, Rudolf Foldvari and Ferenc David were co-opted.[10]

In March 1955 the committee, in deference to Matyas Rakosi and his henchmen, who staged a comeback by launching an anti-' right-wing deviationist ' campaign simultaneously with the dimming of Malenkov's star, passed a resolution removing Imre Nagy and Mihaly Farkas from the Political Bureau and the central committee of the Party. In April Andras Hegedus assumed the premiership, and the Party co-opted Istvan Kovacs and Jozsef Mekis into its Political Bureau.

Since it is outside the scope of this article to retrace the course of political developments, it seems admissible to move from 18 April 1955 to 18 July 1956, the day that marked the end of the ten-year rule of Matyas Rakosi, who yielded his place as first secretary of the central committee to Erno Gero, Muscovite number two. The 18 July meeting of the CC also decided on other shifts in the team, all leading up to the complete rehabilitation of once-high-up victims of the rigged trials recently released from prison. This drive swept Kadar and Marosan back into the Political Bureau ; Revai, too, sat on it again [11] ; and Karoly Kiss, whose sympathies, *at the time,* lay with Imre Nagy, reached the top rung of the ladder during this session. While the stranglehold of the *apparatchiki* had relaxed only partially, the forces pressing for the democratisation of the country's economy and political life were growing increasingly vocal.[12]

In covering the period 23 October–4 November 1956 we must first turn our attention to the 24 October meeting of the Party central committee. This ended by weeding out Rakosi's minions and hatchetmen (Lajos Acs, Bela Veg, Janos Matolcsi) from the Secretariat and choosing the three new secretaries (Ferenc Donath, Janos Kadar, and Gyula Kallai) from among the leaders of the ' Debrecen group ', who had suffered imprisonment during the Rakosi era. Rehabilitated on 14

[10] As a matter of interest, Gabor Peter, the AVO (secret police) chief, known as ' the Hungarian Beria ', was arrested in the spring of 1954, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Between 1945 and 1951 Peter had been member of the central committee of the Party. He is now working in a tailor's shop in the 8th district of Budapest.

[11] Jozsef Revai, who was dubbed the ' Hungarian Zhdanov ', showed himself more or less in sympathy with Imre Nagy's political line after 1953. Nevertheless, in November 1956 he fled to Czechoslovakia and was one of the first to side with the Kadar clique. In his memorable three-page article published in the 7 March 1957 issue of *Nepszabadsag*, he went as far as to take up the cudgels for Rakosi and Gero. The new regime treated him as a ' left-wing ultra ' and was at pains to ease him safely out of the political scene, which was made easy enough by Revai's grave illness. He died in 1959.

[12] Imre Mezo was one of those who were co-opted into the central committee at this time. An old-standing adherent of Imre Nagy, Mezo met his death in tragic circumstances during the siege of the Budapest party headquarters on 31 October 1956. For obvious reasons, the present regime is trying to make political capital out of his death, using it to demonstrate the counter-revolutionary character of the uprising.

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October, Imre Nagy was given a seat on the Political Bureau ; so was Zoltan Szanto, former envoy in Paris. Geza Losonczy, another ' Debrecen group ' man detained for years under Rakosi, became a candidate member of the Bureau, and the name of Ferenc Munnich,[13] who had been in some sort of ' internal emigration ' after 1948 in spite of his Moscow war years and his long record in the working-class movement, cropped up in the 24 October roll for the first time. On 25 October Janos Kadar succeeded Erno Gero as first secretary of the central committee.

Its last meeting three days later, on 28 October, transferred the leadership of the Party, ' in view of the emergency situation ', to a Party Presidium of six. The Presidium included Ferenc Munnich, who was also Minister of the Interior at the time, Karoly Kiss, Zoltan Szanto, Antal Apro, Janos Kadar, and Imre Nagy.

On 1 November, however, it was no longer the Presidium of the *Hungarian Workers Party,* but a preparatory commission formed to convoke the national constituent congress of what was to emerge as the *Hungarian Socialist Workers Party,* which addressed the working people of the country. The commission had made a clean sweep of such signally unpopular figures of the Rakosi regime as Antal Apro and Karoly Kiss. It was, as everybody knows, immediately following his broadcast announcement of the setting up of the commission that Janos Kadar, the chairman of that commission and Minister of State in Imre Nagy's cabinet, ' betook himself ', in company with Ferenc Munnich, to the Soviet Embassy, which arranged for them to be flown to the Carpathian Ukraine. At Ungvar (or Uzhgorod as it now is) they established a ' new revolutionary centre ' in the ' first days ' of November.

WHILE the Soviet troops were moving in to the kill in an all-out offensive ' to restore order ', Janos Kadar, Antal Apro, Istvan Kossa, Ferenc Munnich, and Gyorgy Marosan went on the air to harangue the nation in the name of the new ' revolutionary centre '. They were promptly joined by Imre Horvath and Imre Dogei, a member of the central committee since 1948.

When, in December 1956, the members of the Caretaker Committee foregathered for the first time, the meeting was in very low strength indeed. The official list of the HSWP leadership was not published until 26 February 1957 ; needless to say, it did not contain the names of Imre Nagy and his close associates, abducted to Rumania, but it was equally

13 Ferenc Munnich was police chief of Budapest after 1945, and later Minister in Helsinki and Sofia. In 1956 he was sent to Belgrade as one of a team charged with promoting a Gero-Tito meeting, which took place in mid-October. He had been under a cloud for years because of his Spanish-Civil-War background but his Soviet connections saved him from prison.

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guiltless of those of a number of Rakosi high-ups who had been a great deal in the public eye between 1951 and 1956, such as Istvan Kristof, Istvan Hidas, Laszlo Piros, Istvan Bata, Bela Szalai, Istvan Kovacs, Jozsef Mekis, Lajos Acs, and Bela Veg, let alone the Muscovite ' big guns ', Mihaly Farkas, Erno Gero, and Matyas Rakosi. (Jozsef Revai was given a seat on the central committee.) They were replaced largely by new men, some of whom had belonged to the following of Imre Nagy, like Lajos Feher, at present agricultural expert number one of the regime, while some had signified their adhesion to the 4 November course in good time, not least from opportunist motives. Nonentities, up to then completely out of the picture, suddenly rose to leading positions, like the two present Deputy Prime Ministers, Bela Biszku and Jeno Fock. Evidently, the ' revolutionary workers and peasants government ' was, in the first few months, too much of a beggar to be a chooser. In the Political Bureau appointed in February 1957, a place was secured for Miklos Somogyi, who had been out of the running for several years. Nothing is more pointedly illustrative of the acute ' manpower shortage ' than the fact that the incoming central committee of February 1957 had a mere 37 members as against 64 in 1948, 69 in 1951, and 71 in 1954.

By December 1959 the extremely fluid state of the country's affairs had solidified into something like a recognisable pattern. The Party congress made no notable shifts or replacements in the supreme command, and the membership of the Political Bureau received an accession of one only in the person of Dezso Nemes, whose presence on it was all the more justified as he was head of the editorial board of the central party organ.[14]

To offset this, in the central committee the membership figure dutifully climbed back to the ' conventional ' level, rising from 37 to 73.[15] Examination of its membership list, however, reveals the differences from any of its predecessors. As said before, no more than 15 of the 1948 leaders are to be found on the present committee, while the 1951 roll has bequeathed a mere 12 to posterity, two of them, Kadar and Gyula Kallai, being ex-prisoners with long terms to their credit. But if banished from the central committee, the gods and demigods of the Rakosi era are, almost without exception, still allowed to hold various government offices,[16] while the men of Imre Nagy's circle have been executed, imprisoned or, at best, let fall by the wayside.

14 In the course of the reorganisation in September 1961, Nemes became central committee secretary with Sandor Gaspar, while his place at *Nepszabadsag* was given to Zoltan Komocsin. Another pointer to Nemes's present high prestige is his inclusion in the Hungarian delegation to the 22nd CPSU congress.

15 Since September 1961 the membership of the central committee has numbered 74 (plus 22 candidates). The 74th member is Miklos Ajtai.

16 Bela Szalai is Commercial Councillor to the Hungarian embassy in East Berlin; Andor Berei is chairman of the editorial board of the *Hungarian Encyclopaedia*; Laszlo

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Exactly where, then, do the bulk of the present CC membership hail from? Scrutiny of the December 1959 catalogue of names shows that most of them turn out to have worked at the head of county Party organisations or mass organisations or in Party cells in the ministries. They belong to what is known as the 'middle cadres'. But the new central committee also includes at least one author (Kalman Sandor), one actor (Tamas Major), and even a diplomat (Endre Sik), who has had a long and chequered career in the movement and was Foreign Minister until October 1961. There are, moreover, by way of makeweight, a few chairmen of collective farms with a record of administrative efficiency to back them. The best known of these is Paul Losonczi, who became Minister of Agriculture in 1960.

TO sum up: the leadership of the Communist Party has suffered a sea-change since 1945. The leaders who, at the tail-end of 1944, applied themselves to building up the party from scant beginnings are now either dead or have 'taken sanctuary' in the Soviet Union or languish on the shelf of official disfavour; some of those jailed on false charges under Rakosi and later cleared have even found themselves forced to seek asylum in Western countries so as to escape being arrested a second time.

In the course of fifteen years there has been one person, and one only, in the rarefied stratosphere of the Party command, who has survived everything and everybody; Antal Apro has been a member of the Political Bureau without intermission from first to last. He was 'in' even at the time of the October events, sitting as he did on the reconstituted Bureau of 24 October and on the Party Presidium called into being on 28 October; then, after a few days break, he joined Kadar, Kossa, and Munnich in founding the 'new revolutionary centre'. Another old-timer, Sandor Ronai, former social-democratic leader, ex-chairman of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian Republic and speaker of the present Parliament, parallels Apro in having been a non-stop member of the central committee throughout; in addition, he sat on the Political Bureau between 1948 and 1951, and was re-admitted in 1957. Incidentally, Ronai, in common with Istvan Dobi, the present chairman of the Presidential Council,[17] stayed put all through the 1956 earthquake.

Piros is commandant of the guard of the House of Parliament; Andras Hegedus and Istvan Bata, repatriated from the Soviet Union in 1959, are also in employment (Hegedus, by the latest accounts, is vice-president of the Central Bureau of Statistics). It is interesting to note that it would be futile to look in the Hungarian press for so much as the slightest reference to the fortunes of these men and of all the other functionaries who were riding high in the Rakosi era.

17 Officially, Istvan Dobi has only been a Party member since December 1959; but he is generally known to have sat in on all Political Bureau meetings for many years before. His name first appeared on the CC membership list in December 1959.

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But the central committee can boast other hardy perennials besides Ronai. Karoly Kiss has graced it unintermittently since 1945, and even 'made' the Political Bureau on 18 July 1956, surviving there well into the revolution, until 1 November. Another diehard, Istvan Friss, head of the National Economy Department of the central committee, is one of the *eminences grises* of the Party. He has sat on the central committee since 1945, although, as an economic adviser, he has all along been outside the political melee. He is held partly to blame for the fiasco of the first, revised five-year plan. Since then, however, he has taken great pains to mend his ways and repair the damage done, and is now sharing responsibility with Jeno Fock and Lajos Feher for the management of the Hungarian economy. There is merely a few months' gap in the continuity, since 1945, of the CC membership of Sandor Nogradi, chairman of the Party's Control Commission.

* * * *

The history, then, of the central leadership of the Party is not exactly remarkable for stability. Its sixteen-year span is riddled with profound and far-reaching changes; in fact, the very name of the party has been changed on two occasions. Particularly in the years of the 'personality cult', no explanation was ever forthcoming why old-time communists with outstanding post-1945 record of activity on behalf of their Party kept disappearing overnight. There is ample evidence to show that, among all communist parties, the Hungarian Party is second only to its Soviet counterpart in the number of its leaders turned traitors from heroes and the other way round. Official historians of the Hungarian Party are in for a hard time if they shoulder the uphill task of reducing the zigzags and ups-and-downs of the central leadership to something like intelligibility.

There has certainly been more stability since November 1956. So far there has been no major purge in the ranks of the post-revolution Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, apart, of course, from the assassination of Imre Nagy and his colleagues, who must be left out of account in this particular context, since none of the 'old-guard' communists executed or jailed in 1957 and 1958 was a member of the central committee appointed in December 1956.

A government-cum-Party reshuffle occurred in September 1961. This, however, seems to be aimed rather at a reorganisation of the economic, political, educational, and administrative machinery; certainly, no heads were sent rolling. What seems clear, on the other hand, is that there is a deliberate rejuvenating process going on, for the top government posts are now held by people of a comparatively younger age group, like Jeno Fock, one of the best men in the present Party cadres, and the

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September replacements winnowed out two leaders of the older generation, Premier Ferenc Munnich and Foreign Minister Endre Sik. (Both continue as members of the Party leadership, and Munnich has nominally stayed in the government with the honorary title of Minister of State.) Eventually, of course, both the Party and the state machines are bound to be manned by the products of the post-war period.

From their ranks the man may arise who will some day perform the act of consecrating a monument to the Hungarian victims of the reign of terror, and, having access to the Party archives and documents, may have the opportunity to write a history of that Party that is free from falsifications and distortions.

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After Rakosi

DISGRACE AND REHABILITATION

*William O. McCagg**

IN recent years the communist parties of Eastern Europe have become increasingly skilled at explaining the presence of errors in their pasts. In fact, the old Soviet historian's maxim: 'only the future is certain, the past changes eternally', is no longer so pertinent as it once was. Now the Communist Party and its leaders are less retroactively infallible; the Party need only have been 'essentially correct' in the past. The reasons for the change are obvious. It is no longer possible to suppress the horrors of the past, so they must be attributed to erring leaders. Furthermore, Khrushchev has pointed out that even today's heroes erred in tolerating the activity of the great wrongdoers. The result is that not only may errors be admitted, but the question of personal responsibility may, within reason, be discussed. The variable in Party history today lies in the quality of the past error—whether it is pardonable or not.

The new practice is particularly opportune for the Hungarian communists. In Hungary the Soviet maxim was for many years applied with excessive zeal; two of the four men who have headed the Hungarian Party since its establishment in 1918 were cast for a considerable time into absolute oblivion; of the five men who restored the Party to legality in the autumn of 1944, only one is in good repute today; of the eighteen in the leadership of the newly-created Hungarian Workers Party in June 1948 only three have survived at the top without disgrace; four others have managed to struggle all or part of the way back from disgrace, and one died naturally; the rest died in prison, or live in obscurity. The Party's zeal was so great that for ten years after its accession to power it published no historical account whatever of its past activities. When, in 1954–55, a Party history was produced, it contributed to the collapse of the Party's self-confidence. The rehabilitation of disgraced communists played a significant part in the catastrophe which brought the present regime to power; this notwithstanding, one of its first acts was to herd a new flock into the Party purgatory.

The present Party is naturally aware of the problems created by suppression of the past according to the Stalinist formula; and since 1956 a Party History Institute has been raised to prominence by the central committee. Its leading historian, Dezso Nemes, is a member both

* The research for this article was done on a grant from the Ford Foundation.

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of the Politburo and the Secretariat. With the aid of the new formula, much that was disgraceful in the Party's past has been brought to light. Some examples of how this has been done will illustrate the development of the new doctrine of ' essential correctness ', and will also cast light on the psychology of the regime. The three major affairs which have caused the Party the most trouble are, first, the case of Bela Kun, who was liquidated by Stalin ; then those of Rajk and Kadar, who were purged by Rakosi ; finally those of Rakosi and Nagy, who have been cast aside by the present regime.

BELA KUN was the founder of the Hungarian Communist Party, an associate of Lenin, the leader of the shortlived Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919, and the acknowledged chief of the Party until its disruption by the Comintern in 1936–37. He was ' sectarian ' in the sense that for him an unadulterated proletarian dictatorship was the Party's immediate goal. Since, between the wars, the Party usually consisted of a few hundred men in exile, Kun's policy was somewhat impractical. It condemned the Party to fierce factional strife, for the less intransigent argued in favour of limited legal activity within Hungary and of temporary tactical alliances with other leftist elements. In the spring of 1937 Kun disappeared in Moscow, reportedly after a trial by the Comintern. His disappearance was accompanied by the imprisonment of some hundred other Hungarian Muscovites, most of whom were never heard of again.[1]

After the war Kun was simply not mentioned in Party publications. This may have suited the Party, for its post-war national front tactics were the exact opposite of all that Kun had stood for. Moreover Kun's collaborators, and the pre-1937 Party in general, were very poorly represented in the massive post-war Party.

Stalin's death and the end of his terror brought the question of writing a Party history to the fore ; all that had been published was a glorified biography of Rakosi. Under pressure, the First Secretary took the first step on the path of ' essential correctness '. Early in 1954 he published a lecture on the 1919 insurrection, admitting the fact of Kun's leadership, but blaming Kun personally for its failure. The Party line now was that Kun had deceived Lenin, and had already in 1919 been a Bukharinist traitor.[2]

[1] See A. Szelpal, *Les cent trente trois jours de Bela Kun* (Paris, 1959), and the biographical introduction by F. Munnich to M. Pintner (ed.) *Kun Bela a magyar tanacskoztarsasagrol, valogatott beszedek es irasok* (Kossuth, 1958).

[2] To be exact, Kun was mentioned in the Kostov Trial in Sofia, 1949, as having been a Titoist early in the 1930s. The first post-Stalin reference was in explanatory footnotes to a 1953 collection of Lenin's writings on Hungary. This was followed by Rakosi's lecture and by articles by Laszlo Reti and Dezso Nemes in *Tarsadalmi Szemle* for March 1954.

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Rakosi maintained this line as late as November 1955 in an article in *Voprosy Istorii*. Then, at the XX CPSU congress, Kun was rehabilitated. The result was a second step towards 'essential correctness'; on 21 February 1956 *Pravda* and the Hungarian press commemorated the seventieth anniversary of Kun's birth in articles with little factual content, but with much praise, and no reference to errors. His rehabilitation had a shattering effect on Rakosi's prestige, and marked his final decline. It did not, however, make Kun a hero inside or outside the Party, for his extremism made little appeal to the reformers of the day; what it did do was to open the gate for discussion of CPH relations with the CPSU.[3]

Since then Kun's posthumous prestige has risen. He has been praised, and his widow and family, rediscovered in Russia, were in 1959 brought home. His political writings were published in 1958. In 1959, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of 1919, he replaced Rakosi as the great pre-war Party hero. Schools and factories can now be named after him. During the repression of 1957 the regime apparently hoped to win sympathy for itself by honouring one who had incurred the enmity of Stalin. This attitude concerns primarily the person of Kun; his policies are less fashionable. The regime has chosen instead both the name and the political traditions of the MSzMP (Socialist Workers Party), an attempt at legal activity within Hungary of 1925–27 which Kun opposed and reportedly sabotaged. The present party has relieved Kun of specific responsibility for the failure of 1919; but its historical output shows clearly that Kun made mistakes, and that his policies were less than correct. The culmination of this trend came with the publication in 1960 of Kun's literary essays; the introduction presents him as an intellectual as well as a political paragon.

The case of Bela Kun illustrates the doctrine of 'essential correctness' in several phases of its development. First, the Stalinist silence was broken, though the fictional crimes were upheld. Next, the person was rehabilitated, though without reference to the facts. Subsequently there was a gradual rediscovery of the true facts. But since political considerations dictated the whole process, care has been taken to keep the rehabilitated character detached from his policies. In the end the character has been glorified without any commitment to approve his policies.

The case also reveals something of the regime's outlook. The Kadarists have reason to want to rid themselves of the many skeletons of the past, but their treatment of Bela Kun goes beyond the strictly utilitarian. They have disposed of the father image of the previous regime—Rakosi

[3] An interesting example of this indifference to Kun is the debate between Lukacs and Nemes in *Parttorteneti Kozlemenyek*, Oct. 1956, pp. 95–137. It ranged over the interwar history of the party, but Kun is hardly mentioned approvingly.

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—but the figure they have put in its place is smaller in scale. They have separated Kun's image from a political tradition they consider disreputable, and have selected another tradition. This ingenious device indicates their concern about proper ancestors and respectability.

Laszlo Rajk entered the Party as a student in the early 1930s, fought in the Spanish Civil War, and became the leader of the refounded underground Party in the autumn of 1944. Among the new post-war Party members he was popular as a romantic figure, and as Minister of the Interior from 1946 to 1948 he gained personal credit for the defeat of 'reaction'. The causes of Rajk's decline are obscure. There can be no question of his seeking to supplant Rakosi, but in personal contacts the two men became less and less compatible. When Stalin clamped down on his European satellites in 1948–49, Rakosi apparently sought relief from his own insecurity through vindictiveness against Rajk. In 1949 Rajk was publicly tried as a Titoist agent, and executed. The staging was patently Russian, but Rakosi boasted in public that he personally had engineered the sacrifice.[4]

Kadar's case was similar. He, too, entered the Party in the thirties, rose in the underground, and, as Secretary of the Budapest Party Committee, was prominent during the seizure of power. But he lacked Rajk's popularity. Besides, in 1943, as senior Party officer at liberty, he followed up the dissolution of the Comintern by dissolving the CPH. This was shortly recognised as a mistake. There was naturally little open talk about it after the liberation, but it cast a shadow on Kadar's career. Kadar was moreover a friend of Rajk, and in 1948 was persuaded by Rakosi to take over the Ministry of the Interior from his comrade. In this capacity, Kadar was officially responsible for the purging of Rajk, and for all the other iniquities of 1948–50 : it is alleged that he personally persuaded Rajk to make a confession. This did little to enhance his reputation. In the spring of 1951, after months of foreboding, Kadar in his turn fell victim to Rakosi, but unlike Rajk he tumbled without publicity from the top of the Party into prison.

The fall of Rajk and Kadar, and the imprisonment of many other communists, deeply affected the Party. With Rajk the 'Spanish' and 'Western' communists disappeared, and with both went people from the underground ; there was a simultaneous purge of former social-democrats. But just as important as the tangible purge was the intangible effect. From 1950 to 1953 it was dangerous to have been associated with any one of these groups ; few people in the post-war Party were not so associated, so the purge led practically everyone to 'adjust' his own

[4] The fullest biography of Rajk is in Francois Fejto, 'L'affaire Rajk est une affaire Dreyfus internationale', *L'Esprit*, Nov. 1949, supplemented in the same author's *Ungheria* (Milan, 1957). The account here is based on my own investigations.

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past. The trial of Rajk and the silence of Kadar symbolised the fear which hung over the Party.

REHABILITATION of communists began in Hungary after 1953. The movement was intended to clear the Party's decks, but the effect was more dynamic. Silence and implicit self-deception gave way to questions and outraged criticism. Kadar reappeared with other survivors in 1954, but differed from many of them by accepting office in the Party. Still, he was active in the spreading ferment, and in June 1956 formulated his own version of 'essential correctness' by demanding in addition to personal rehabilitation a public explanation of one of the shadows on his name.

> It is not necessary [for Party historians] to make anything rosier than it was . . . or blacken anything. . . . Frankly, the 1943 decision to dissolve the Party had, alas, harmful influences and effects which Marxist historians cannot but label serious. But whether from the point of view of Marxist history writing, or from the point of view of the Party's policy (and in my opinion the two are identical), it is necessary to seek and tell the truth. We must put an end to the intolerable situation . . . whereby for 11 years, without worth-while discussion, without seeking the facts or the truth, people . . . dealt with this topic in a version determined by the cult of the personality, based on arbitrary, unfounded, subjective assertions.[5]

At that time Kadar, like everyone else, thought that the safeguard against a repetition of Stalinist crimes was to publish the facts, to end the silence about the past.

The reappearance of Kadar and his fellow prisoners relaxed the tension of the terror, and weakened confidence in the Party leaders; but it was the rehabilitation of Rajk which kindled the flame. On 29 March 1956, Rakosi confessed in *Szabad Nep* that the Rajk case had been 'based on a provocation'. For the Party members this was little better than a confession to first degree murder by accident, and three months later Rakosi was replaced by a dual leadership of Stalinists and rehabilitees as personified by Gero and Kadar.

The appearance of Rajk's ghost brought Kadar's ideas about revealing the past to a more mature stage. There is a widespread report that in the leadership crisis of July 1956 Kadar was warned that his part in Rajk's confession would be made public. After this, for almost three months, Kadar was quiet. Early in October the dead Rajk and his

[5] *Parttorteneti Kozlemenyek*, Oct. 1956, p. 26; reprinted in vol. 5 of the latest Party history course, pp. 253–261. This plea concludes an account of what happened in 1943. Blame is placed first on a Comintern precedent, then on ignorance of Moscow's wishes; Kadar also argues that the dissolution really was not a crime at all.

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co-defendants were given a ceremonial funeral, which turned into a public demonstration by communists and the general public against Stalinist excesses. Kadar himself did not officiate, and this was perhaps one of the reasons why, when the revolution broke out three weeks later, it crystallised around Nagy, not Kadar. When, as the Soviet tanks advanced, Nagy fled to the Yugoslav Embassy, he was accompanied by Rajk's widow. Kadar sent both into exile.[6]

Since the revolution Kadar, as First Secretary, is fulsomely praised by the Russians. His collected post-revolution speeches are the regime's bible. There are no streets or factories named after him, but he is described in party writings as a working-class hero. Rajk, on the other hand, is ignored. His widow was released in 1959. But the line adopted in daily propaganda is slightly deceptive. For the latest edition of the Party history reveals that with regard to their pasts Rajk and Kadar receive more or less the same treatment. Both are mentioned when necessary; neither is given much comment. Kadar is distinguished by having his explanation of why he dissolved the Party in 1943 reprinted in full. Rajk's distressing fate is described in the same terms as Kadar's imprisonment; without further elaboration the charges against him are said to be false. In brief, there is silence about Kadar's past in the same sense as there is silence about Rajk's.[7]

Although Rajk is rarely mentioned, both his policies and his collaborators are in favour. The period in the Party's past when its policies were most nearly correct is that of 1936 to 1948, and in particular the years after 1944 (even Rakosi is considered to have been correct in that period); and it has become once more an honour to have served in the underground, or in Spain, or even to have been active in the pre-war legal labour movement (this last with reservations). Veteran fighters who agreed to cooperate are prominent throughout Kadar's officialdom. The cases of Rajk and Kadar show that 'essential correctness' not only permits the retention of a hero without his past policies, but also retention of the policies without the hero.

THE paths followed by Rakosi and Nagy to disgrace are too well known to need recounting here, but it is useful to indicate certain vital differences between these and the cases of Kun, Rajk, and Kadar. Rakosi and Nagy are victims of the present regime, and both of them fell on issues of state policy; their names had strong political and emotional connotations for the general public. In neither case was the

[6] The question of Kadar's role between March and November 1956 has escaped treatment in the extensive literature on the revolution.

[7] See vols. v and vi of the new history course. The brief biographies at the end of Dezso Nemes, *Magyarorszag felszabadulasa*, 1960 edition, are also useful indicators of present official attitudes.

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fall an inner party affair ; and neither can conveniently be rehabilitated. For the foreseeable future, neither can be exhumed without his policies, and they are therefore not eligible for the treatment awarded Bela Kun. Nor can the precedent of Rajk and Kadar be cited. The rehabilitation of either would have broad, though utterly different, public repercussions. Rakosi does not arouse enthusiasm even inside the Party, and since the present system is founded on Nagy's destruction, it is hardly surprising that the Party does not contemplate his rehabilitation. The official treatment of these cases must be judged in this light.

Between his departure from Hungary in July 1956 and the consolidation of the Kadar regime in the spring of 1957, Rakosi was in peril of criminal prosecution. His comrade in crime, Mihaly Farkas, was arrested after the Rajk funeral and sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment ; there is some evidence that the Ministry of the Interior was preparing charges against Rakosi himself. But as the official version of the 1956 ' counter-revolution ' gradually took shape, less and less blame was laid on the Stalinists, who are now said to have done no more than ' blunder '. Farkas was amnestied ; so too was Gabor Peter, the former secret police chief whom Rakosi used as a scapegoat in 1953–55. With one exception —Rakosi—the Hungarian communists who fled to the Soviet Union in 1956 are believed to have returned home.

Conversely, as Rakosi's portrait lost its blackness, the picture painted of Nagy and his colleagues grew more sinister. In June 1958 Imre Nagy and some of his friends were executed, others imprisoned after a secret trial. There is no direct evidence but little doubt of Soviet pressure ; the trial and the sentences were announced simultaneously in Moscow and Budapest. Some prominent persons associated with the revolution have since been released, but at the price of political silence or of collaboration with the regime.[8]

The official account of the Nagy trial has been fully analysed elsewhere.[9] How it will be treated in party historiography can be surmised, but not recorded. Party history in its latest version has now reached the year 1948. Both its falsifications and its omissions show a departure from Stalin's methods. In the official published report of the Nagy trial there was no dramatic recognition of a photograph of the roadside milestone near which the villains of the Rajk trial had secretly conferred. There was no comic relief like the self-incrimination of Szalai. The present regime was content with producing former fascists and mysterious Western journalists to support its case. Similarly, as the new Party history approaches embarrassing times it does not become less detailed,

[8] The most prominent associates of Nagy to be released are Gyorgy Lukacs, Tibor Dery, Miklos Vasarhely, and Mrs. Rajk.
[9] *The Truth about the Nagy Affair* (London, 1959).

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but cuts down on the number of names mentioned. No one has disappeared altogether; but, with Rakosi and Nagy, Kadar and Revai have also faded away. The Party increasingly resembles a headless beast, whose anonymously collective decisions respond to the demands of worker and peasant delegations. In a word, the suppression of facts is now reduced to a minimum and disguised under a semblance of detailed accuracy. The difficulty is greater when it comes to making the treachery retroactive. In a recent comment on Nagy, the leading historian of the Party wrote :

> On the Party's recommendation, Nagy became Minister of Agriculture [in 1944]. The land reform, which was pushed through and executed by the Communist Party, naturally enhanced his personal reputation. . . . Only later did it turn out that even in the question of the land reform Imre Nagy gave evidence of opportunist behaviour. . . . The resolution of the Central Committee, and the developing organised struggle of the landless and poor peasants supported by the working class, forced even Imre Nagy to draw back. It is a fact that, though reluctantly, he then accepted the Central Committee decision, and argued for it both in the government and in public. His opportunism appeared with renewed strength at the time of the revolution's victory, and eventually he abandoned the idea of proletarian dictatorship, and completely betrayed the workers' power.[10]

Clearly it would be politically convenient to find that Nagy was a traitor from the beginning, but this goes no further than muddled and unconvincing insinuations about his character. The same uneasiness is apparent in the treatment of Rakosi :

> Matyas Rakosi committed serious errors in the post-1948 period, and his activity seriously harmed the socialist cause. . . . But in the liberation period and the first years thereafter Rakosi's activity was *essentially* [my italics] useful. Of course, no matter how important his role, and no matter how useful his deeds at that time—and in earlier struggles—it does not in the least diminish the harmful and reprehensible character of his doings in later years (p. 46).

Rakosi must not be disgraced altogether, for this would spoil the 'correct' tradition of 1944–48. On the other hand it is expedient

[10] Dezso Nemes, *Magyarorszag felszabadulasa, 1944–45* (1960), p. 160. The Russians have fewer scruples. In A. I. Pushkash, *Borba za Agrarnye Preobrazovanie v Vengrii, 1944–49* (Moscow, 1959), the names of Rakosi, Gero, and the Nagyist agrarian expert Donath are entirely omitted from the bibliography and text. Nagy is cited once—as a saboteur of the land reform in 1945. The trend to headlessness is well illustrated in a study of the Party History Institute, *A munkasosztaly az ujjaepitesert, 1945–46, dokumentumok* (1960).

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to mention the mistakes. The result, of course, is confusion, which was probably intended.

The doctrine by which a communist party need only have been 'essentially correct' in the past has made it possible for the parties of Eastern Europe to discuss their accomplishments and errors more freely than they could under Stalin. The case of Hungary, however, indicates that the new doctrine was not part of a premeditated policy, but the result of a series of shocks. The first steps were taken by the Stalinists themselves. They broke the silence about the past, but tried to make no concessions in the then official version of the Party history. Nonetheless this precipitated a tendency to reveal more facts about the past. The periodic rehabilitations of 1954–56 contributed to confusion. Order, if it can be called order, was restored only when Party interest was again brought forcefully into the foreground. The present formula reflects all these factors. The Party is now unwilling to ignore completely the facts of its past, but its history today is also a political creation, just as it was under Stalin. Although more facts are forthcoming, the presentation of the past still represents a marriage of convenience between history and political needs.

With the new doctrine of 'essential correctness', the Hungarian Party has made some headway towards disposing of its skeletons in the cupboard. But its historiographical problems are far from being solved. The most satisfactory case from the Party's point of view was that of Bela Kun. The regime has neatly adopted him, but has avoided praise for his policies. It has thus satisfied its desire for tradition, without embarrassment or political inconvenience. The cases of Rajk and Kadar himself were, however, more difficult to deal with. As far as it is possible to make the past explicit, Kadar is of course viewed in his own image; but Rajk tends to be ignored. In the cases of Rakosi and Nagy the regime has no reason to rehabilitate them, but it has also shown a certain degree of inhibition in dealing with the whole problem of their disgrace.

There are, of course, good reasons for this. Nagy's return would mean the destruction of the Party and to tamper with his ghost is dangerous. The Kadar regime prefers therefore to apply the new formula discreetly, as if the ghosts could be exorcised by talking the past victims away.

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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Miklos Veto

THE last census in Hungary did not give figures of membership of religious bodies, but estimates suggest that of the ten million people who live in the country, roughly 7,000,000 are Roman Catholics, and 2,800,000 are Protestants (two-thirds of these are Calvinist and of the rest the great majority are Lutherans). There are some 60,000 members of the Orthodox Church and 60,000 Jews.

In the first years after the war, during the coalition government, a number of churchmen held office. Mgr B. Varga was elected President of the National Assembly, and Father I. Balogh was made a Minister of State. A protestant clergyman, the Rev Zoltan Tildy, became Prime Minister (1945), then first President of the Hungarian Republic (1946).[1] So the Church seemed to have maintained its social influence despite the loss of its land during the land reform carried out under the premiership of Imre Nagy. However, this peaceful coexistence with the state was soon disturbed. The communist press carried a good deal of anti-Church propaganda and attacks on Cardinal Mindszenty became more frequent and violent.

Mgr Jozsef Mindszenty, who became head of the Catholic Church in Hungary at the end of 1945, comes of a peasant family. He did not have a remarkably distinguished ecclesiastical career. At the beginning of the nineteen-thirties he became a member of the committee appointed by the hierarchy to prepare a land-reform project. He was nominated bishop in 1944. In the autumn of that year, after Horthy's unsuccessful coup d'état, the bishops of West Hungary decided to deliver a memorandum to the government to stop the hopeless struggle and to preserve the unoccupied part of the country from destruction. Mgr Mindszenty drew up the memorandum which the bishops signed and handed to the Minister of the Interior. A few days later he was arrested. He was freed after four months by Soviet troops. His anti-fascist record made him the most suitable candidate for the then vacant See of the Primate. His arrest in December 1948 marked the end of the period of peaceful coexistence. The years 1949–51 saw a merciless frontal attack on the Church, the dissolution of Catholic organisations and religious orders, nationalisation of Catholic and Protestant schools, and the arrest of innumerable priests and laymen. Many died in prison or were executed. It may be asked whether, if the Cardinal had chosen a more moderate

[1] He was a Minister of State in Nagy's government during the 1956 revolution. After its defeat he was arrested and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. He was released in 1959 and died in 1961.

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line, had shown more willingness to cooperate with the regime, the heavy persecution might have been avoided. No one can answer this question, but the example of Mgr Grosz, archbishop of Kalocsa, is quite instructive. Mgr Grosz became chairman of the Bench of bishops after the Cardinal's arrest. He signed a compromise agreement, a sort of *modus vivendi* with the government, and was received together with the other bishops with the greatest honour by the Head of State. A few weeks later he was arrested and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment (1951). He was released in 1956 and again became chairman of the Bench of bishops, which office he held until his death in the autumn of 1961. During those five years he consistently tried to meet the requirements of the government while emphasising his absolute loyalty to the Holy See; he stated publicly that Christianity as a *Weltanschauung* could never be reconciled with Marxism. He was succeeded by Mgr Hamvas, Bishop of Csanad, who follows the same line.

It is unlikely that the fate of the Church in the Soviet bloc depends on the attitude of the ecclesiastical leaders. It is decided by the particular needs of the regime and the extent of the Church's influence among the masses. The Church is powerful in Poland above all because of its historical record as bulwark of national independence movements (in Hungary it had no such past), and at the same time the Bierut regime was less brutal than Rakosi's dictatorship in Hungary.

Persecution declined in Hungary during the post-Stalin period (1953–56), but still many priests were arrested in the more peaceful years of Imre Nagy's first government (1953–55) and during the second Rakosi regime (1955–56), only a shadow of the first. The Church played virtually no part in the 1956 rising. The Cardinal made no direct political intervention ; he received delegations and made two broadcasts but these last were by no means directed against the socialist order.[2] The Kadar regime has continued the Church policy of its predecessors without major change. It is true that one of its first decrees was intended to guarantee freedom of religious education in schools, but with the consolidation of the government's position, this has been disregarded. Some liberal gestures were made towards the Church. Some theological books were published, and recently the government authorised a theologian to participate in one of the preparatory committees of the Council, but he was not allowed to go to Rome. Mgr Grosz made speeches and

[2] J. P. Sartre, who cannot be accused of pro-Catholic feelings, wrote: ' Quant au Cardinal Mindszenty, la presse stalinienne en fait son loup garou . . . Entre cette voix sourde qui se trainait sur les ondes et les tueries qui se poursuivaient dans les égoûts, la presse communiste a voulu voir une relation profonde. Ceux qui l'ont cru c'est par passion; seule la paranoia stalinienne les empêche de croire la vérité: c'est que ce vieux prêtre isolé et les chasseurs de tête sont separés par un vide immense '. ' L'ombre de Staline ', *Temps Modernes*, Nov.–Dec. 1957, pp. 620–621.

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wrote pastoral letters in favour of the communist peace movement and high state honours were conferred upon him. Until the beginning of 1961, few Catholic priests or laymen were in prison, but that year saw more severe repressions against the Church. Twelve prominent Catholics were tried on charges of anti-state activity and of giving illegal religious instruction to children; and many lesser-known persons were arrested, some being subsequently released. This does not imply a fundamental change in the regime's policy; it is probably intended as a reminder to the Church of the precariousness of its position. *Katolikus Szo* (Catholic Word), the weekly of the collaborator priests and Catholic fellow-travellers, announced that the state had cut aid towards the maintenance of the clergy and seminaries. In addition to political and financial pressure, a new attack was launched on the Church's sacraments. The East German civil naming ceremonies seem to have inspired the Kadar regime to attempt the same substitutions for christening and confirmation, so far without much success. These Christian ceremonies are imbedded in the very core of popular life. Nevertheless, a good deal of energy is being put into promoting these 'civil sacraments', and a guide to 'socialist ceremonies' is shortly to be published. Altogether, the Kadar regime's ecclesiastical policy has tended in the last two years to become much sharper; trials and arrests are the consequence and not the cause of this change.

A SOCIOLOGICAL analysis of Catholicism in Hungary today is virtually impossible because direct enquiry is ruled out, there are no statistics available, and estimates are most unreliable. A Hungarian prelate, interviewed by a foreign journalist, estimated the percentage of practising Catholics to be slightly above 30 per cent of the adult Catholic population.[3] This does not differ much from the figure for other European countries, but in the absence of data for the different regions, for villages and towns, social classes and age-groups, it indicates only that Hungarians are far from indifferent to the Church. It does not mean that Catholic life in Hungary can be compared with that of a Western country where the percentage of practising adults may be similar.

Hungary's seven million Catholics live in three archdioceses and eight dioceses, one of the dioceses being Uniate. Archbishops and bishops are appointed by the Pope, but by a decree of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic in 1957 these appointments require the prior agreement of the Presidential Council, as formerly of the Head of State.

Of the eleven archdioceses and dioceses, four are governed by apostolic administrators appointed by the Pope in 1958 and approved by

[3] Cf. *Le Monde*, 3 November 1960.

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the Presidential Council. They are acting respectively for Cardinal Mindszenty, who has been at the American Legation since he sought asylum there in 1956, and for two other bishops who are under arrest. One of the apostolic administrators is in charge of the vacant See of Eger. (The Archbishop of Eger died five years ago.) Two other dioceses became vacant recently by the death of the bishop of Pecs and of Mgr Grosz. The remaining five dioceses are governed by their bishops or archbishop. During the last ten years all of them were at one time or another under arrest, and most of them are very old or ill or both. It is ten years since the government gave its agreement to the nomination of a bishop; it is probably waiting for the remaining members of the Hierarchy to die out. No Hungarian bishop has been able to go to Rome since 1947; their contacts with the Vatican must be made through the Office of Cults. The representative of this Office holds the real power in the diocese. He can use terror against the priests and political blackmail against the bishop; he writes pastoral letters which the bishop has to sign. He has the final word in most of the appointments of parish priests, deans, or diocesan dignitaries. His mere presence in the bishop's palace causes uneasiness and fear.

The position of the lower clergy depends very much on the attitude of the local CP secretary or chairman of the local Council, but at the best he constantly encounters obstacles which make it difficult for him to fulfil his duties. He is often in danger of arrest and sometimes more or less cut off from his parishioners. In spite of these difficulties, the diocesan clergy generally maintain the ancient organisation. But the regular clergy suffered a devastating blow in 1950 when the religious orders were abruptly dissolved by the government. A year later some of them were authorised to resume limited activities on a restricted scale, but the great majority had to take employment in factories or offices. Others were incorporated into the diocesan clergy.

The training of new priests meets with difficulties, but the half dozen seminaries and the Theological Academy of Budapest have at present 200–300 students. This is not too unsatisfactory; it does prevent a nation-wide shortage of priests, at least for the next decades. Admission to the seminaries is decided by their teaching staff but the representative of the Office of Cults has the right of veto. The same is true of ordinations; in 1960 Bishop Schvoy was heavily attacked by the press for ordaining some young priests without the authorisation of the Office of Cults. At the beginning of 1959 there was a political strike at the Theological Academy of Budapest and more than three-quarters of the seminarists were expelled; it has since been reported that some of them have been readmitted. As far as teaching is concerned, there is no cause

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for complaint. The teaching follows the traditional pattern of any Catholic seminary in the world.

Clergy and seminaries have been maintained by the state since 1945 as compensation for the confiscated church lands. This aid, plus voluntary contributions to the Church, provide a living for the priests. The state gave financial assistance for church construction too ; forty-four new churches were built in 1959. However, state aid was cut in 1961, and the present grants will expire in 1965.

Although the bishops' authority as such is not denied nor the supremacy of the Holy See questioned (there has been no attempt to build up a ' National Church ', which means that there is no danger of schism), the Church is hindered in every possible way in fulfilling its mission. It is not very easy to be a practising Catholic in communist Hungary. In general there is little trouble for peasants who go to church, or for elderly people who do not hold important posts. But church-going is not without its dangers for white-collar workers, students, and intellectuals, especially school-teachers. They are not threatened by arrest and in most cases they are not likely to lose their jobs (exceptions being school-teachers and people in responsible public office). Yet they are considered suspect and are often asked to give up their religious practices. They are handicapped in their career and their children find difficulty in being admitted to colleges.

The Hungarian people as a whole are not prevented from going to church. The essential and elementary Catholic practice which takes place inside the church, the mass and sacraments, are left intact, but there is no room for the usual social manifestations of Catholic life. The flourishing professional and cultural associations for young people and adults were dissolved in 1947–49; their leaders and some of the active members were jailed or executed. The *Actio Catholica* is only nominally active. Until 1948 more than 70 per cent of the primary schools and more than 50 per cent of the secondary schools were maintained by the Christian Churches. There are no more Catholic or Protestant primary schools and the teaching orders maintain only six high schools for boys and two high schools for girls. The Protestants have two high schools, the Jews one. The problems of religious education are very complex. Theoretically parents are free to send their children for religious instruction, but in practice this freedom is very limited. There are administrative difficulties of all kinds and pressure is put on the parents to dissuade them from sending their children to catechism classes. The school authorities allow the priest to hold his class only at the most inconvenient hours, and do their best to counter his teaching. In high schools there is no religious education at all. No statistics are available as to the number of schoolchildren following religious instruction. In the

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country districts virtually all children attend catechism classes. Not long ago the *Zalamegyei Hirlap* (Zala District News) reported an interview with a village party secretary who was asked why he allowed his son to attend the priest's classes. He answered, ' I do not want my son to be an outcast '. Of course, this story is by no means characteristic of the country as a whole.

Catholic cultural activities are insignificant. The St. Stephen Society, chief exponent of Catholic thought and culture, still exists and meets three or four times a year, but nothing important happens at these meetings and most people are simply unaware of its existence. Catholic publications virtually ceased in 1948–49. The Catholic Renaissance of the second quarter of the century had produced a galaxy of writers, sociologists, poets, and novelists of Catholic inspiration. Silence was imposed for a decade on almost everything which contained a spark of Catholic belief. Since 1956 novelists and poets have been allowed to publish their writings even when they revealed explicitly Catholic features, but philosophical and sociological works of religious inspiration were not allowed. No theological books were issued between 1949 and 1957 except some copies of the New Testament. Since 1957 a few theological books have been published. Anti-religious propaganda has been strengthened by the issue of a new periodical, *Villagossag* (Light), designed to combat ' religious prejudices and anti-scientific superstitions,' which publishes distasteful stories about priests and lay Christians, and fierce attacks on ' the clerical reaction.'

There is one Catholic weekly, *Uj Ember* (New Man), semi-official paper of the hierarchy (61,000 copies), containing short news items and no political articles; *Katolikus Szo* (Catholic Word, semi-monthly 18,000 copies), is written by the collaborator priests and their sympathisers, but is scarcely read. The *Vigilia* (10,000 copies) is a literary monthly which has managed miraculously to survive and which has continued to publish, even during the worst years of the Rakosi era, genuinely Christian philosophical articles, essays on Church history, reviews of Western cultural events, short stories and poems uninfluenced by ' socialist realism '.

It is not easy to go beyond the data, events, and figures and to attempt a description of popular attitudes and feelings. Over-simplifications cannot be avoided. However, one specific aspect of the attitude of people to Catholicism and to Christianity in general in communist Hungary must be mentioned. This is the political inspiration of religious practice. Although the hierarchy—with the exception of the Cardinal and one other bishop—was never belligerent, and most of the lower clergy have tried to find a *modus vivendi* with the regime, people consider the Church as the last and only legal channel of resistance to

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an indigestible ideology and a subservient regime. Churchgoing is the sign of unwillingness to submit completely. Many people go to mass not for love of God but for dislike of Kadar. The Church is now regarded as a symbol of Hungarian independence and enduring national values. This is more true for the Catholic Church than for the Protestant, largely because of the difference in their organisation. Unlike the centralised Catholic Church, Protestant bishops are elected, and this gives the state the opportunity to intervene. It can prevent an appointment in the Catholic Church but it cannot impose one. The Catholic hierarchy is thus more independent.

The recent association of the Catholic Church with the cause of national independence is perhaps a dubious gain. This loyalty and the sentimental or politically motivated attachment to the Church is accompanied by a great ignorance of Catholic doctrine and a lack of experience in Catholic social or cultural work among youth. The young churchgoers are very vulnerable to political events which determine their attitude towards the Church ; many of the young refugees gave up their religious practices after arriving in the West, since these were no longer needed as a manifestation of national independence.

There is still a large proportion of the Hungarian population traditionally attached to Church and Faith, but the promising beginnings of a Catholic renaissance were extirpated before they reached the mass of believers and many of the priests. Sixteen years is a very short time in the life of the Church and probably we are not yet able to measure how Hungarian Catholicism has met the challenge. For the time being Catholicism still penetrates Hungarian society and Church and Faith represent the only important discord in the harmony of a totalitarian state and ideology.

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PHILOSOPHY UNDER KADAR

Tibor Hanak

DESPITE the brief-lived 1919 communist revolution, Marxist philosophy barely pierced the surface of Hungarian thought; between the wars, the universities and the philosophers affiliated to the Hungarian Academy of Science felt justified in shrugging off materialism, dialectical and otherwise, as virtually dead and buried. A Catholic writer, in a book published in 1943, asserted that 'materialism as a trend of philosophy is negligible in our contemporary thinking'.[1] Yet it was not long before dialectical materialism returned to challenge the Hungarian intellectual; philosophers soon found themselves caught up in ideological polemics and the routine of popularisation. While this tended to debase rather than raise scientific standards, it had the incidental advantage of stirring up a fair interest in philosophy as pertinent to public affairs.

The communist takeover in 1948 did not disrupt philosophic pursuits; what it did was to suppress open intellectual enquiry and block up the windows which had been opened to Western thought. Between 1945 and 1948, the severe paper shortage notwithstanding, at least some of the representative works of various European schools and thinkers, continued to be published—Epicurus, Heraclitus, Descartes, Marx, Freud, Heidegger, Jung, and Sartre; after 1949 no book by any living, non-Marxist philosopher was published in Hungary. Even Communist Party ideologues could do no creative work without intellectual freedom, and in 1949 George Lukacs was officially condemned for exalting 'bourgeois realist' writers, so disregarding the duty of Leninist partisanship, and for doing less than justice to the products of socialist literature. This attitude, it was said, sprang from a desire to perpetuate the provisional post-war democratic policies of the party: 'It is one thing to ignore socialist aims for tactical reasons; it is another to *disown* the aim of socialism'.[2]

It is significant that the monopoly of Marxist philosophy in Hungary was ushered in by an ideological hue and cry against George Lukacs, one of the few eminent Marxist thinkers. That was not all. There followed the dissolution of a number of time-honoured scientific institutions and associations, including the Hungarian Philosophic Society founded in 1901, the Hungarian Psychoanalytical Association (1913), the Hungarian Psychological Society (1925), the Hungarian Association for Individual Psychology (1927), and the Hungarian Society for Social

1 P. Kecskes: *A History of Philosophy*, Budapest, 1943, p. 524.
2 *Szabad Nep*, 25 December 1949.

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Studies (1901). The two leading philosophical reviews, *Athenaeum* and *Pantheon*, ceased publication after 1948 and for nearly ten years Hungary had no periodical devoted to philosophy. Non-Marxist professors of philosophy were pensioned off or dismissed, and in the Academy of Science many faculties were closed and courses discontinued; a number of subjects, such as psychology, logic, social and cultural anthropology, and sociology, were struck off the curriculum, and philosophy could no longer be taken as a basic subject. Philosophy was replaced by the study of Marxism-Leninism (dialectical and historical materialism, political economy, party history), compulsory for all students in all faculties. In the almost total absence of Marxist philosophers (Lukacs was gagged, his opponent, Laszlo Rudas, died in 1950), the philosophic literature of the period was riddled with Russian names. In 1952, for example, only two out of twenty-one publications on philosophy were by Hungarian authors, and no fewer than twelve by Russians.[3] The all-pervading dogmatism and the lack of qualified writers on philosophy set narrow limits to the range of subject-matter and kept standards at a low level. Books and treatises on the history of philosophy were almost completely lacking; most of what was printed was an undistinguished rehash of Stalin's writings, presented another summary of the theory of knowledge, or spelt out political targets 'on the ideological front'. The proportion of propaganda in the total publishers' output is clear from the following figures: while in 1938 and 1945 books accounted for 53 per cent and 52·1 per cent respectively of all publications, in 1949 only 29·7 per cent were books as against 67·4 per cent political pamphlets. Pride of place, in terms of individual titles and size of impression, was reserved for the collected works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, of which 9 million copies were printed between 1945 and 1953.[4]

THE year 1953 marked the beginning of a gradual recovery from the state of suspended animation into which philosophy had sunk. This faint dawn was not bright enough to enable the philosophers to break out of the Marxist magic circle; but the Russian authors' sun was passing into eclipse, and Lukacs and his collaborators staged a comeback in the field of research and literary activity, largely in the form of contributions to the history of philosophy and studies in aesthetics. Attention was devoted to an appraisal of the past of Hungarian philosophy, and certain themes until then under the taboo of doctrinaire orthodoxy came once more into the open. There was, however, no

[3] *Statisztikai Szemle*, Vol. 37, No. 4, p. 422. The others were annotations, music, maps, etc.

[4] *A Konyvtaros* (The Librarian), Vol. 3, No. 6, p. 47.

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reorientation of ideology, nor were any works of major thematic significance forthcoming. In a country harrowed by troubles and seething with legitimate economic and social grievances, the 'poverty of philosophy' had no claim to being treated as a priority issue.

The Petofi Circle debate on philosophy in the summer of 1956 showed conclusively that what preoccupied the public mind was not abstract theory but fundamental human values, without which truth was not worth seeking. The primary need was to create a climate in which the scrutiny of theoretical problems could once again take on meaning, and the conclusions be given unequivocal and undisguised expression. There were also wrongs waiting to be righted, sins of omission and commission, all raised and denounced in the course of the debate: the lack of a philosophical review and philosophy department within the Academy, the suspension of George Lukacs from university teaching, and the rapid spread of the quotation-mongering habit, fatal to original thought. Even though the interval of grace was too short for non-Marxist thinkers to get into print, in the given context the odd book did carry some weight. George Lukacs' *Dethronement of Reason* and *Der junge Hegel*, and the lectures he gave in the summer of 1956 did much to widen the horizon. Lukacs had not, as his adversaries now contend, relinquished his Marxist outlook when he maintained that the 'abstract contradiction' between capitalism and socialism was not at that particular stage of development an adequate criterion by which to judge and determine the day-to-day course of events, and that, accordingly, the emphasis had at least temporarily shifted to the concrete dichotomies of progress versus reaction, peace versus war. Still, statements of this sort kindled fervent hopes in many people that dogmatism was about to crumble and the silenced thinkers of Hungary once more find a place in the domain of a common Hungarian culture.

Developments after the revolution of October 1956 at first seemed to hold some promise that the aspirations of the philosophers would not come to nothing and that the new openings could be pursued. But any illusions about the prizes within their grasp were soon to disappear. These were mostly confined to incidentals, the outer scaffolding of the scientific set-up, long-overdue organisational innovations, some increases in subsidies and grants, at best an amplification of subject-matter. Any attempt at free enquiry or at the formulation of new theses and theories was stopped short by the Party.

The outstanding post-revolution triumph was the inauguration, on 1 February 1957, of an Institute of Philosophy within the framework of the Academy; this was shortly followed by the appearance of the first issue of *The Hungarian Review of Philosophy*, and by a drive for recruiting a psychological study group. Philosophy in the universities, until

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then a subsidiary part of the ideological syllabus, was now required to observe higher standards of instruction, as were logic and psychology, now after ten years to be admitted once more as main subjects. At the same time the scope of ideological training was extended to include introductory courses on the history of philosophy.

Nor was criticism wholly silenced after the revolution. Discontent with the anomalies of the system adopted by the Academy of Science from the Soviet model was expressed in 1957 at the meetings of the science departments, and on one occasion the Chairman of the Scientific Grading Committee reported on the rehabilitation of a number of Hungarian scientists and scholars condemned in 1949. Until September 1957, ideological courses were conspicuously absent from university curricula. Indeed, in some places the staff of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism were denied admission to the university, and there was an insistent demand for instruction in other schools of philosophy beside Marxism.[5] This reformist ferment was also reflected in the first issue of *The Hungarian Review of Philosophy*. 'The purpose of this *Review*', says the introduction, 'is to cultivate a Marxist philosophy purged of dogmatism and vulgarisation', but this did not mean that the magazine 'will deny the hospitality of its columns to polemical articles and comment that express a different point of view'.[6] In the summer of 1957, however, the Party adopted a resolution to intensify ideological propaganda and reintroduce Marxism-Leninism as a compulsory subject in the universities.

In May 1958 the Society for Popularising Social Science was reorganised and its programme of courses and series of lectures amplified by the inclusion of Marxist philosophy. A mere couple of months later it was reported that attendances had passed the one million mark. There was a new boom in translations from the Russian, though it did not assume the same proportions as in the Rakosi era. The *Review of Philosophy* began to devote a good deal of its space to accounts of Soviet books on philosophy. Of 41 philosophic works discussed in the three years 1958 to 1960, twenty were by Russian authors and only four by Hungarians.

The purpose of these changes was not left in doubt. This was, first and foremost, to root out bourgeois views, and not merely to encourage studies in current philosophical and social problems of the age. Revisionism was officially proclaimed Public Enemy Number One. The signal for the anti-revisionist drive in the scientific sphere was given at the 1957 general assembly of the Academy. The Chairman's report foreshadowed

[5] *Nepszabadsag*, 20 July 1957.
[6] *Magyar Filozofiai Szemle*, No. 1, pp. 1–2.

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impending reprisals : ' It it understandable that the Academy for its part will also have to draw certain conclusions from the actions and attitudes of some of its members during and after the counter-revolution '.[7] The anti-revisionist campaign accordingly took on the character of a series of personal onslaughts. In the past four years a succession of vendettas has spotlighted the present plight of philosophers in Hungary. George Lukacs, Agnes Heller, and Sandor Szalai have been cast in the role of principal whipping-boys. Within the context of the function Marxist philosophy is called upon to discharge, each censure and each accusation is coloured by ulterior political motives. Beyond this, however, the attacks made on these three philosophers illustrate their views on aesthetics, ethics, and sociology, respectively.

GEORGE LUKACS, deported to Rumania as a member of Imre Nagy's Government during the Hungarian revolution, returned to Budapest in 1957. He was deprived of his chair at the university, but was allowed a seat on the editorial board of the *Review of Philosophy*. During 1958 he was the target of a barrage of newspaper attacks, and his name disappeared from the front page of the *Review*. The Philosophy Institute devoted two full sessions to a critical appraisal of his writings ; the charges preferred were partly political, partly an indictment of his views on philosophy and aesthetics. In all three spheres, the main burden of the accusation was that Lukacs had advocated ideological coexistence, opportunist appeasement, a ' third way ' between capitalism and socialism, thereby diluting the substance of the class struggle. In philosophy, he was upbraided for reducing materialism to second-fiddle rank, obscuring the meaning of the struggle against idealism, and exalting Hegel above Marx, which meant ' laying the very basis of Marxist philosophy open to question '.[8] A review of his approach to literary values provided the excuse for bringing out of the deep-freeze the 1949 denunciations of his disregard of the principle of Leninist partisanship, his slighting treatment of socialist-realism, and his over-estimation of bourgeois literature and of the importance of artistic spontaneity. Even the ' theses on literary criticism ' published early in 1961 persist in attributing to his influence the present widespread interest in Western literature and the corresponding disparagement of socialist literary productions : ' certain criticisms which make use of the yardstick of bourgeois classics to discredit and belittle the creations of socialist art ' feed on Lukacs' ' fallacious ' theory.[9]

[7] *Magyar Tudomany*, 1958, No. 1–2, p. 28.
[8] E. Balogh, ' Zur Kritik des Irrationalismus ', *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* (East Berlin), 1958, p. 630.
[9] *Kortars*, March 1961, p. 429.

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That all pioneering effort is hedged round with the same taboos on the ethical, no less than the political and literary, plane is trenchantly illustrated by the case of Agnes Heller. Her treatise on the ethics of Chernyshevsky, written in 1955, earned Miss Heller the title of Candidate of the Academy of Science; her further work centred on the attempt to hammer out a Marxist system of ethics. Her conclusions are subjected to 164 pages of criticism in two consecutive issues of the 1960 volume of *The Review*. The chief objection is that, in setting forth the complex correlations between morality and politics on the one hand, and morality, law, and the state on the other, she has given precedence to ethics over political expediency, and thus failed to recognise the superiority of the communist system to class societies. Her 'individualist humanism' has been singled out as a prime target, and denounced for presenting the individual as the be-all and end-all of any ethic, seeking to secure a sheltered niche amid the turmoil of political movements for 'the cherished inwardness of the self' in order to 'protect the integrity of our personalities'. Miss Heller turns inward upon the self, directs her gaze towards the individual and the family. She looks to these 'islands' for the moral force that 'can best help them to link up eventually with an ennobled communal life, without the sacrifice of their personal values'. Her elevated tone has been branded by her opponents as bourgeois: 'Under the pretence of Marxist ethics, Heller has furnished theoretical justification for the disenchantment, counter-revolutionary consciousness, passive resistance and active opposition of certain petty-bourgeois intellectuals who have retired into internal emigration in token of protest against the reorganised Party'.[10] This judgment, apart from its theoretical implications, had personal consequences; Miss Heller was forced to resign her teaching post in Budapest University. She is now said to be teaching in a grammar school. The official cultural policy-makers at times pretend that the attacks on Lukacs and Heller have been nothing more than a polemic, but this is a misrepresentation, as neither was granted the right of self-defence, and both have been denied an outlet for new publications.

The third main line of attack has as its target the person of Sandor Szalai; the controversy concerns the relationship of historical materialism and sociology. Of the three disputes, this is the only one to show certain positive aspects, first, in the very posing of the problem, and secondly, in the constructive zeal discernible in the critique offered. Sandor Szalai, a Marxist sociologist, had been active in the University of Budapest until the banning of sociology, when he was dismissed and later imprisoned for six years. He was released six months before the outbreak of the revolution.

[10] *Magyar Filozofiai Szemle*, No. 1, 1960, p. 39.

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As a participant in a sociological symposium staged by the Philosophy Institute on 30 June 1960, he advanced the view, in opposition to several philosophers, that the axioms of historical materialism were of a philosophical nature and, as such, offered a general methodology for the social sciences, but that this did not mean that it could be equated with sociology. Sociology was not a province of philosophy, but a branch of applied science with a range of specific tasks all its own. When, in two issues (14 and 28 April 1961) of the weekly *Elet es Irodalom* (Life and Literature), he presented the state of sociology in Hungary to the public at large, the communist press lashed out at him savagely. Szalai had affirmed that the rich store of facts assembled by sociological research in the capitalist countries contained, ' even with due allowance made for all distorting factors ', a wealth of worthwhile information. This should be turned to account, if only because ' in the field of sociological research and its harnessing for more efficient social organisation and improved levels of productivity, we are lagging far behind the advanced Western capitalist states and our own socialist needs '. The first onslaught on Szalai denounced his article as an unscientific and anti-Marxist attempt to rehabilitate bourgeois sociology and knock the scientific bottom out of Marxist sociology. It is interesting to note, however, that the strictures that followed, while continuing to reprove Szalai for his sympathies with bourgeois sociology, were equally severe upon the intolerant tone and inadmissible methods (such as the garbling of quotations) used by his critics in the columns of the central Party organ. And even though the attacks have thrown a spanner into Szalai's scientific career, this does not prevent others from preparing the ideological ground for sociology on the quiet, nor in fact from giving cautious expression to Szalai's opinions. One tell-tale sign is the recently formed team of sociologists employed at the Philosophy Institute ; another is the publication of some books on sociological themes. Moreover, the last few issues of the *Review of Philosophy* contain essays which, while retaining the stock terminology of party propaganda in their warnings against the revisionist menace, may well mark a breakaway from the bigotry of dogmatic Marxism towards the adoption of inductive methods of research.

WHAT remains to be described is the state of psychology, mathematical logic, and the history of philosophy. Since 1949 psychology had been a proscribed science in Hungary. Immediately after the revolution an effort was made to build a skeleton structure for the practice of psychology, but it was not until April 1960 that the Academy established a Board of Psychology in charge of publishing, after an interval of twelve years, *The Hungarian Review of Psychology*. The

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majority of the studies printed fall within the scope of experimental psychology.

The study of mathematical logic is still in the embryonic stage. In 1949 both secondary school and university curricula had shed logic as a subject for instruction, and it was several years before it was reinstated in the Faculty of Education of Budapest University, and in teacher-training colleges. As a result, the ideological consistency of the lectures suffers from the difficulty of sorting out the first principles of logic. Nor did logic fare better in the field of publications. Bela Fogarasi's textbook, the only major book on logic to have appeared in the past ten years, virtually boils down to a mere compendium of Aristotelian logic. Its first three editions reject logistics as a pretext for shoring up idealism by the buttress of logic and leave the subject severely alone. It is only in the fourth edition, published after the revolution, that the author discusses mathematical logic as a new field of research. Since then there have appeared a few more distinguished contributions, including an introduction to the subject by T. Varga, entitled *Mathematical Logic for Beginners* (Budapest, 1960).

The study of the history of philosophy at academic levels gathered momentum after Stalin's death. Popular lecture courses held in 1955 were followed in 1957 by the reintroduction of the subject, though only within the framework of ideological instruction, to colleges and universities. By all accounts, the lectures and books enjoyed great popularity with undergraduates and public, even though the purpose of teaching the history of philosophy was defined in the following terms: 'The chief purpose is to follow the meandering of human thought to the point where it succeeded in evolving dialectical materialism'.[11] The so-called 'theses on philosophy' issued in 1960 showed a definite backsliding. After some lip-service paid to the need for research came the warning that 'Whoever gives precedence to the study of the history of philosophy over other aspects of scientific work in the sphere of philosophy finds himself in conflict with the essence, the social outlook of Marxism'; and: 'We will not permit any undue emphasis to be laid by university teaching staffs on the history of philosophy, at the expense of dialectical and historical materialism'.

For all the attempts at *Gleichschaltung*, the fortunes of philosophy in Hungary are as varied as political life itself. On the one hand there is the anti-revisionist struggle, waged with such acrimony that it is proposed to turn the *Review of Philosophy* into a 'militant organ of the philosophical front', and the Philosophy Institute of the Academy, in

[11] *Magyar Filozofiai Szemle*, Nos. 1-2, 1958, p. 181.

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common with the university Faculties of Philosophy, into so many spearheads of this warfare. On the other hand, there is a marked improvement in the state of psychology, logic, and sociology, implicit in which is a tacit avowal of the failure of basic Marxist tenets to provide, as had been expected, cut-and-dried answers to the question-marks of science. Answers do not derive from prefabricated speculative formulas or dogmatic articles of faith ; nothing but the intimate union of method and research can yield clues to the manifold puzzle. Sciences which have achieved relative independence from Marxist ideology, such as mathematical logic, psychology, and possibly sociology, are making appreciable headway. The other provinces of philosophy remain in the grip of party politics. Since 1957, no work of any consequence has appeared in these fields. There has been much talk of the problems of philosophy, but the philosophers have been silent.

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THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY

Peter Kende

The Demographic Background

HUNGARY with its ten million inhabitants has one of the slowest rates of population increase in Europe, or in the world. The immediate post-war years showed an increase of 8–12 per thousand, but the rate of increase declined after 1956 to 7, and after 1959 to 5 per thousand.[1] This is due to a fall in the number of births, as the deathrate has not increased in these years ; on the contrary, the deathrate shows a long-run downward trend. There is a tendency for the number of marriages to decline, and for the number of divorces to increase ; the rate of divorce is approaching 9 per thousand of married persons (it was 3 per thousand before the war and about 6 per thousand after the war).[2]

The average age of the population at the beginning of 1960 was 33·6 years, four years more than in 1930. The age groups for the whole population were in 1960 the following [3]:

From 0 to 19 years ...	3,302,600
„ 20 to 39 „ ...	2,908,300
„ 40 to 59 „ ...	2,400,000
Over 60	1,365,600
TOTAL	9,976,500

The ' economically active population ' amounts to about 53 per cent of the total. The term refers in Hungarian statistics to men between 15 and 60 and to women between 15 and 55 years. Since the war this proportion has steadily declined, from 62 per cent in 1949 to 60 per cent in 1956, and to 58 per cent at the beginning of 1960. Nearly 200,000 people emigrated in the autumn and winter of 1956, of whom the great majority belonged to this ' economically active ' category. Hungary occupies an intermediate position between the Western and Central European countries with their more aged population, and the Eastern and South European countries with their younger population.

The shift from the countryside to the towns is continuing. The number of city dwellers increased by about 600,000 in the period between the censuses of 1949 and 1960, whereas the population of the villages

1 *Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv* (Hungarian Statistical Annual: hereafter noted as *MSE*), 1959, p. 10. The natural rate of increase for Europe was 7 per thousand in 1958 ; for the world population it was 17.

2 Ibid., pp. 10 and 19.

3 Preliminary results of the census of January 1960. *Demografia*, 1960/3–4, pp. 307–311.

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remained stationary, although it can be assumed that the agricultural population plays a greater part in the natural population increase. At the beginning of 1960 the percentage of town dwellers amounted to 40 per cent of the total population.[4] There is a corresponding shift from agricultural occupations into industry and into the tertiary occupations. The figures for 1956 give a total of 1,991,000 agricultural workers, while a recently published investigation puts the number of people employed in agriculture at the height of the season at 1,786,000 for 1958.[5] This means that in the two years following 1956 the numbers actively engaged in agriculture fell by a further 200,000. The large-scale collectivisation which has taken place since then must have accelerated this process; unfortunately the statistical publications do not give the number of non-collectivised peasants.

Have the other sectors of the economy absorbed this flight from agriculture? Judging from the available data on the numbers employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors, this seems likely.[6]

	January 1956	*Mid-1958*	*Mid-1959*
Industry (including small-scale industry and building) ...	1,335,000	1,443,000	1,513,000
Transport and commerce ...	527,000	539,000	565,000
Public services	283,000	275,000	290,000
	2,145,000	2,257,000	2,368,000

This shows an increase between 1956 and 1958 of 112,000 in the numbers employed in other than agricultural occupations, i.e., half the number of those who left agriculture. There was a further increase by 1959, but it is probable that the number of peasants who left their land increased as well.

Changes in the Social Structure

Pre-1956 Hungary was two-thirds 'socialist' in the eyes of those who identify socialism with state and cooperative production. The position changed in the autumn of 1956, because more than 60 per cent of the peasants collectivised in the previous years reverted to individual farming. Moreover, in 1957, during the period of comparative liberalisation, there was some revival of small-scale private industry as well. This process is obscured in the statistics, which are based on prices only,

[4] *MSE*, 1959, pp. 4 and 41, and *Statisztikai Havi Kozlemenyek* (monthly statistical bulletin, hereafter noted as *SHK*), 1958/6, p. 6.
[5] *Adatok es Adalekok* (Data and Information, hereafter noted as *AA*) p. 31, *Kozgazdasagi Szemle* (Economic Review), 1961/5, p. 515.
[6] *MSE*, 1959, p. 61, and *AA*, p. 31.

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giving a somewhat misleading picture. Even so, they show that this process was reversed from 1958 onwards.

	Percentage contributions to the national income [7]			
	1955	*1957*	*1958*	*1959*
Private sector	29·1	34·8	31·7	22·5
of which 'capitalist'	1·3	2·2	2·3	—
Socialist sector	70·9	65·2	68·3	77·5
of which 'cooperative'	9·3	9·6	8·5	12·5

'Capitalist' means in this context small undertakings employing 2–3 wage-earners. The net output of the 'capitalist sector' amounted in 1958 to 2·5 milliard forint, of which 2 milliard came from small-scale industry and from building, and 0·2 milliard from commerce; in the other sectors 'capitalist production' was negligible. In the same year the net output of the private sector, as a percentage of total net output in the main productive sectors, was as follows:

Industrial production ...	6·3
Building	24·8
Agriculture	80·7
Transport	7·8
Commerce (home trade)	1·7
Total of all sectors ...	31·7

This means that in 1958 more than four-fifths of agricultural production came from small peasants. In 1959 the proportion fell to 65 per cent, as a new wave of collectivisation started.[8] Later structural changes in agriculture can be seen from the figures of land ownership given in the Statistical Yearbook for 1959 (pp. 138–139):

	May 1958	*May 1959*	*March 1960*
State farms ...	36·5 per cent	34·8 per cent	34·8 per cent
Collectives ...	9·8 per cent	27·3 per cent	43·3 per cent
Individual farms ...	53·7 per cent	37·9 per cent	21·9 per cent

This table is however somewhat misleading, as one-third of the total area of Hungary, consisting of forests, meadows, moors, and other uncultivable areas, is given under the heading of the state sector. It is probable that even as late as 1959, more than 60 per cent of the arable land and of gardens, and nearly 90 per cent of the vineyards, were cultivated by private individuals. Collectivised production became preponderant only in 1960 (and is supposed to have been completed by the spring of 1961), but there are no reliable statistics for this period yet. Moreover, it is

[7] *MSE*, 1949/1955, p. 42; *Statistical Handbook* 1957, p. 51; *MSE*, 1957, p. 52; 1958, p. 54; 1959, p. 48.

[8] *MSE*, 1959, p. 48.

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obvious from the statistics relating to previous years that the so-called ' socialist sector ' includes tacitly several forms of production (notably in the field of animal husbandry and gardening) where the actual production is carried out individually (homestead farms and subsidiary holdings). In this respect collectivisation is accompanied, though this is not admitted, by the breaking up of the agricultural area and by an increase in the number of dwarf holdings.

The revival of private industry in 1957 proved to be only temporary. In December 1957 there were 123,000 people engaged in independent small-scale industrial activity (against 98,000 in September 1956). By the end of 1960 their number was less than 77,000. The number of private traders is similarly decreasing year by year. At the end of 1960 it was only 10,000.[9]

Trends in Economic Development

The political and economic crisis in the autumn of 1956 raised widespread doubts about the previous economic trends, and it proved necessary to modify the distribution of the national income in favour of consumption goods. How this was put into effect is shown in the following table :

	Distribution of the national income 1955–59 at current prices, in milliard forint:				
	1955	*1957*	*1958*	*1959*	
Total national income (= net social product without services)	94·3	82·5	107·3	109·9	126·5 (b)
of which:					
For external payments ...	1·9	0·3	— 5·0	2·2	0·0
Investment in capital goods ...	10·2	9·0	9·2	11·7	20·3
Investment in circulating goods	8·9	— 6·7	16·9	4·7	7·8
Public consumption (a) ...	8·9	8·1	8·4	11·3	13·8
Consumption of population ...	64·4	69·5	77·7	79·8	84·5
of which:					
Food	40·1	42·9	47·3	47·9	50·1
Industrial goods	20·3	22·6	25·9	26·5	28·7
	Index figures 1949 = 100:				
Total national income	164	146	180	191	205 (b)
Investment in capital goods ...	211	186	171	264	302
Consumption of population ...	141	154	167	175	187 (b)
Consumption of population as per cent of national income	68·4	84·2	72·6	72·5	66·7

(a) consumption of goods and material by government and public bodies and by public services.

(b) includes services of public transport and post, not shown in previous years.

Sources: *MSE* 1958, p. 53; 1959, p. 48.

[9] Ibid., p. 122 ; *SHK*, 1961/3, pp. 59, 64 and 65.

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Before analysing this chart it should be noted that it is impossible to consider the distribution of the national income independently of the existing price structure. The price system before the end of 1958 undervalued production goods to a considerable extent, and consumption goods carried practically the whole burden of taxation. Consequently the relative value of consumption appears higher than it would have been with a more equitable price system. The price revision in January 1959 corrected this to some extent, so that the data relating to this year give a rather more realistic picture of the distribution of the national income. Comparison with previous years is made more difficult by the fact that in 1959 the statistics of national income accounted for passenger transport and postal services, omitted in previous years.

Having made these comments, we can say that in 1957 and 1958 the consumed part of the national income was both absolutely and relatively greater than in 1955. The relative value of consumption was highest in 1956; this was a result not of the government's economic policy but of the spontaneous action of the population and was closely connected with the running down of stocks. The key as always can be found in the index for net capital investment, which—as can be seen—has again considerably exceeded the increase in the index of the total national income since 1958. It can be seen from the corresponding figure for 1959 that the proportion of consumption had to decline, although perhaps not to the extent shown in the last column of the table.

Let us look now at the proportion of the fixed investments in the various sectors of the economy—always the essence of economic policy:

		Distribution of investments in percentages				
	Annual average investment at 1954 prices Milliard frs.	*Agriculture*	*Transport*	*Industry*	*Of this light and food industries*
1950–54	... 13·5	14	13	44	3·4
1955–56	... 11·4	19	8·6	44	7·0
1957–59	... 14·6	15	10	42	6·4

The table shows that in spite of political changes, by and large the main emphasis of economic policy remained unchanged. Two-fifths of the resources are still used for the development of industry, while only a fraction goes to the industries supplying immediate consumer needs. Transport is neglected as before, although it is well known that conditions on roads and railways are severely criticised. More attention was paid to agriculture before the 1956 revolution (this is even more true for 1954 than for 1955–56) than after 1957, when economic policy reverted to the spirit of the first five-year plan. Allocations to agriculture were used almost entirely for the development of the state and collective sectors, although the small peasant farms still play a considerable role

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in the supply of foodstuffs. Nevertheless, the mechanisation of agriculture has been slightly accelerated in comparison with the pre-1954 period. The number of tractors increased from 13,000 in 1949 to 25,000 in 1956 and 32,100 in 1959.[10]

Since 1957 the stress has been on the development of the engineering, electrical, chemical, and plastics industries, which increased their net output by 45 to 80 per cent between 1955 and 1959. In the same period the output of the mining and iron and steel industries rose 12–13 per cent, of light industry and the food industry 18–20 per cent.

Only 7 per cent of the average annual gross fixed investment was used for housebuilding between 1950 and 1956.[11] The rise in 1957 to about 20 per cent was not sustained. The figure fell in 1958 to 14·7 per cent, in 1959 to 9 per cent. Nevertheless between 1957 and 1959 46,600 flats were built on the average each year, whereas the three years' average before the 1956 revolution amounted only to 28,000 flats, and in the first four years of the five-year plan only to 18,000. The increase is mainly due to an increase in private building, with or without government loans; 27–28 per cent of the flats built in 1958–59 were built with government money, about the same percentage completely from private means (mainly houses in the villages), and about 45 per cent were private buildings with the help of government loans.

Output : Industry and Agriculture

Economic growth seems to have proceeded since 1956 at roughly the same rate as during the first five-year plan. This applies to agriculture as well, meaning that neither before nor after 1956 was there any significant growth. Expressed at current prices (in milliard forints), and in the form of indices, the national product between 1955 and 1959 was as follows (*see first table on opposite page*):

'Home trade' represents the total of the government taxes levied on consumption goods minus the cost of distribution. The minus items under the heading 'Export trade' express the losses incurred if the exported goods are calculated at home trade prices. This is not necessarily an expression of unfavourable terms of trade; it can also be explained by the faulty price structure of industrial goods. In any case it is misleading to give this item under a separate heading; the item 'Industry' should be decreased by this figure.

The increase in the net national product over four years averages 5 per cent annually, which is less than the 7–8 per cent increase shown in the first five-year plan; it is true that reconstruction after the war had an accelerating effect in the five-year plan, whereas in the period after 1956 growth was retarded by the crisis of 1956.

10 Tractor density in Britain is ten times this figure.
11 *Statistical Handbook* 1957, pp. 53–54.

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	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
			Milliard forint		
Industry	50·5	41·5	52·7	60·3	68·8
Building	5·5	5·7	7·0	8·3	12·1
Agriculture	31·5	28·9	38·6	34·1	34·6
Freight transport (a)	3·4	3·1	3·5	5·5	5·1
Home trade	11·9	12·0	12·5	11·7	10·4
Export trade	– 8·8	– 8·9	– 7·3	– 11·0	– 5·4
TOTAL (b) ...	94·3	82·5	107·5	109·8	126·5
			Indices (1949 = 100) (c)		
Industry	210	178	216	243	265
Agriculture	127	106	124	128	133
Total national product ...	164	146	180	186	199

(a) includes from 1958 onwards passenger traffic
(b) including other minor items
(c) calculated at stable prices, not including post and other services

Sources: *MSE*, 1958, p. 53; 1959, p. 47.

The increase in the output of non-agricultural goods over the four years amounted to 30 per cent. As the numbers employed in non-agricultural production increased from 2,520,000 to 2,740,000 in this period, this represents an annual average increase of 4·5 per cent, calculated per capita of the numbers employed, which is about the same as the average increase during the first five-year plan, calculated by the same method.

Fixed investments in non-agricultural production averaged 7·5 milliard forint (during the first five-year plan 8·4 milliard forint); after 1956, therefore, investments were somewhat more profitable than in the previous period. Net productivity per head employed yields the following table (1949 = 100):

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Mining	99	88	87	97	98	101
Heavy industry ...	135	120	144	161	171	183
of which iron and steel	121	106	114	125	132	137
power	132	115	118	132	138	140
machine industry .	138	124	154	175	185	200
Light industry ...	145	123	139	145	146	156
Food industry	143	135	144	148	155	161
All state industry ...	131	116	133	144	150	159
1955 = 100	100	89	102	110	114	127

Source: *MSE*, 1959, p. 87; *SHK*, 1961/3, p. 20.

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The changes in productivity until 1959 are slow in relation to the amounts invested ; in mining, generation of electric power, and in light industry they are downright deplorable.

Agricultural production has not advanced by comparison with 1955. This stagnation has in fact lasted since the war, but is obscured by the fact that the year 1949, with its very poor output, is taken as the basis for comparison. Taken over a longer period, the main agricultural crops show little improvement in comparison with the decade before the war; animal breeding also stagnated, fruit and vine output has actually declined, no doubt because the government, obsessed by the idea of collectivisation, never gave the small peasant farms a chance to consolidate their position. The pressure for collectivisation came in waves but it never stopped ; individual farming gradually deteriorated while the capital invested in the socialist sector did not yield corresponding returns.

It is true that the state and collective farms, well equipped with machinery and fertilisers, show a slightly better average yield in the four main grain crops than the small peasants who do not receive any public funds. Nevertheless the average yield of the individual farms remained until quite recently higher than the yields of the collectives and state farms (with the exception of a few efficient model establishments) in nearly all secondary crops, such as industrial crops, market gardening, hay, maize, potatoes, rice and beet.[12] Their yield per acre of cultivated land is higher than that of the collective or state farms, as was admitted in the autumn of 1960 by an expert who otherwise is a protagonist of collective farming.[13] Finally, the country is dependent on the small peasant for its meat supply. The only difference since the completion of collectivisation is that animal breeding is now carried out on the dwarf ' homestead farms ' and subsidiary plots, instead of the small farms as previously. The newly organised collectives cannot provide either the animals or the labour in sufficient number. Official pronouncements are unanimous in this respect. If meat consumption increased in 1959–60, this can only be explained by the increased slaughter of animals.

Incomes and Standard of Living

After the war real wages increased until 1949, declined from 1949 to 1953, and began to rise again from the autumn of that year, catching up with the 1949 level in 1956, when they were slightly higher than the level of the year before the outbreak of the war. As the middle strata of society with their independent incomes have practically disappeared, real wages rose above their pre-war level only for manual workers in industry and for agricultural workers ; the real income of all other sections

12 *MSE*, 1959, p. 146.
13 Ferenc Vagi, *Kozgazdasagi Szemle* (Economic Review), 1960/8–9, p. 974.

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(especially of clerical workers, teachers, and employees in commerce) declined.

The year 1957 brought considerable wage increases to urban workers. These were unquestionably one repercussion of the revolution; they certainly cannot be explained by an increase in productivity; industrial wages in 1957 exceeded the wages of 1956 by 14 per cent, whereas productivity increased much less. The incomes of all wage earners from 1956 are shown as follows:

	Monthly nominal wages in forint	*1956=100*	*Cost of living index (1956=100)*	*Index of real wages (1956=100)*
1956 ...	1255	100	100	100
1957 ...	1445	117	102·5	114
1958 ...	1480	120	103	116·5
1959 ...	1539	124·5	101·5	123
1960 ...	1582	128	103	124·5

Source: *MSE*, 1959, pp. 65 and 175; *SHK*, 1961/3, pp. 59, 67, and 73.

The declining rate of increase in wages and salaries since 1957 can be explained by political factors ('the situation was consolidated'), partly by changes in productivity. As productivity as a whole is increasing only slowly, it is impossible to step up investments and at the same time maintain the rate of wage increases introduced in 1956–57. The economic plan published in 1961 envisages an average wage increase of 1·8 per cent, which could be easily nullified by the present rise in food prices on the free market. An improved standard of living is relegated to a most modest place in the second five-year plan, beginning in 1961.

It is much more difficult to estimate the change in the income of the peasantry. No statistics on this have been published for a number of years, not even on the size of the agricultural population. But if we compare the 32–34 per cent increase in the total wage bill with the 22 per cent increase in the total consumption of the whole population, we must conclude that the income of the peasantry is either stagnant or increasing only very slowly.

It is probable that once a peasant with a medium-sized holding enters a collective, his income declines. This opinion is based partly on personal observation, partly on theoretical considerations. Would it otherwise have been necessary to cajole the Hungarian peasantry for more than a decade into joining the collectives? Would they not have joined voluntarily if it were true that they could get a higher income with less work? The peasant certainly works less in a collective than when he is cultivating his own land. But less work means less income, even if the government supports the collective farms with capital.

One thing that has not changed since 1957 is the poor state of distribution and unsatisfactory quality of the goods supplied. There is always some temporary shortage of one commodity or another,

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sometimes confined only to one part of the country or even to a part of town. A typical extract from the 1961 press : ' Whose fault is it that the population is short of drinks ? The brewery experts maintain that the glass industry supplied only 3,500,000 beer-bottles of the 15 million promised, and that 17 waggon loads of these were faulty '.

* * * *

The Hungarian revolution of 1956 proved costly to the Soviet Union although the lesson was not given in vain. Kadar and his team have been governing Hungary since 1957 with that lesson in mind.

The restoration of the economy started at the beginning of 1957 in an unfavourable situation. The general strike provoked by Soviet military intervention practically paralysed economic life for several months, and stocks of goods were nearing exhaustion. The resumption of production encountered not only psychological difficulties ; it was realised that the targets of the first five-year plan could not be maintained, especially in the field of heavy industry. However, the economic revival could count on some important reserves. As soon as the peasants were free to leave the collectives, their production increased and the abolition of compulsory deliveries to the state, one of the most popular acts of the revolutionary government, was wisely maintained by its successor.

Similarly, small-scale private industry enjoyed a certain amount of elbowroom, and contributed to the production of consumer goods, especially those which cannot be easily standardised. Thirdly, countries in the Soviet bloc contributed both financially and by supplying goods. In 1957 Hungary received goods to the value of about 5 milliard forint on credit. Finally, as the rate of investment declined, there was an increase in consumer income. Since 1949, largely as a consequence of over-investment, wages had lagged behind the increase of productivity.

These favourable conditions were in operation for the years 1957–58 ; from the autumn of 1958, when the government felt strong enough to move away gradually from the policy adopted in 1957, the rate of wage increase has slowed down, the private sector has declined, and, most important, a new wave of collectivisation started which by 1961 practically finished off the small peasant farms.

Nevertheless, with the exception of agriculture, there is no complete reversal to the economic policy of the pre-1956 period, and even less to the pre-1953 period. Since 1957 a more rational spirit has been shown in the direction of economic life, an interest in the profitability of current or projected activities. The search for an ' economic optimum ' became one of the basic activities of national planning ; at present the existing price structure is the greatest obstacle to finding an optimum solution, although the price revision of January 1959 did constitute a step in the right direction.

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PLANNING, PRODUCTION, PRICES

J. Baracs

THE first Hungarian five-year plan (1950–54) contained serious errors both in the aims outlined and the methods of planning adopted. After the first change in policy in July 1953 the Communist Party accepted the view that targets had been over-ambitious, but the only criticism of the methods of planning was an article by G. Peter, President of the Statistical Office, published in the December 1954 issue of *Kozgazdasagi Szemle* (*Economic Review*), which however had no effect. The reforms of July 1953–March 1955 modified the aims but left the planning methods unchanged; discussion of these began during the summer of 1956, after the twentieth CPSU congress in Moscow.

At that time a most comprehensive and critical article by the same writer in the July–August issue of the same journal opened a discussion which continued into the following year. Among the many works on planning written at that time, J. Kornai's *Over-Centralisation in Economic Administration* (published in English in 1959), was comprehensive and informative, although his enquiry was limited to light industry. From 1958 onwards the discussion gradually lost its critical edge, an exception being the book by Bela A. Balassa, *The Hungarian Experience in Economic Planning* (also published in English in 1959). Although based on the Hungarian experience, it deals with almost every theoretical problem of economic planning.

Discussion concerned the experience of the period 1950–56, when many mistakes were made which were not necessarily inherent in the planning system, for example, the trend towards autarky, over-ambitious planning, and neglect of raw material needs. Although it is relevant primarily to Hungarian development, the discussion is of general importance in so far as the manifestations described are typical of every planned economy of the Soviet type; the mechanisms released by these mistakes and the consequent heavy economic losses are clearly formulated. One basic assumption was shared by all the economists—that the planning system itself was faultless, any mistakes therefore being the result of faulty decisions by the central planning authorities. The planning system could be made to work perfectly if the correct methods were used. This political restriction on the limits of discussion made it impossible to reach final theoretical conclusions; on the other hand, the discussion was more than a catalogue of errors committed; it showed the complex repercussions of these errors throughout the entire mechanism of a Soviet-type planned economy.

During 1956–57, criticism of planning methods in Hungary was directed at the excessive centralisation of decision-making, which meant

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that production became disconnected from economic needs ; the rigidity of the price system, and the lack of correspondence between costs and prices ; the inefficient allocation of resources ; and the low profitability of investments. All these problems are of course closely inter-related.

When prices are incorrect it is obviously impossible to invest economically. The profitability of investments can be calculated in monetary terms only through prices. If costs are incorrectly reflected in prices, a planned investment may be profitable on paper, but actually makes a loss, or at least yields less than an equal investment in an alternative project. In fact, the profitability of investments was not even brought into the calculations for many years.

The connection between excessive centralisation and incorrect prices is equally obvious. The Hungarian economists derived the necessity of reforming the price system from the harmful consequences of over-centralised planning. If there were economic prices, profitability could be made the basis of the bonus system and on this premise the management of individual firms could exercise a greater degree of independence. Profitability based on correct prices could be made the factor regulating production. However, if prices are incorrect, the profits of single firms may be actual losses for the economy as a whole. All these factors, plus the bureaucratic bias existing in every planned economy, mean that it is the central planning authorities who decide upon every detail of a firm's activity. This system not only makes planning complicated ; some parts of the plan cannot be carried out, and the execution of others cannot be checked. It is impossible to determine in advance the details of consumption or of foreign trade, while agricultural output has its own laws.

THE first years of economic planning in Hungary showed an increasing trend towards centralisation. It is characteristic of that time that the number of instructions issued to individual firms in 1956 varies between 300 and 1,000. Of these, from 3 to 10 were singled out by the authorities as worthy of attention by managers, since they provided incentives under the bonus system.[1] The bonus system was concerned with creating material incentives for the fulfilment of the plan, but even if it were successful it could not eliminate the contradictions inherent in over-centralisation. Even these few instructions, it was pointed out, had been wrong. For years the system had provided incentives only for the quantitative fulfilment and overfulfilment of the plan, but had neglected such questions as reducing the costs of production, and improving the quality and finish of products.[2] Kornai demonstrated repeatedly why it

1 Cf. Peter, op cit., p. 705.
2 Cf. I. Varga, ' The Opinions of the Committee of Economic Experts ', *Kozgazdasagi Szemle*, October–December 1957, p. 998; Peter, op. cit., p. 695.

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was wrong to connect the payment of premiums with the exact fulfilment of the plan, when the plan itself was distorted as a result of excessive centralisation and of errors in the price system. Premiums can be won by trickery, by changing the composition of production programmes, and by distorting the figures for unfinished products. The more highly priced and valuable the article, and the higher the raw material content, the better will the index of labour appear. In other words, productivity appears to have risen, although in fact no change has taken place in the production programme. In the absence of a correct price system, adequately indicating economic gains and losses, instructions (in this example, higher productivity) can be fulfilled in a way which causes economic loss (in this case, waste of raw materials). In such cases the bonus system, designed as a reward for improved performance, rewards those who have caused economic losses. Costing plans are also very loose and can be abused, for instance, by diregard for quality. But again, improved cost plans can also shift production in the wrong direction. In Soviet-type planned economies the prices of raw materials are generally fixed too low (the most outstanding example in Hungary was the price of coal which had been heavily subsidised). Cost plans could be fulfilled by means of a parsimonious wage policy accompanied by a lavish use of raw materials.

Hungary is poor in raw materials, and one of the best chapters in Kornai's book demonstrates, in this context of material supplies, how certain typical mechanisms of the planned economy lead to certain typical mistakes. Shortages of material tend to accentuate the phenomena of periodic fluctuations in production, and frequently lead to lower standards of quality and to serious waste as the enterprises are driven to substitute more expensive material for the cheaper ones in short supply ; they may even have to use sub-standard material. The lack of adequate stocks also handicaps organisations engaged in importing raw materials. It is an inevitable consequence of all these problems that chronic shortages of raw materials increase the centralised administrative direction of the economy. ' On the one hand, the shortage of materials is one of the factors which has led the authorities to go in for minutely detailed planning. On the other hand, this very same shortage of materials is one among a number of factors which renders the exact observance of these plans impossible ' (Kornai, p. 172).

The defects of the price system brought to light throughout the debate can be summarised as follows : costs of production do not appear in prices at the place where they actually arise, and are therefore not reflected correctly in prices. Or, to put it in another way, prices are independent of the socially necessary inputs. The methods of price fixing

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applied in heavy industry, as against those used in light industry or the food industry, were particularly criticised. The scarcity of capital and raw materials is not expressed in the prices which are determined by wage costs. The difficulty of establishing correct prices is aggravated by the uncertainty of cost calculations. If a commodity is produced by one enterprise only, its price is determined by the condition of that enterprise, and depends solely on the productivity potential of its equipment. When more than one enterprise produces the given commodity, the price may be fixed arbitrarily, either by the average or the marginal costs. But even if appropriate prices were fixed, this would solve the problem only at the time of their introduction, because price rigidity does not allow for changing conditions. The system of administrative price-fixing always becomes obsolete, the Hungarian price system at this time being particularly outdated as it was based on 1950 cost figures.

ONE argument which is repeated often by Hungarian economists against the existing price system is that producer prices are not linked to consumer prices, and thus to the relation between supply and demand. In general, prices do not take into account the balance of supply and demand. Consequently industrial firms are not interested in consumer prices. Supply and demand change faster than administratively fixed prices. Therefore, even if a balance between supply and demand is brought about by prices at the time they are fixed, it is probable that the actual prices will soon be outdated and not correspond to equilibrium prices.

It follows that the profitability of individual enterprises does not truly reflect the success of their work and thus prices are not appropriate regulators of the process of production. On the other hand, the economic plan cannot regulate all the details of production as it should in the absence of a correctly functioning price system. Thus, not even production programmes can guarantee the balance between supply and demand for each commodity. These failures of planning restore to the price system a certain capacity to influence production ; but, given the errors of the price system, this influence often works to the detriment of the national economy. Another weakness of the system to which reference was made was that consumer prices are fixed mainly on political, and not economic, grounds.

The proposals for reforming the price system suggested, first, that relative prices should reflect relative costs, in order to avoid conflicts of interest between individual concerns and the economy as a whole ; second, that prices should establish an equilibrium between supply and demand, so that production corresponds with the needs of the population, and so avoid scarcities in certain commodities and unsaleable stocks

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of others. It was demonstrated that neglect of these criteria leads to an uneconomic use of resources and to a less than optimal satisfaction of economic needs. There was, however, no general agreement on the methods of embodying these desiderata within the framework of a planned economy, for this would presuppose that prices react flexibly to fluctuating relations between supply and demand, and that production programmes, being determined by profitability, would fluctuate in line with changing prices. This type of mechanism is, however, inconceivable in a Soviet-type planned economy.

The political limitations of economic arguments in Hungary are nowhere demonstrated more clearly than in the discussion on the problems of the price system. The logical consequence of the debate would have been to introduce a form of market mechanism; but even the boldest dared mention this only with extreme caution. Some reformers suggested the introduction of freely moving prices for certain consumer goods only; others wanted to have a maximum limit even for these prices, but everybody wished to keep the system of administrative price fixing for the widest range of commodities. Within these limits, they tried to make price formation more flexible and to relate prices more closely to costs. More radical suggestions might have been construed as deviationism on the Yugoslav pattern, and this, even in 1957, would have been highly imprudent.

These contradictions explain the duality of the Hungarian discussion. On the one hand, the reformers demonstrated the harmful effects of the existing price system; on the other, B. Csikos Nagy, President of the Price Office responsible for the elaboration of a new price system, demonstrated that most of the suggestions were irreconcilable with the planning system. His main arguments were that a system of freely moving prices would endanger planning stability. In the first instance, the level of real wages would be decisively affected and this would upset the planned wage policy. By influencing real wages, freely moving prices would change the consumption fund of the economy and thus distort the planned distribution of the national income. So long as there is a general scarcity of commodities, free formation of prices cannot be allowed. But even in a situation of general plenty, it cannot be assumed (as most reformers apparently do) that competition among enterprises would tend to lower the prices of consumer goods. In a socialist economy enterprises in the same branch of industry are directed by a single organisation (trust), and thus monopolistic agreement among the enterprises is more probable than open competition. For the same reason no price system is possible in which the profitability of single enterprises could determine their production; the profit rate will differ for each commodity and thus the assortment of production programmes

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might strongly affect the profitability of individual enterprises. Therefore, in an economy with fixed prices but without plans regulating the details of production, the profitability principle might conceivably work against the interest of the national economy by diverting production from the planned line and by failure to use existing potential to the full. His final conclusion is that the regulation of the production process should not be left to price fluctuations.

Nagy's views were reflected in the new price system introduced on 1 January 1959. The defects of the old system were reduced in scope but not in substance. The new prices reflected costs more accurately than the earlier prices and the new principles of price fixing contained some elements of elasticity. The system of central price fixing was retained. But costs have changed since the introduction of the new price system, and prices are no longer in accordance. Thus conflicts between the interests of firms and those of the national economy are increasing, and the profit-sharing system frequently tends to divert incentive in the wrong direction. The tendency of the bureaucratic system to revert to central decision-making, thereby curbing the independent initiative of the subsidiary bodies, is again apparent. Balassa drew the conclusion that in a Soviet-type planned economy no method of price fixing is conceivable which establishes a permanent equilibrium between supply and demand and achieves an efficient allocation of economic resources.

Investment policy, too, in so far as it was connected with the adverse Hungarian experience, came in for discussion. According to Balassa's calculation, the share of the national income devoted to investment was, in certain periods of the first five-year plan, as high as 35 per cent, considerably more than the 25 per cent considered 'normal' by Soviet economists. The results, strikingly poor considering the tremendous efforts involved, were attributed to various causes. As we have already seen, a wrong price system made the calculation of profitability impossible and so prevented rational planning of investments. The discussion emphasised the harmful effects of the regulation which permitted enterprises to pay no interest on their fixed capital. The allocation of fixed capital (and this was true partly of working capital too) free of interest, prevented the price system from reflecting the scarcity of capital, and killed incentive on the part of the enterprises to organise their investments economically. On the other hand, the same factor introduced an erratic element into the allocation of investment funds by the central authorities. The neglect of profitability calculations reinforced the trend towards autarky, as it freed the planners from the need to pay attention to world market prices. Other mistakes emphasised in the discussion on investments were as follows : economic considerations were neglected in favour of political, or, to put it in the formula of M. Turanszky, 'subjective

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decisions were made'; awards granted to investing enterprises provided no incentive for the economic use of investment funds. Only a small part of the investments made actually raised productivity during the first five-year plan; an indication of this was that although only 21 per cent of the total industrial investment funds were used for machinery, 56 per cent were devoted to construction costs. Balassa summed up the position (p. 188):

> 1. The enterprise endeavours to obtain as much in investment funds as possible; 2. these investment funds are demanded (and often obtained) even without sufficient justification; 3. the enterprise is inclined to demand an excessive variant even if a modest one would suffice; 4. the investment frequently appears as the most convenient solution to the enterprise's problems in the sphere of plan fulfilment and profitability; 5. the gratuitous character of the investment funds tempts the enterprise to cover some of the costs of current production at the expense of the investment account; 6. investment funds being appropriated yearly and not transferable for the next year, needed or un-needed, the investor will spend the available funds at the end of the year, since otherwise these would be lost (in general, funds are often spent even if their use is unjustified, in order to fulfil the investment plans in monetary terms); 7. since additional funds can generally be obtained to complete the project, the investor is unconcerned if actual costs exceed planned costs.

Early in 1958—more than ten years after the launching of planned economy in Hungary—a regulation was issued by the Planning Office ordering that all investment decisions were to be preceded by the preparation of profitability calculations, but the suggestion of the reformers to charge interest on fixed capital was rejected. But although the old method of granting fixed funds was retained, and in spite of the defects of the new price system, the profitability of new investments improved perceptibly compared with the earlier prodigality.

Thus the economic discussion had certain practical results; it led to the abolition of excessive centralisation as well as to improvements in the price system and investment policy. The reforms contain, of course, an element of compromise which is political in origin. Although it did not distinguish clearly between failures which are inherent in a planned economy, and those which might have been avoided, the Hungarian debate has had a measure of success. At least it has restrained the planning authorities from committing avoidable errors.

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HUNGARY AND COMECON

George Kemeny

HUNGARY'S economic relations with the outside world since the war are similar to those of the other East European countries in the Soviet orbit. Political influence was to be reinforced by economic arrangements designed to tie the economy to the Russian market and Russian supplies. Before the war there had been little trade between Hungary and Russia, or between Hungary and its neighbours in Eastern and Central Europe ; her most important trading partners were Germany, Austria, Italy, and Great Britain. One of the primary objects of postwar Soviet policy was to detach Hungary as well as other East-Central European countries from their Western connections. Redirecting the flow of trade from West to East was fostered first by Hungarian reparations to the Soviet Union, later by successive trade agreements, in which the USSR had top priority and the popular democracies ranked second. Trade with the West was treated as a residual item, retained only for the purpose of acquiring indispensable materials as well as high quality equipment. As a result, the share of Russia and the PDs in Hungarian exports rose from less than ten per cent to approximately 65 per cent, while that of Western Europe was reduced from 65 per cent to less than thirty.

Hungary emerged from the second world war as an agrarian country in the process of industrialisation. In 1950, after a period of reconstruction, she embarked on an enforced industrialisation programme on strictly Stalinist lines. During the decade that followed, the country's economic and social structure underwent a drastic change. In spite of temporary severe setbacks, the industrial labour force was doubled and the surplus of labour in agriculture absorbed. At the start of this period slightly more than half the active population was engaged in agriculture. This proportion decreased to roughly one third by 1960, while the active industrial population rose from one-quarter to one-third of the total gainfully employed. These changes were bound to affect Hungary's foreign economic relations. Hungary has achieved a degree of industrialisation comparable to that of Czechoslovakia prior to the second world war, and there was consequently a definite shift in the composition of foreign trade. This did not necessarily imply the disappearance of an agricultural surplus, much less the need to import food, but it was clear that industry had to account for a larger proportion of exports in order to keep the economy going.

In discussing Hungary's economic development, it should be remembered that the country is poor in industrial raw materials. There

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are fairly rich bauxite deposits and a few years ago uranium ore was discovered. These are available for export, but there is no reason to assume that the aggregate exports of bauxite and uranium ore would perceptibly change Hungary's balance of trade. As the substantial surplus in grain and animal products has vanished, Hungary has no significant export surplus in any primary commodity. She is in this respect in a weaker position than Poland with her coal, or Rumania with her oil. As it is, industrialisation involves strong dependence on imported raw materials. Thus the combined effect of industrial growth and of the neglect of agriculture made the foreign trade position extremely vulnerable.

The first, outwardly inactive period of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon or CMEA) from 1949 to 1954 coincided with the first bout of Stalinist planning in Hungary and in the other PDs. The activities of the organisation were heavily veiled in secrecy; the efforts it made to promote integration by fostering intra-orbit trade have never been disclosed, but it is clear from what actually happened that it made no attempt to coordinate economic plans; the national economic plans showed marked tendencies towards autarky. A small country like Hungary, with about 9 million consumers, embarked on an all-round industrialisation programme instead of devising a plan based on specialisation and international division of labour. Rakosi's and Gero's plan was to create a replica of the Russian industrial structure with exaggerated emphasis on heavy industry. It was the height of folly to construct vast iron and steel works on the sands of the Danube more than a thousand miles from adequate ore deposits. Low grade ore had to be brought to the works by rail from Krivoi Rog in the eastern Ukraine. The major part of the foundry coke reached the furnaces at irrationally high freight charges. As a result the cost of importing the raw materials to produce one ton of steel exceeded the cost of a ton of finished steel imported from abroad.

Burdened by these unreasonable basic costs, an engineering industry was brought into being, sufficient both to support industrial growth in Hungary, and to contribute to Russian needs. As a result of this rapid expansion, engineering products became the main Hungarian export.

AFTER the death of Stalin new ideas on intra-orbit cooperation came up for discussion, and integration became the catchword. A master plan was devised for the more efficient development of resources. As a first step towards more rational cooperation, the economic plans of the Soviet Union and the PDs were to be synchronised. The second Hungarian five-year plan, due to start in 1956, was accordingly brought into step with the sixth Soviet plan, but the events in Poland in October

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1956 and the revolt in Hungary brought this plan to an end. In the meantime, more realistic tasks to be tackled by Comecon were formulated. While propaganda for an all-embracing master plan was dropped, committees were set up to work out schemes for industrial specialisation. Projects for intra-orbit division of labour centred firstly on the engineering industry. Within this division, Hungary was assigned the task of producing telecommunication equipment, precision instruments, certain types of machine tools, agricultural machinery, and railway equipment. Through the large-scale production of a limited number of products a higher level of industrial efficiency was to be reached. But if rationality was to be promoted in one direction, it was curbed in another by the continued insistence on the priority of heavy industry, as shown in the three-year plan (1958–60) and the current five-year plan. Large scale investment for expanding the steel works in Stalinvaros is being made, augmenting the losses already incurred by misguided capital expenditure. Steel output is scheduled to rise by 50 per cent during the five-year period.

Pre-war Hungary exported large quantities of primary products in exchange for manufactured goods. The pattern of trade is now quite different. Manufactures have become the principal exports while most of the imports consist of raw materials. In the west an exchange of industrial goods against primary products is by no means disadvantageous. This does not apply to the ' socialist world market ', in which, because of the incoherence of the price system, world market prices are accepted as standards for intra-bloc trade, but it is by no means easy to fix the ' world market prices ' for all the varieties of specialised engineering products, and this allows considerable scope for bargaining when prices are established for trade agreements. The negotiators of Stalin's Russia ruthlessly exploited their strong bargaining position. In trading with the USSR, Hungary as a country exporting industrial products suffered from adverse terms of trade, by having to sell them at low prices and to purchase raw materials at high prices. A careful study of the trade between the USSR and the PDs revealed that this discrimination was more pronounced against Hungary than against the group as a whole.[1] However, under the impact of the 1956 revolution, prices were revised to Hungary's advantage. Surprisingly enough, in 1958 a deterioration set in again, but it did not wipe out the previous improvement.

Manipulation of the terms of trade added to the difficulties produced by the general course of economic policy, which meant that Hungarian manufactured products were sold below cost even if they obtained the

[1] H. Mendershausen, *Memorandum on the Terms of Trade between the Soviet Union and Smaller Communist Countries*, Rand Corporation, 1959.

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world market price. The Hungarian communists are aware of the gravity of the cost problem. It was reported in the Hungarian communist press that Czechoslovak engineering works, although technically at the same level as similar establishments in Hungary, produced at half the cost. This is the more serious as it refers to the leading industry which was expected to carry the main burden of the growing export trade. In the course of the five-year plan engineering was scheduled to expand by 85 per cent, within a general industrial growth rate of 60–65 per cent. Under these conditions it was only with difficulty that foreign trade could be kept in balance.

Though industrial production had by 1959 overcome the heavy setback suffered during and following the revolution, the balance of trade remained adverse, and the deficit increased in 1960. Although in some respects the three-year plan (1958–60) was successful, Hungary remains a problem child of Comecon, a liability rather than an asset. It seems strange therefore that Hungary should play an active part in the communist economic offensive. Since 1959 agreements have been signed with a number of countries for the delivery of capital goods and the construction of industrial plants. The financing is to be undertaken by Hungary on a long-term basis. Outer Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, the United Arab Republic, Ghana, and Cuba, possibly also India and Indonesia, will benefit from these agreements. Under these Hungary's financial commitments will approximately equal the amount of assistance offered by the Soviet Union after the revolution.

THE part assigned to Hungary in trade in these strategic areas seems more a recognition of the technical capacity of Hungarian industry than of the country's financial strength. Hungary's economy would become much sounder if her resources were utilised rationally. One of the country's main resources is the fertile soil, agriculture being, in spite of rapid industrial expansion, the biggest single industry. But its development has been held back rather than promoted. In the days of Stalin and Rakosi, farming was neglected in order to build up heavy industry. Throughout the past decade collectivisation has been very much a major issue. When Imre Nagy formed his first government, a number of collective farms were dissolved, and, after the trend had been reversed in 1955, the revolution brought the dissolution of the majority of collective farms. But, after a few years of grace, Kadar's collectivisation drive, started at the turn of 1958–59, transformed the whole of rural Hungary. The consequences were unexpected. Industrialisation had already skimmed off surplus agricultural labour, leaving some parts with a shortage of manpower. Kadar's policy resulted in a further depletion of farm hands. Elderly people and the owners themselves stayed behind,

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while the younger generation left the villages in hundreds of thousands, causing a dramatic change in the age structure of the agricultural population. The consequent dislocation dealt a blow to agricultural output. While the demand for food grew, domestic supplies lagged behind requirements. The labour shortage on the collective farms became so severe that the government decided to permit the use of hired labour. Communist planning has not succeeded in replacing the lost manpower, but inadequate supplies are not allowed to interfere with exports. In the scramble for foreign exchange, meat, grain, and other foodstuffs are shipped abroad during the early months of the agricultural season, while later on it becomes necessary to import them. The 1961 trade agreement with the Soviet Union provides for the import of bread grains amounting to about 20 per cent of an average crop. This food deficit increases dependence on the Soviet Union and affects Hungary's position within the bloc. Russia, as the main raw material supplier, provides 90 per cent of the imports of iron ore, three-quarters of the cotton, two-thirds of the timber, and all oil imports.

The development of agriculture could contribute to restoring the balance of the Hungarian economy, but it cannot solve the whole problem. Industrialisation, if pursued in an undogmatic fashion, is a further, but by no means secondary, answer. This was the opinion expressed by a committee of economists, communist and non-communist, set up in Hungary shortly after the revolution. Their report stated that Hungary should concentrate on industries which process domestic or easily obtained raw materials, and gave a guarded warning against exaggerated reliance on foreign supplies. The party rejected these suggestions. In an official statement [2] it declared that the experts had not taken into account the possibilities offered by the economic cooperation of the socialist countries and by Soviet Russia's willingness to help. Discussion on the subject has been discouraged since, but resistance to Comecon decisions has persisted in the administration. Early in 1959, Kadar found it necessary to utter a warning against the conservatism and lack of adaptability of the economic leaders. He called for more understanding of the advantages of intra-orbit division of labour, claiming that socialist common interests must overrule all other aspects in shaping the country's economy. Closer cooperation within Comecon became, therefore, the order of the day.

Cooperation as understood at present does not imply supra-national planning. It was stressed by a leading communist economist [3] that the drafting of national plans and all decisions on investment and distribution

[2] *Kozgazdasagi Szemle*, July 1958.
[3] Laszlo Hay: 'Economic Cooperation of the Socialist Countries', *Társadalmi Szemle*, June 1960.

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of manpower rest with the national government. The coordination of the plans follows as a second stage. This applies in principle to the so-called perspective (long-term) plans as well. No reference to a plan for the bloc as a whole is made; however, the main lines of development, up to 1980, have to be agreed upon in common.

It has been repeatedly stressed that relations between socialist countries should not be determined by 'the law of value'. Rather, they should be governed by the so-called 'law of proportionate development'. If this has any meaning, it indicates that, whenever expedient, cost considerations are subordinated to political decisions. Comecon decisions no doubt exert an influence on national planning and the indications are that the influence will grow stronger. The sectors of the plan backed by Comecon enjoy top priority. Unquestionably the interweaving of Hungary's economy with that of the bloc is being speeded up by Comecon's activities. Friction and tension tend to grow at the same time as directives and interference from outside arouse resistance. Increased integration certainly reinforces the dependence on Russia.

Lack of an adequate yardstick for measuring and comparing costs defeats any attempt to determine, even approximately, the economies achieved by specialising production. However, there is no reason to doubt that some costs have been reduced in some branches of industry. These reductions cannot outweigh the consequences of the inefficiency of labour in agriculture and the irrationality of the continual extension of heavy industry.

In conclusion, despite the rationalisation of industrial activities in some sectors, cooperation on Comecon lines does not ease internal economic strains. An over-ambitious investment programme competing with exports, foreign debt repayment, and commitments imposed by Comecon in the shape of credits to under-developed countries, exerts undue pressure on resources. The solution sought by the Kadar regime consists in imposing higher working norms whilst freezing wages. It is the old method of extorting bigger output without adequate reward, and this method, if applied consistently, involves increasing hardship. Hungary, however, has entered a phase of industrialisation in which high standards of technical skill and competence are required, and at this stage coercion is less effective than incentives. It should perhaps be borne in mind that this issue also faced post-Stalinist Russia and induced Khrushchev to concede that higher living standards were necessary for the Russian people.

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BUDAPEST REVISITED

Anthony Rhodes

IF undue importance appears to have been attached in this account to the writers of Hungary, it is because, apart from the role they played in the 1956 revolution—and in all previous revolutions in this land—they have always been one of the most important sections of the community. Anyone who has established himself in the Hungarian literary world, even in the most modest way, has a greater standing among the population than any politician or practical man of affairs. They show less of the exaggerated respect we display towards our military and political rulers. It is as if the Hungarians have seen that the practical men have done them little good throughout their tragic history, and they turn away from them to something more permanent. This is particularly true today—five years after the revolution. Kadar, Munnich, Marosan and the others who seized power in November 1956 are not so much disliked, as regarded as non-entities—compared with Dery, Illyes, Nemeth, Hay, Tamasi, the lyrical poet Sandor Woeres, and a host of other writers who are busy at work again.

In a poor country, where there is not much to spend money on, literature means a great deal, and books are cheap. The Hungarians have always been quick to spot a real writer, and distinguish him from those who have obtained their reputation largely through governmental influence. Thus, the novelist Bela Illyes, a competent storyteller it is true, but also a government man if ever there was one (he came back from Russia in 1945 in Russian army officer's uniform), still has his books published in many tens of thousands of copies, but his sales are relatively poor. The books of Laszlo Nemeth, on the other hand, who is now being allowed to publish again, are sold out almost immediately. Everyone knows that Nemeth, owing to his great reputation in 1945, was asked to become an honorary member of the Party, a post carrying with it a highly paid professorship at the University of Budapest. He refused, preferring to go as a school-teacher to the provinces, barely earning a living for his large family. As a result of this 'refusal to collaborate in the building of socialism', he could not publish his books for six years.

Now this sixty-year-old essayist, novelist, and playwright, has just published his new set of essays, *Sajkodi Estek* (*Evenings at Sajkodi*); Sajkodi is the village on Lake Balaton he retires to regularly. The five thousand copies were sold out while I was in Budapest. It contains an important essay showing that the Socialist Utopia can never be achieved, but that the transformation of 'communist life' into 'human life' is

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possible. Another essay is in the form of instructions to the youth of Hungary, telling them not to try to change the world again. Only a global upheaval, he contends, can achieve this. This today, he says, is unthinkable.

This book was criticised two months ago in the party newspaper *Nepszabadsag*, but no attempt has been made to ban it, nor does this seem likely under the present conditions. The regime is now biding its time, believing that in ten, twenty, even thirty years, these difficult, older writers, will have passed on, and their successors will have become indoctrinated enough to be more amenable.

And yet it is the problem of these successors, the young, which is the real problem facing ' communist writing ' or ' Marxist-Leninist literature ' today. Mr Gyula Csak expresses it bitterly in *Elet es Irodalom*, (31 March 1961). ' The writers of the newest generation ', he says, ' have broken away from the traditions of living literature. They all cook up the same soup. To use an expression taken from sport, they feel the lack of experienced trainers.'

His first sentence describes the problem admirably. The ' writers of the newest generation ' are the young proletarians and peasants of literary talent, such as the poets Ferenc Juhasz and Laszlo Nagy, and others whom the regime ' discovered ' in the late forties, and to whom it granted aid in the form of many scholarships. In his early work, Juhasz was the ideal young communist poet, writing about the lives and problems of agricultural workers. But when he saw what was going on around him in Rakosi's Hungary, he began to change, and wrote an epic on the Tatar invasion which could not be published, owing to its topical innuendoes. His poem *The Prodigal Country* (a land which kills its own children), became a kind of bible to the young revolutionaries in 1956. It is about the peasants' revolt in 1540, but it is again full of topical allusions. After the revolution, Juhasz had a nervous breakdown and spent some months in a mental hospital. I met Juhasz on two occasions in Budapest, and found him recovered, but he is still not publishing, and certainly has not returned to the Party fold.

THIS communist call to its lost children is echoed by Darvas, the President of the Writers Union, in a speech to the union on 27 February 1961 (reported in *Elet es Irodalom*, 10 March 1961), where he refers to these ' silent ' young writers. ' I consider ', he said, ' that the temporary absence of Ferenc Juhasz and Laszlo Nagy is a very grave problem.'

The Party is handling these young renegades as carefully as it handles Nemeth and the older writers, hoping that somehow one day they may return to the fold that gave them birth. Some of these young, once

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communist writers, have even become infected with Western ideas. On 5 May 1961, *Elet es Irodalom* published a long article by Bela Kopeczi, the head of the state publishing department, on the appearance of Existentialism in Hungary. After a dissertation on Sartre, he examines the works of a number of young Hungarian writers who are influenced by Sartre and Heidegger.

His article is balanced, very different from the onslaught which would have been delivered in Rakosi's time. In particular, he discusses the works of younger writers like Ferenc Juhasz, Geza Ottlik (author of the popular *School on the Border*, published in 1959), Magda Szabo, Gyula Hernadi, and a number of others ; he examines them critically, but not necessarily unfavourably. All these writers are Existentialist, in that ' they regard man as an isolated individual developing according to his own rules '. Magda Szabo, author of one of the best recent novels, *The Deer* (which is to be published in England), reveals ' fatalism ' in her work. ' Her heroes destroy themselves like the heroes of Camus '. Geza Ottlik's work is based on the highly un-Marxist adage that ' our civil life is a vacation in the summer '. Then there is Hernadi, whose books reveal the general cynicism prevailing throughout Hungary in the years immediately after 1956. He gets rapped on the knuckles for his depression, and is now, I am told, having difficulty in getting anything published.

In short, all these young writers who should, after twelve years of communist indoctrination, be good Marxists, regarding the writer not as an individual, but as a member of a team concerned with communal welfare and ' social progress ', reveal the ' decadent ' Western influences.

The point, I think, about Mr Kopeczi's interesting article is that it has been printed at all—although, of course, he proves finally that these writers are in error, and that later they will see their error.

Mr Kopeczi, as head of the state publishing apparatus, is a man of considerable power in the literary world. He comes directly under the Minister of Culture—as of course does all literary, university, scholastic, theatrical, cinematographic and journalistic life. This means that the Minister of Culture and his colleagues wield a degree of power unthinkable to us in England. In the days before 1956, the days of the cultural dictator Revai, this power was consistently abused. If there was any doubt about a play or a book he, the redoubtable Revai, had the last word. All the critics watched him when he attended the theatre ; by yawning or clapping he could make or break a play.

It is the same in theory today, except that the Minister of Culture is no Revai. She is a woman, Miss Benke, an elementary schoolmistress by profession, whose chief interest is in primary education. From all accounts she is what a Hungarian writer who had suffered much in the

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Revai days described to me as *une brave fille*. She leaves the purely cultural side to her deputy, the ex-peasant Gyorgy Aczel. He had a difficult time under Rakosi, who put him, like so many other working-class men who had graduated into the intellectual classes, in prison for ' deviationist views '. He is now, of course, a sound regime man (or he would not occupy such a post), and when he received me in his ministry he wore the approved badge of office, an open-necked shirt.

I had an interesting conversation with him and found him pleasant enough. All the same, it filled me with foreboding to think of the almost limitless power of this man over my writer colleagues—the new aspiring ones particularly, rather than the established men. If one can imagine any single English publisher in charge not only of every other publisher in England, but having the last word in what plays shall be put on, what films should be shown, what foreign books shall be translated, as well as controlling, in conjunction with his superior, all the newspapers, the entire educational system of England, Oxford, Cambridge, the red-brick universities, all the schools from Eton down to the smallest council school, one obtains some notion of the power reposing in such a man and his ministry. It is surely asking too much from human nature.

English writers who grumble about their publishers would do well to remember that, whatever they may feel about them, there are at least thirty of them, and if one publisher doesn't take their book, there are twenty-nine others who may. Hungarian writers have only two publishers to approach, *Magveto* and *Szepirodalmi*, and both are state owned. (A word must be said in favour of the *Europa* Publishing House in Budapest, which publishes exclusively foreign literature in translation. It is now trying to enlarge its scope and introduce more modern Western writers to Hungary. It also produces an excellent section of European classics, in paperbacks, at the price of a cup of coffee. These books are on every bookstand in the streets or railway stations all over the country.)

SOME of the writers I talked to had been members of the Party before 1956, but they had not rejoined, although invited to do so. Before 1954 they had to join the Party—in order to make a living. Now, this was not necessary.

A young man who is courageously trying to make his living as a writer and has not joined the Communist Party, summed up the literary situation very well. ' Before 1954 a writer ', he said, ' if he wanted to make a living, had to satisfy two requirements, *in this order of importance* : One : to receive the benediction of the Party. Two : to receive the approval of the public. Now the same things are true, but the order is reversed. You cannot achieve the first, unless you have achieved the second '.

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A certain relaxation has been allowed, not only to the authors of repute, but also to the more popular brand of writers. Before 1953, no modern Western books or plays, let alone such trivia as detective stories or American 'musicals', were permitted. Today, owing to the greater influence of popular opinion, a number of these 'decadent' Western features are allowed. Indeed, there are now some odd similarities with popular writing and journalism in the West.

There is Clara Feher, who is immensely popular as a playwright, combining sentiment and a furtive suggestion of sex, with enormous success, not only in Hungary but in Russia, Poland, and the other satellites. When I met her, she was off on a prolonged holiday tour with her husband, to Russia, Poland, France, Italy—on their own of course and in a smart new car. Such a woman now earns a fortune.

Then there is Laszlo Passuth, whom I spoke to in his new house at Tihany on Lake Balaton. His historical works have always been immensely popular. During the Rakosi period he was not allowed to publish, because Revai, the cultural dictator, considered his writing *kitsch*. But when I met him, he was engaged on an historical novel about the life of Velasquez, which will certainly be published. He is now making an excellent living, entirely by the once despised historical novel. The same can be said for the old blind writer, Gyorgy Szanto, a witty and delightful man, whom I met in his house. His popular historical novels, condemned under Revai, are now on sale and in constant demand.

Then there is an entirely new kind of popular writer, a phenomenon which has appeared since 1956, Andreas Berkesi, a former colonel in the secret police (AVO), who took to the pen after the revolution. He writes novels about the revolution, but from the AVO point of view, full of cloak and dagger situations, sinister Western agents, and romantic midnight frontier crossings. His heroes are pure, honest, decent communists, who finally triumph over the clever, lying Westerners, who will descend to any depths of evil to achieve their designs.

Crime fiction is published too. Before 1956, people used to pay large sums on the black market for Agatha Christie, Simenon, and other popular Western detective writers. These 'forbidden' books were passed feverishly from house to house. But now that there is a series of them on the market, the demand seems to have diminished; and the venture was described to me by its founder as having been something of a commercial flop. They are admittedly highly priced, but this at least shows greater understanding of human psychology on the part of the regime.

I mention this so-called *kitsch* element to show that a greater variety of reading and theatrical matter is available today in Hungary. Frequently, when I turned on the radio, I found myself listening to

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American jazz. And while I was in Hungary, a reader published a request in the *Magyar Nemzet* agony column asking for 'books on dadaism, futurism, cubism, and any form of modernism'. No one would have dared to do this in Rakosi's day.

IN the dramatic world, a surer form of control can be exercised than over the poets and writers. Every theatre is supposed to produce half a dozen plays a year. Of these, two are supposed to be new Hungarian plays, two come from the Soviet Union or the other Peoples' Democracies, one or two are classics, and one perhaps may come from the West. It is easy enough to find the last two categories and Western plays, such as those by Osborne and Dürenmatt, have recently been put on with great success. The difficulty is to produce Hungarian plays on approved themes. Often the theatrical producer reaches his wits' end towards the end of the season, and collects a number of playwrights whom he entreats, 'For God's sake, you know we've got to produce something on a trans-Danubian collective! We're running behind schedule'.

Then they all work feverishly, in the Hollywood manner, one writing a part here, another a part there, until finally something is ready.

This 'cobbling' method is reputed to have functioned in the production of Darvas' recent wildly publicised play *Dawn Fire* (Darvas, an old admirer of Revai, is now President of the Writers Union). It is about a peasant trying to organise a collective farm with a rich brother, who does not want to cooperate. The rich brother burns his barn and sells all his goods. But in the end, all turns out well; he sees the truth and joins up. Here, we can still smell the flavour of the world of artificial folksiness of Stalin's times.

Another playwright who has made his name since the revolution is Lajos Mesterhazi, who has produced a number of plays about the revolution—seen from Kadar's point of view. His plays are useful propaganda, and have been widely played in Russia and the other East European countries. Mesterhazi has done so well out of them that he has been able to buy a fine house in the Var, once the aristocratic quarter of Buda. His recent play, *The Eleventh Commandment*, is about a naive but honest socialist, mesmerised by counter-revolutionary propaganda, who finds the true socialist road in the end.

While I was in Budapest, the first translation of Proust's novel to appear since the war was published. Early one morning, I saw a queue outside a bookshop. The news had gone round that fifteen thousand copies of *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu* were being put on the market. Why, I asked, this queueing? (which, I later learned, was taking place outside all the bookshops selling Proust). If the book sold out

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immediately, then presumably the authorities would reprint? It was surely a good commercial proposition? No, that was not how economics worked in matters of culture in a socialist state, I was told. Everyone knew that Proust would not appear on the market again for many years. This concession to a public anxious to read ' decadent bourgeois literature ' (and no writer can qualify for this communist condemnation better than Proust), was a limited one.

Here we have another instance of the limited or controlled nature of the liberal measures being introduced ; for the authorities know that for every liberal measure of this kind they grant, more will be demanded. And they are determined that things shall not go as far as they have in Yugoslavia or, for that matter, in Poland.

IN spite of the revolution, or one might say because of it, there is more free speech in Hungary today than in any other Eastern European country except Poland. A left-wing English journalist who was here two months ago was so impressed by ' not seeing any secret police about ', that he wrote in his paper that they had ceased to exist. I mentioned this to some Hungarian friends, who roared with laughter.

The AVO, or the new AVO one might call it, operates just as effectively, but in a different way. In Rakosi's day, the bell would ring at 5 a.m., the notorious ' milkman's call ', and you would be spirited away for your alleged ' crime ' without trial or warning. Now, you were rung up by a well-spoken but unknown voice in the late morning, and asked to come to some recognised meeting place: the Belvarosi Café is a favourite resort. Here, you are greeted by a well-spoken official in civilian clothes who offers you coffee and a cigarette. After some desultory conversation, he takes from his pocket a letter, which you recognise as the one you wrote some days ago to a relation in the West.

' In this letter ', he says, ' you wrote most critically and unfairly of the socialist society we are trying to build. You are giving the West an untruthful and biased picture of conditions. I must warn you that if you write this sort of thing again, there will be trouble '.

No one will deny that this method is an improvement on the one employed by Mr Peter Gabor and his colleagues who ran the AVO in Rakosi's time.

I also enquired into the fate of another, very different figure, dating from the 1956 days, Cardinal Mindszenty. He is still in the American Legation, where his health has improved considerably in the last two years. As he is only seventy and in full possession of all his faculties, he will presumably still be there for many years to come ; for no one knows what to do with him. Outside the American Legation, two government vehicles still wait day and night for this redoubtable opponent of the

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regime to set foot on the pavement. A year ago, he wanted to attend a Consistory in Rome, and his hosts wrote asking the government if he might have a free pass through the country, to Rome and back. The Hungarian government replied, politely but ironically, that they had no idea that the Americans were harbouring a wanted criminal, who had escaped from prison in 1956, and whose sentence still had some years to run! They regretted they could not give him a free pass.

Mindszenty's following in the country is no longer as great as it was. Among the intellectuals, even those who are absolutely anti-Kadar, it is almost nil ; they contrast his heavy-handed methods with those of the skilful Wyszynski in Poland. It is among the peasantry that the memory of this courageous man is still alive.

To sum up conditions in Hungary today I will quote an article by Andreas Nagy in the February 1961 number of *Partelet*. Writing about conditions in the factory he said, under the heading ' Not Behind Their Backs ', ' There are still cases in which a person is transferred or dismissed as the result of gossip, and there is nothing he can do about it *because the real cause is not mentioned* (his italics). Groups like floating seaweed coil around a man and drown him '.

In the basic behaviour of the Party towards the nation, then, little has changed in the last five years. But that such an article as this one in *Partelet* can be printed today—and that small concessions of the kind already described are being granted—must be counted as an improvement in the lot of the unfortunate Hungarians. They only hope that these limited improvements may continue.

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